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ABSTRACT
Infrastructure PPPs encounter unexpected changes in the technological, economic, social
and political environments over their long lifetimes. They require governance frameworks
that enable them to continue to deliver services efficiently and effectively when faced with
such uncertainties. This thesis compares and contrasts alternative governance mechanisms
that have been tried and tested over time and across geographies, with a focus on India.
The usual governance mechanisms based on contracts or independent regulatory agencies
appear to be insufficient in the face of turbulence. Contractual frameworks, wherein the
public and private partners enter into long-term contracts that allocate risks, specify
performance levels, tariffs and other terms of agreement, are effective in soliciting
investment from the private sector. However, since all possible future scenarios and
associated contingencies cannot be specified a priori, contracts are incomplete and
contractual governance by itself inadequate. Regulatory frameworks, wherein independent
regulators exercise discretion in setting tariffs and service levels in order to respond to
changes over time are expensive and inefficient Moreover, they are inadequate by
themselves in the complex institutional environments that characterize infrastructure in
countries such as India.
Most critically, the thesis finds that governance based on contracts and regulation seems to
emphasize, institutionalize and reinforce antagonistic relationships between public and
private 'partners'. To respond to unforeseen changes, however, it is necessary to move the
focus away from arms-length relationships towards structures that emphasize real
partnership. Based on case studies of successful PPPs in India, the thesis identifies best
practices in engaging public sector partners and key stakeholders in projects, for instance
through financial partnerships or representation on the project companies' Board of
Directors. It finds that such structural mechanisms are effective supplements to the usual
governance frameworks.
Finally, the thesis proposes that the model of infrastructure delivery using Independent
Public Authorities holds promise for infrastructure delivery in India. The ability of IPAs to
mobilize private investment, engage public sector partners and internalize negotiations
calls for further exploration of their suitability in Indian conditions.
Thesis supervisor: Richard de Neufville
Title: Professor of Engineering Systems and of Civil and Environmental Engineering
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Introduction
Though India has one of the highest GDP growth rates in the world (average
rate of 8% since 2002-03), it ranks 75t globally in terms of infrastructure
development (KPMG, 2006). The country's future economic growth and the overall
quality of life of its citizens are threatened by its continuing inability to install and
manage infrastructure assets.
Infrastructure business in India has a history of underinvestment and public-sector
dominance in ownership and delivery. However, owing to the poor quality of
existing assets, large gaps between supply and demand in most sectors, financial
limitations, and overall inefficiency, the current and subsequent national Five Year
Plans call for a significant increase in investment and greater private sector
involvement in financing and delivery. Total spending on infrastructure during the
Tenth Five Year Plan (2002-07) amounted to $204 billion,1 24.5% of which came
from the private sector. The Mid-Term Appraisal for the Eleventh Five Year Plan
projects a cumulative investment of $456 billion during the Plan Period (2007-12),
with 36.2% coming from the private sector (Government of India, Planning
Commission, 2011). Initial projections for the Twelfth Plan (2012-17) envision total
investments of $1025 billion with a 50% private sector share (Government of India,
Ministry of Finance, 2011a).
The government has emphasized that much of this increased private involvement
will be in the form of public-private partnerships (PPPs). In fact, India has already
become the top destination in the world for PPPs with 740 reported projects as of
July 2011 across all major infrastructure sectors at various stages of completion
with a total projected cost of $84 billion. Central and state governments have
dedicated considerable resources towards establishing institutional and financial
support towards the formulation, appraisal, approval and management of PPPs.
Forms of support include fast-track processing; financial support as grants, interest
free loans, long term debt facilities, and equity investments; and standardization of
documents such as Requests for Proposal, Requests for Qualification and Model
Concession Agreements across sectors.
Much of this support has been limited to up-front project preparation and has paid
less attention to governance of PPP projects over their long lifetimes. However, the
business of infrastructure is about delivering essential public services over time, not
simply constructing physical assets within ex-ante estimates of time and budget.
Success can't be measured only in terms of number of projects with contractual
agreements, financial closure, or even construction of assets within time and budget.
Real success is about delivery of the public service sustainably over time. Projects in
India, however, face challenges both during delivery and operations.
1 Assuming an exchange rate of 45 Rs/$; based on Government of India, Planning
Commission (2007).
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Indeed, an analysis of 894 projects across 17 infrastructure sectors in India between
April 1992 and March 2009 found that 40% of project experienced cost over-runs
and 82% experienced schedule over-runs (Singh, 2010). A progress report issued in
October 2010 by the Ministry of Statistics and Program Implementation illustrates
the same message: delivering infrastructure is extremely challenging. Out of the 559
projects, 14 were ahead of schedule, 117 were on schedule, and 293 were delayed,
causing cost over-runs in excess of $15 billion (Government of India, Ministry of
Statistics and Programme Implementation, Central Statistical Office, 2010). Issues
that repeatedly plague infrastructure business in India include delays and litigations
over land acquisition, multiplicity of required clearances from different sources, lack
of a structured and reliable policy framework, shortage of funds, and inadequate
inputs such as labor and materials.
Though descriptive statistics are not readily available (and harder to estimate),
infrastructure projects face numerous challenges over their operational lives in
addition to these challenges in initial delivery. Case studies of infrastructure
projects from different sectors and geographies in India illustrate that despite best
efforts to identify and allocate key risks apparent at the time of contractual
agreement, changes in the political, economic, social and/or technical environment
surrounding these projects can have major impacts at different stages of the project.
For instance, the Dabhol power plant's experience shows that that political changes
can potentially lead to project cancellation; the Coimbatore road project shows that
projects often suffer from financial difficulties owing to public opposition; and the
Tirupur waste project shows that unexpected changes could lead to service
disruptions and associated environmental and health problems.
The central focus of this thesis is to compare and contrast governance mechanisms
in terms of their ability to solicit private investment up front and reliably deliver
public services over time in the face of unforeseen changes. This dual need
underscores the importance of the third 'P' in PPP: 'partnership'.
Chapter 1 motivates the need for such governance mechanisms by establishing that
infrastructure projects routinely suffer on account of unexpected events such as
public opposition, political opportunism and demand uncertainty. It presents a
number of cases across geographies and sectors within India that elucidate the
inevitability of unforeseen changes.
Chapter 2 evaluates the practice that currently dominates project governance:
reliance on long-term contracts. At the heart of this practice is the assumption that
all major risks (in terms of likelihood and magnitude of impacts) and desired service
levels can be precisely defined a priori and that risk allocation frameworks can then
be designed to incentivize both parties to achieve the project's objectives
consistently over time. However, contracts are inevitably incomplete and often
require renegotiation and/or reliance on arbitration or the rule of law (in courts) in
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the face of differences between project partners. Such a confrontational framework
is unlikely to be sufficient by itself as a governance mechanism.
An alternative to locking project partners into prescriptive agreements for long
periods of time is to allow Independent Regulatory Authorities (IRAs) to
periodically review and adjust key parameters given observations over time.
Chapter 3 thus turns attention toward short-term, relational contracts and
discretionary regulation.
Proponents of regulatory governance propose that independent regulators can
simultaneously pursue the interests of consumers and investors while remaining
free from political influence. Such an approach provides the necessary flexibility to
deal with uncertainties over time and prevents contractual renegotiations in which
partners to a PPP have incentives to act opportunistically. However, the contentious
relationship between regulators and private companies does not emphasize true
partnership. Rather, it incentivizes private parties to withhold the information that
regulators need in order to develop effective rules and entails long administrative
and legal delays.
Chapter 4 examines successful Indian infrastructure PPPs across sectors in search of
alternatives to such combative arrangements. It attempts to identify mechanisms by
virtue of which issues can be resolved before they become contractual and the
partnership can be sustained and even strengthened over time. It emphasizes the
need to focus on developing true 'partnerships' via greater involvement of the
public sector partner and other key stakeholders in project structuring and
operations.
Chapter 5 identifies a governance structure that formalizes some of the tactical
solutions identified in Chapter 4. It finds that Independent Public Authorities (IPAs)
have the potential to deliver services through turbulence over time. Though IPAs
are not a governance panacea, they represent true partnerships with the ability to
bring project partners to the table to work through issues and differences. Their
ability to mobilize private investment, engage public sector partners and internalize
negotiations calls for further exploration of their suitability in Indian conditions.
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Chapter 1: Motivation
Infrastructure projects are characterized by large sunk costs, long gestation
periods, and highly uncertain returns based on several assumptions (regulatory
environments, technology, costs, demand levels, etc.). In order to establish the
business case and solicit investment, project developers need to make projections
about the future. However, only one thing is certain - some of their assumptions
about the political, economic, regulatory, technical and social aspects surrounding
an infrastructure project will inevitably be incorrect and there will certainly be
factors that impact the project that they will have not thought of a priori.
Indeed, in the General Counsels' Roundtable held at Stanford University to examine
the managerial and institutional reasons for the failure of private infrastructure
projects in emerging markets, one participant shared, "The only thing that is
predictable, is that over a 20 year life, the situation in these countries is going to
change (Orr and Metzger, 2005)." Indeed, a review of operational experience with
390 PPP projects delivered under the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) program in
England affirms this intuition: "...it is inevitable over the course of 25 to 30 years of
operation that changes will be needed to the services and assets provided (U.K.
National Audit Office, 2008)."
The experience of infrastructure PPPs in Latin America through the 1990s tells a
similar story: change is inevitable and flexibility to adjust and adapt to changing
environments is essential. Analyzing a dataset from the World Bank covering 307
concession projects in the sectors of transport and water in five countries
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico) between 1989 and 2000, Guasch and
Straub (2006) find that more than half of these projects were renegotiated, on
average 3.5 year after the signing of the contract.
The need to acknowledge that critical conditions surrounding a
project will change over time is evident
Findings From Troubled Cases
This chapter identifies and characterizes the most relevant long-term uncertainties
that are particularly relevant for infrastructure projects in India. It takes inspiration
from actual cases where such uncertainties have had a large impact on the
infrastructure asset and associated public service.
The information on case studies has been complied largely based on data from
publications of the PPP Cell of the Department of Economic Affairs (DEA) in the
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Ministry of Finance of the Government of India2 , Mahalingam, A. (2010), Delhi, V. S.
K. et al. (2010), material provided as part of the "Management, Finance, and
Regulation of Public Infrastructure" course at Harvard Kennedy School3,
newspaper/magazine articles, consultant reports, conference proceedings, and
other secondary sources.
Table 1 outlines the cases explored in this thesis of projects that suffered on account
of unforeseen changes. The subsequent discussion presents three detailed case
studies representing the different types of unforeseen changes that affect projects
over time. Figure 1 summarizes findings from the other detailed case studies, which
can be found in Appendix 4.
2Government of India, Ministry of Finance, "Public-Private Partnerships in India",
http://www.pppinindia.com/. Last checked July 15, 2011.
3 Harvard Kennedy School, PED-209.
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Table 1: Troubled Projects in India
No. Case Sector Source of Impact on Award Change
Change(s) Project Date Date(s)
1 Delhi Airport Airport Political - Institution Potentially 2006 2011
of a new Regulator Devastating
Political - Change in Financial losses;
2 Dabhol Power leadership; Public Loss of 1992 1995; 1998;Power Plant Opposition -high reputation due 2001; 2005
tariffs to Expropriation
Political - Change in Project canceled
3 Karur Bridge Roads municipal without 1997 2005
government compensation
Political - Reneging High debt
East Coast on promise to service costs;4 Road Roads increase tolls by 8%; Had to mobilize 2000 2002/03
Regulatory Banning revenues from
industrial activity other project
Tirupur Solid Political - New laws Waste piling up Soon after5 Waste Waste on waste in Tirupur 2000 construction
Management management
Coimbtore Political reneging Difficult to break Four years
6 Bypass Toll Roads Public opposition - 1997 into
Road Refusal to pay tolls even operations
Latur Water Public opposition Delayed by over7 supply Water based on 'right to a year; Future 2006 Immediate
water' sentiment uncertain
Timarpur- Public opposition - Delayed by over During
8 Okhla Waste Waste Environmental a year; Future 2008 Construction
Management grounds uncertain osruto
Delhi Water Water Public opposition Privatization 2005 2005
Privatization water' sentiment cancelled
Narmada Public opposition - Decades of delay Multiple and10 Power Resettlement and in project 1979 ongoing
Hydropower rehabilitation commissioning
Macroeconomic, Revenues = 38%
Tirupur environmental of projections;
11 Water Water legislative, Exhausted debt 2000 2009
Supply technological service reserve
advances fund
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Cases Studies of Troubled PPPs
Dabhol Power Plant 4: Showcasing The Politics of Infrastructure Projects
"'Many of India's problems in this regard can be summed up in the five-
letter word, Enron (US. Congress, House, Committee on Government
Reform, 2002)"
Basics
Shortly after 'liberalization' of the Indian Power sector, Enron was to become the
first foreign developer to conclude a large-scale power project in India. The project
involved supplying 2,500 MW of power in two phases from a dual fuel (gas and oil)
plant to India's most industrial state with a total envisioned cost of $2.89 billion. The
project company (Dabhol Power Corporation, DPC) initially involved equity
investments from US infrastructure giants such as Enron (80%), General Electric
and Bechtel (10% each) with MSEB purchasing 15% of Enron's equity at a later
stage. Table 2 summarizes the sequence of major events related to the project
4 Author, based on data from Wells (1997a), Wells (1997b) and Palepu et al. (1996)
unless otherwise specified.
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Table 2: Dabhol Power Corporation: Sequence of Events
Date Event
1991 Economic and Financial Reforms in India undertaken under theleadership of a new Prime Minister and a new Finance Minister.
1992 Enron and MSEB sign MoU to build Dabhol project
1993 Dabhol Power Company and MSEB sign Power Purchase Agreement(PPA) with option on second phase to be exercised by July 1995.
1995 Financial closure realized with expected commissioning date at end
(Feb.) of 1997.
The Opposition comes into power in the state on a platform of
1995 throwing Enron into the Arabian sea; The Munde Committee issues a
(July) critical report that recommends scrapping the Dabhol project. State
government cancels agreement in July.
1995 Enron seeks $300 million in compensation through arbitration. State
(Aug - Dec) government alleges fraud and misrepresentation.
1996 Negotiations resume - contracts renegotiated, Phase I expanded,
state bound to both Phases.
1998 MSEB buys 15% equity stake from Enron.
1999 Phase I starts generating power (740 MW); second phase units
(May) expected to start in June and October 2001.
2000 (July) Electricity price from Dabhol = Rs 7.80/KWh (four times regular
rate)
2000(Dec.) Unaffordable electricity bill of $22 million for MSEB.
2001 Maharashtra stops paying. Enron enters into arbitration and halts
construction on 90% complete Phase II.
MSEB-Enron to renegotiate the contracts at lower prices, Enron
2001 refuses and demands $2.3 billion (to cover costs of investment and
debt).
2001 Enron scandal in the US -> project on hold
2005 Project taken over by NTPC, GAIL and Government of Maharashtra;
Payments made to GE and Bechtel.
2006 Phase I renamed Ratnagiri Gas and Power Pvt. Ltd started operationin May after a hiatus of five years.
Source: Author, based on data from: (1) Wells Jr., L. T. (1997), "Enron Development
Corporation: The Dabhol Power Project in Maharashtra, India (A)," HBS No. 797085; (2)
Wells Jr., L. T. (1997), "Enron Development Corporation: The Dabhol Power Project in
Maharashtra, India (B)," HBS No. 797086; and (3) Palepu, K. G., Rangan, V. K and Srinivasan,
S. (1996), "Enron Development Corporation: The Dabhol Power Project in Maharashtra,
India (C)," HBS No. 596101
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Initial Agreement
Enron and its partners spent significant resources in order to win themselves a
favorable deal in partnership with the most credible and creditworthy of all State
Electricity Boards: Maharashtra State Electricity Board (MSEB) in the most
progressive industrial state in India. The project lead from Enron admitted that
Enron spent close to $20 million to 'educate' their Indian counterparts on the
benefits of private power delivery (U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Government
Reform, 2002). Through multiple rounds of negotiation, the consortium managed to
secure very favorable terms and conditions and to protect themselves against major
foreseeable risks. In fact, the deal was considered by many, including the World
Bank as being "one sided" in favor of DPC and "too good to be true" (EPW Editorial,
2005). Particular tenets in the agreements that contributed to this reputation
included:
- Fuel supply: Agreement to use imported LNG instead of locally available
coal: This was to help Enron since its subsidiary had an agreement to develop
enough LNG for export to fuel 10,000 MW of power.
- Supporting infrastructure: Contractual obligations for public sector
counterpart: MSEB to provide land, water, power, communication, approach
road, and transmission lines from power station to its power grid.
- Transfer of commercial and exchange rate risks: 20 year take contract,
under which MSEB was to pay for at-least 90% of the installed generation
capacity at high power prices (about four times prevailing electricity tariffs,
resulting in return on equity estimates of 26.52%) regardless of whether the
electricity was actually used. MSEB was required to bear all exchange rate
risk.
- Counterparty risk mitigation: Guarantees from the Maharashtra State
government and further sovereign guaranteed from Government of India in
case of default by MSEB.
- Breach of contract termination fees: Enron was covered in case of
termination before or after commencement of commercial operation.
- Further protection against sovereign risk: $298 million in commercial
export credit loans guaranteed by the US Export-Import Bank and $100
million loan from Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), a US
agency that provided political risk insurance.
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Unforeseen Impacts
Despite the World Bank's warnings of excess capacity and non-justified expense, the
initial agreement was struck due to new Prime Minister Narasimha Rao's desire to
sell his economic restructuring plan to the people of India.
In 1995, a new coalition of the nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the
Hindu nationalist Shiv Sena replaced the Congress state government that had been
responsible for entering into the Dabhol contract. A formal review committee for the
project concluded (among other things) that the price of power was too high and
MSEB was under unreasonable payment obligations under the original agreement
owing to an exchange rate increases from Rs. 32/$ to Rs 46/$ and an oil price
increase from $15/bbl to $35/bbl. It recommended total capital cost savings of $588
million form the government's perspective, all of which was to be borne by the
private partner. The allowed return on equity was also reduced.
The incoming government repudiated the deal and forced Enron to agree to a
revised deal that would reduce power rates, capital costs and other expenditures,
and switch to a locally produced fuel. Table 3 summarizes these changes:
Table 3: Dabhol Power Corporation: Original and Renegotiated Deals
Original (1993) Revised (1996)
Capital Cost (Billion $)
(Phase 1+2) 2.84 2.51
Capacity (MW)
PhaseI 695 740
Phase II 2015 2184
Unit Capital Cost (Million $/MW)
With Re-Gasification Facility 1.41 1.15
Without Re-Gasification Facility 1.16 0.92
Capital Recovery Charge 3.69 2.44
US cents/kWh
Source: Data excerpted from Parikh, K. S. (2001), "Thinking through the Enron Issue",
Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 36, No. 17, p. 1466, Table 1.
Despite this renegotiation, problems continued because of the basic non-
sustainability of the contractual agreements. After MSEB faced unaffordable
electricity bills, the project went to international arbitration with claims from DPC
of opportunistic behavior on part of MSEB and counter claims from MSEB of
misrepresentation of facts and cost escalation on part of DPC. Sovereign guarantees
were initially not honored by the state or the central governments since the matter
was in dispute. Upon declaration of Enron's fraudulent activities back in the U.S. and
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its subsequent bankruptcy, Bechtel and GE acquired Enron's 65% stake and
received settlement compensation from the Indian government. Amounts overdue
to 19 overseas lenders were also settled at a discount (Loo et al., 2008).
This example shows how political realities can manifest into unexpected adverse
impacts over time regardless of contractual safeguards.
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Coimbatore Bypass Toll Road: Public Opposition Leads to Low Demand
Basics
The city of Coimbatore experienced heavy congestion and long traffic delays, owing
largely to a National Highway passing through the city. To ease the situation, the
government envisioned the construction of a bypass road but lacked the funds to do
so. Further, the low projected revenues from the bypass road meant that the project
was not considered viable on its own. The Government of Tamil Nadu thus decided
to expand and toll a neighboring bridge and include the toll revenues as part of the
financial equation for the bypass road project. A tripartite concession agreement
was signed between the Ministry of Surface Transport (Government of India), Tamil
Nadu State Government and private company L&T Transportation Infrastructure
Limited (LTTIL) in October 1997 for the same.
Unforeseen Impacts
Users of the bridge were upset at a toll being charged for a facility that they had
previously used for free, and protested against payment of tolls. Some users
resorted to active opposition by leaving their vehicles at the bridge to block all
traffic. As a result, the average toll collection at the bridge was less than Rs. 75,000
per day as against the projected daily revenue of Rs. 1.8 lakh to Rs. 2.0 lakh
(Raghuram and Deepa, 2002).
Furthermore, state-run buses lobbied for and won a decision to lower the tariff
rates, which in turn placed enormous pressure on the concessionaire to break-even
on this project. Although the initial agreement clearly specified that the state
government would absorb risks due to non-payment of tolls, the government
refused to take "action towards ensuring toll compliance or compensating for the
losses (Raghuram and Deepa, 2002)." In the face of losses and rising interest
payment obligations, the private concessionaire felt compelled to request the
government to take over the project.
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The Tirupur Water Supply Project: Successful Completion but Low Demand
Basics
In 2000, a 30-year concession was awarded to New Tirupur Area Development
Corporation Limited (NTAD CL) - a special purpose vehicle established to implement
the first water sector related project under the public-private partnership
framework in the country.
In the Tripur area, "shortage of water supply and inadequate infrastructure for
collection, treatment and disposal of industrial / domestic wastewater were the
major bottlenecks for the growth of the industries (Infrastructure Leasing &
Financial Services, 2005b)." Under the agreement, NTADCL was to treat and supply
185 million liters of water per day from the Cauvery river to the dyeing and
bleaching industries and around 800,000 domestic consumers.
The project was completed on time and within budget and was celebrated as an
example of a PPP success and upheld as a "viable model for implementing other
projects in the sector (Tamil Nadu Water Investment Company Limited, 2010)."
Project developer IL&FS claimed that the project enabled the government to
leverage its investment by about 100 times and that "accelerated investments due to
the multiplier effect would further this leveraging to about 5000 (Infrastructure
Leasing & Financial Services, 2005b)." It celebrated the "innovative structuring and
prudent allocation of risks" and termed the successful commissioning of the project
as "an outstanding achievement in the sector and a benchmark project". However,
despite this early declaration of success, the project faced challenges owing to
changing circumstances during implementation.
Unforeseen Impacts
By 2009, the projects revenues fell to only 38% of the pre-project forecasts and the
debt reserve fund had been exhausted (Mahalingam and Kapur, 2009). This was
mainly due to:
e A decrease in demand for textile exports owing to the global recession
e Environmental legislation leading to the forced closure of several units
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e Adequate rainfall over several years incentivizing textile owners to drill their
own bore-wells to extract groundwater at lower costs
e Advances in technology leading to lower water intensity in the industry
Thus, though demand risk was perceived as very low since the main users were
already paying similar rates for lower quality water, the project confronted several
challenges on account of unforeseen demand and policy shocks.
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Figure 1: Troubled Projects in India
Delhi International Airport Limited: Regulatory and Policy Flip-Flops
Karur Bridge Project: Bad Forecasts and New Government Opportunism
East Coast Road Project: Government Reneges on Promises
Tirupur Solid Waste Management Project5: Waste Today, Gone Tomorrow
Latur Water Supply Project: The "Right" To Water Incites Agitation
s Since the sector does not have a formal regulator, I consider laws governing the
'rules of the game' in the sector as a form of regulation.
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Timarpur-Okhla Integrated Municipal Solid Waste Management Project: Not In My
Back-Yard
New Delhi Water: Public Opposition Crushes Private Participation Effort
Narmada Dams: Public Opposition Leads to Big Changes and Long Delays
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Common Uncertainties
These case studies of infrastructure projects from different sectors and geographies
in India expose the reality that despite best efforts to identify and allocate key risks
apparent at the time of contractual agreement, conditions surrounding projects are
bound to change over time. Surprises are inevitable and adjustment to these
unforeseen changes is key to project survival and success. Political, public
opposition, and revenue uncertainties seem to be particularly relevant in the case of
India owing to their frequency and severity of impact. These factors are formulated
in the subsequent discussion.
Political
Relevant Cases: Delhi International Airport, Dabhol Power Plant, Karur Bridge
Project, East Coast Road Project, Coimbatore Bypass Toll Road.
Since they deliver essential public services over many years and are considered
strategic assets, infrastructure projects are inherently characterized by an active
government role at various stages of project conceptualization, development,
delivery and operation/maintenance. Doh and Ramamurti (2003) characterize the
main roles of the public sector in infrastructure PPPs as "sponsor/investor;
consumer/customer; rule-maker/regulator; and mediator/moderator of opposition
political and non-governmental interests". In PPP projects, government usually also
plays the role of enabler/partner by agreeing to provide access to land, water,
electricity and removing other bottlenecks to smooth project delivery. Through
these multiple stages and avenues of involvement, public parties are a significant
source of risk to infrastructure PPPs.
Common avenues through which public parties affect projects are:
- Changing the 'rules of the game': Government action or inaction in setting
or changing the 'rules of the game' governing a project can have a material
adverse impact on the project. Examples include change of law, regulations,
taxes, and incentives; negation or cancellation of license and approval; non-
allowance for agreed tariff adjustment formula or regime. For instance, as the
World Bank reports in relation to Indian State Electricity Regulatory
Commissions (SERCs), "...with the enactment of the Electricity Act, 2003,
[power producers] are supposed to be monitored and regulated by
independent SERCs. However, in practice, no investor can be sure if the
regulator will adjust prices, or when, or the extent to which non-action (or
injurious action) will be defended on the grounds that social factors
(especially, "affordability") need to be taken into account (The World Bank,
2006)."
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- Reneging on specific commitments: Commitments can take a number of
forms including purchase of the infrastructural service under guaranteed off-
take agreements, provision of termination payments, subsidies or sovereign
guarantees, input supply agreements (such as for water, waste, coal and gas),
procurement of land, clearances, permits and licenses, etc. These
uncertainties are especially relevant in an environment marked by changes
in government and political actions of interest groups (Doh and Ramamurti,
2003).
It does not come as a surprise that in the latest Overall Project Finance Ratings
published by Business Monitor International (2011a), India scores seventh out of
thirteen countries assessed in the Asia Pacific Region. Moreover, it only comes in
ahead of Cambodia, Pakistan and Indonesia in terms of legal and regulatory risks,
which fall under political risk in the framework presented herein.
The reasons for why public partners adversely interfere in the business of
infrastructure in the Indian context, along with some examples are presented
herein:
Temptations for Opportunism
In infrastructure PPPs, public partners initially need private investors and thus offer
attractive terms. But once projects are operational, the investors require a long
periods to recover their investments while the public partners have already secured
what they need (Woodhouse, 2005). Such agreements thus present obsolescing
bargains and consequent incentives for opportunism, 6 since public partners have
incentives to force changes in the terms of the original agreement - either gradually
(a practice commonly referred to as 'creeping expropriation') or suddenly.
The incentives for opportunistic behavior are strong when the post contractual
agreement environment differs from what was originally envisioned. Differences in
actual vs. forecasted traffic, in the cost and time involved in land acquisition or
environmental restoration, in the availability of key inputs such as raw materials,
electricity, or water, etc., or in the macroeconomic environment all fall under this
category.
Literature related to concession agreements in Latin America has best covered
examples of opportunistic behavior. The cancellation of water concessions in
Cochabamba (2001) and La Paz (2005), Bolivia and Argentina's unilateral reduction
in utility tariffs (such as for Aguas Argentinas) in the wake of a financial crisis in
2002 are good examples. The takeover of the Second Stage Expressway in Bangkok
(1993) is a high profile example of political opportunism closer to home. In India,
there have been multiple cases of reneging and even termination of power purchase
agreements in Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, and Tamil Nadu (The World Bank,
6 for a strategic game theoretic model of opportunism, see Moszoro (2011).
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2006). The Karur Bridge project previously outlined in this chapter is a good
example in this respect
Regulatory Flux
The regulatory environments surrounding different infrastructure sectors in India
are under various stages of development (see Chapter 3 and Appendix 3) and
constantly evolving. India's history with power sector policy is a good example of
frequent changes in the 'rules of the game.' As Dubash and Rajan (2001) explain,
"the goalposts of success in the sector have moved perceptibly, from electricity as a
vehicle for social and economic development to narrow financial success." These
changing goalposts manifest themselves as changing rules.
Starting in the 1970s, multiple states de-metered and heavily subsidized electricity
for agricultural customers to win votes, and hiked industrial and residential
electricity rates to cover the resulting financial shortfall. Starting in 1991, the sector
instituted attractive policies including tax holidays, selective counter-guarantees,
high guaranteed returns on investment and additional bonuses to entice foreign
investment for independent power projects. Realizing the extravagance of these
experiments, an independent national electricity regulatory commission and
independent state electricity regulatory commissions were set up under the
Electricity Regulatory Commission Act of 1998. The Act sought to rationalize
electricity tariffs and eliminate subsidies (Lamb, 2006). Thereafter, the Electricity
Act was passed in 2003 as an overarching framework legislation that consolidated
and replaced all previous legislation.
In addition to these large, sweeping changes in direction, there have been numerous
changes in rules and regulations involving the allowed rate of return (for instance,
return on equity in private power projects was lowered from 16% to 14% for the
period 2004-09 and has been increased again), taxes and subsidies, depreciation
rules, allowances for foreign investment, etc. that have large impacts on the project
value. Lamb (2006) provides a good discussion of renegotiation in India's power
sector including a number of cases affected by regulatory changes. (See Chapter 3
for further details on the development of the regulatory environment for the Indian
Power sector.)
The case of the recently commissioned Delhi International Airport, otherwise
celebrated as an example of a PPP success story, illustrates the potential devastating
effect of regulatory uncertainty.
Overlapping Authorities
Infrastructure projects require clearances from a number of central, state and local
government bodies. The time taken to obtain all requisite approvals varies between
18 months and four-five years. This multiplicity of rival and competitive
bureaucracies is a big threat to infrastructure projects.
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In the power sector, for instance, numerous agencies have authority over various
aspects of a project (Sharma and Vohra, 2008). The Central Electricity Authority
(CEA) establishes generation, transmission and distribution standards; the Central
Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) enforces tariff norms for central
generation plants; state regulators issue tariff orders, licenses, etc. at the state level;
the New Appellate Tribunal handles appeals on regulatory decisions; central and
state pollution control boards ensure compliance with emission standards; and
other national, state and municipal level ministries agencies and departments such
as state irrigation departments, forest departments, Ministry of Environment and
Forests, municipal water boards, civil aviation departments, Ministry of Petroleum,
Ministry of Coal, etc. play other roles. At any point in time for any reason, any of
these authorities could change rules and force the project to adjust.
A World Bank review of Indian infrastructure reports: "In spite of many states
having introduced, on paper, 'single window clearance', the fact remains that when
most projects apply for approvals at the state-level, these have to go through
multiple clearances at various levels (The World Bank, 2006)." Getting a project off
the ground requires "joint and timely efforts of the departments involved. However,
interdependence of efforts means that it is easy for departments to shirk responsibility
and pass the blame on to others... Laxity on the part of just one department or dereliction
of duty by a few officials can hold up the entire project (Singh, 2010)."
Pure Politics / Political Symbolism
"Governments continue to engage in a pervasive practice of selective
and disruptive recontracting of legally binding agreements, especially
when there are shifts in political parties or ruling governments (Doh
and Ramamurt, 2003)."
There are frequent changes in leadership during the lifetime of a project and
sometimes during the development and construction phases themselves. For
instance, during the 5 years of construction of the Cochin airport, "CIAL officials had
to deal with three Civil Aviation Ministers, four Civil Aviation Secretaries, four
Chairmen of AAI at Central Government, and three Chief Ministers, four Transport
Ministers and four Transport Secretaries at the State Government (Akintoye and
Beck, 2009)." Such changes often bring with them changes in political ideology,
ultimately manifesting into changes in public sector commitments in PPPs.
Akintoye and Beck (2009) explain: "In a democratic country like India, a change in
government after elections can be an important risk factor. Large projects that are
initiated by the incumbent government and those that are still in the development
phase are usually reviewed by the new government....it therefore becomes
important to have a structure that facilitates political commitment at the highest
level"
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Such motivations were particularly evident in the case of the Dabhol Power Plant,
wherein the BJP ran the election for state government largely based on its promise
to "throw Enron into the Arabian sea" after the Congress government had opened
up the economy to foreign private investors and structured the initial deal with
Enron (U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Government Reform, 2002).
Public Opposition
Relevant Cases: Delhi Water, Narmada Hydropower, Timarpur-Okhla Integrated
Municipal Solid Waste Management, Latur Water Supply
G6mez-Ibinez (2007) explains that customers of infrastructure services "are often
heterogeneous groups with different initial conditions and interests (G6mez-Ibafiez,
2008)". This problem is intensified in regimes where cross-subsidization (creating
winners and losers) is prevalent, as is the case in India. Thus, conflicts are bound to
arise owing to differences in service levels, tariffs, coverage, etc.
In addition to this technical reason, a democratic society such as India is especially
susceptible to outspoken public protests and demonstrations, which may have
devastating impacts on infrastructure projects. These may be politically motivated
and organized (for instance, by NGOs), represent genuine concerns of the local
communities that may be adversely impacted by the projects (for instance, facility
users or nearby residents affects by pollution, land dispossession, natural resource
depletion etc.), or involve deeper issues of a sense of a public "right" over having
basic services provided to them and a sense of national pride (in cases involving
foreign players). As Mahalingam (2010) comments "Social pressures from activists
protesting against inequitable resettlement, environmental degradation, and so on
also leads to difficulties in implementing PPP projects."
One of the most popular international examples of public opposition to PPPs leading
to project cancellation is that of water services in Cochabamba, Bolivia. The private
concessionaire was given full rights to the entire city's water supply and alternative
well-established water sources were to be phased out. Furthermore, tariffs were to
rise since the concessionaire was allowed to charge tariffs to recover all capital
costs. Protests started as soon as the private concessionaire began operations in
November 1999. After six months of roadblocks, strikes, and public demonstrations,
the Bolivian government cancelled the concession contract (Levitt et al., 2009).
A few high profile examples of public unrest leading to the cancellation or delay of
projects with private participation in India include the Timarpur-Okhla Integrated
Municipal Solid Waste Management Project (environmental grounds), the Latur
Water Supply Project (ideological grounds), the Coimbatore bypass toll road
(economic grounds), the Narmada Hydropower projects (ideological, religious,
ethnic, environmental and economic grounds) and the Delhi Water Privatization
effort (ideological and economic grounds).
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Outspoken public figures against private participation in infrastructure, especially in
projects involving foreign corporations include Vandana Shiva, Sunita Narain,
Medha Patkar and Arundhati Roy. These 'environmentalists' have massive
followings and considerable clout. When such projects get really politicized, even
members of the popular Indian film industry (Bollywood) do not miss out on an
opportunity for populism (popular Bollywood actor Aamir Khan got heavily
involved with the Narmada Bachao Andolan).
Demand
Relevant Cases: Tirupur Water Supply, Vadodara Halol Toll Road, Delhi-Noida Toll
Bridge, Coimbatore Bypass Toll Road, Rajiv Gandhi Salai Road
Demand forecasts are especially important for road projects in which capital and
operating cost recovery depends upon tolls from road usage. However, the same
rationale applies to power projects and other infrastructure projects that depend
upon user charges for cost recovery and profits over time.
In a study of 87 toll road projects, the rating agency Standard and Poor's (2004)
found that "toll road forecasts have, on average, overestimated traffic by 20%-
30%...The range stretches from projects whose traffic was only 15% of the original
forecast to projects that exceeded their forecasts by more than 50%." An earlier
study by the same organization concluded "a meaningful approach to adjusting the
output of traffic and revenue models should be incorporated into the analysis."
In a study by of a dataset of 307 Latin American projects with private participation,
Guasch et al. (2005) found that the most quoted reasons for the renegotiation calls
were the need to adjust tariffs or redefine investment, often in the light of demand
levels that appeared to be significantly lower than was initially expected. Indeed,
highway traffic forecasts have generally been too optimistic, with subsequent traffic
shortfall of 60% in Mexico and 40% in Colombia. This was probably due to the
willingness to make concessions more attractive to investors.
Despite the fact that toll road PPPs are very common in India under the BOT route,
numerous projects have suffered from overconfidence on the reliability of forecast
estimates and lack of mechanisms within the project framework to deal with traffic
demand uncertainty. Some high profile local examples include the Delhi-Noida-Delhi
Toll Bridge (revenue for the collection of tolls fell below break-even levels in the
initial years), the Vadodara-Halol Toll Road Project (actual thoroughfare was 30% of
the original forecast), the Coimbtore Bypass Toll Road Project (toll collection
revenues were only 35% of the projected revenues), the Rajiv Gandhi Salai Road
Project (agitations and violent protests were reported), the Tirupur Water Supply
Project and many others.
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Summary
Examination of infrastructure project cases from different geographies and sectors
within India has established that changes in the political, economic, social
and/or technical environment surrounding these projects are inevitable and
can have major impacts at different stages of the project. The cases of Dabhol
power in Maharashtra, Karur bridge and Delhi water privatization are proof that
such changes can be potentially devastating leading to project cancellation. Latur
water, Narmada hydropower, and Timarpur-Okhla waste show that projects often
suffer from inordinate delays owing to unexpected developments. Other projects,
such as Tirupur waste, show that unexpected changes could lead to service
disruptions and associated environmental and health problems.
In terms of timeline, some projects experience changes before or soon after the
project award date (Tirupur waste, Timarpur-Okhla, Latur water, Delhi water, some
projects in Narmada dams), some soon after construction and early in the
operations stage (DIAL, East Cost Road) and some well into operations (Tirupur
water, Dabhol power, Karur bridge, Coimbatore bypass road, some projects in
Narmada dams).
The uncertainties that were found to have the highest frequency and severity of
impact are political (owing to opportunistic temptations, regulatory flux,
overlapping authorities and political symbolism), public opposition (on
environmental, socio-economic, health, ethical or moral grounds), and
demand/revenue related (owing to unrealistic and inaccurate demand forecasts).
Thus, structuring projects for stability and to recover investments in the midst of
changing technologies, policies, and public demands over decades is critical. Indeed,
based upon a review of sixty infrastructure projects, Miller and Lessard (2000) find
that "turbulence - not technical difficulties, external effects, or complications - is the
real cause of difficulties in projects" and that "only the presence of governance
capacity...can provide some protection (Miller and Lessard, 2000)." Indian
academics studying PPPs have identified the same need. For instance, Mahalingam
and Kapur (2009) highlight that the "ability to monitor the project and steer it
through turbulences that it might encounter over its lifecycle" is a key element of a
successful PPP program.
The subsequent chapters present various mechanisms to deal with such turbulence.
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Chapter 2: Contractual Governance
Infrastructure projects are characterized by high up-front investments,
strategic value, asset specificity and long gestation periods before achieving return
on investment Thus once the asset is constructed, the private partner is in danger of
opportunistic behavior on behalf of the public partner, who has an incentive to
renege on original commitments since it is less dependent on making the project
functional. On the other hand, since the private partner now enjoys a monopoly
position over the delivery of a key public service and since coordination of prior
technical and managerial knowledge is often vital in such projects, the public
partner is also in danger of counterparty opportunism. Partners in infrastructure
PPPs (both public and private) will only participate in the project if they are
confident that the counterparty will not behave opportunistically over the life of the
project. A common way of instilling such confidence in the partners while holding
them true to their commitments is through long-term contractual agreements. Such
contractual arrangements are discussed herein with a special focus on India's PPP
contracts.
The Concept
In most infrastructure PPPs, contract serve as "the vehicle for tangibly distributing
benefits and risks (Garvin, 2009)" between the pubic and the private party and
specifying obligations of each party over a project's life (typically 20-50 years). They
are structured to balance the interests of the public and the private partner and
neither can unilaterally change any of their provisions. They are vital "not just as a
bidding document but as the foundation for the management of the contract
throughout the life of the PPP"7.
The public partner (such as a Ministry) or an independent third party (such as a
regulator) ensures compliance with the specifications and standards and outlines a
schedule of payments to incentivize the private party to invest (G6mez-Ibainez,
2008). In cases of differing opinion, either party can appeal to the courts or to a
contractually specified independent third party (arbitrator, regulator, etc.) if they
cannot themselves come to a mutually agreeable solution. Contracts are thus by
nature adversarial.
At the heart of the practice of drafting long-term contracts is the assumption that all
major risks (in terms of likelihood and magnitude of impacts) and desired service
levels can be precisely defined a priori and that risk allocation frameworks can then
7 Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs, "First
Draft of Key Project Documents," PPP Toolkit for Improving PPP Decision Making
Processes, http://toolkit.pppinindia.com./urban-transport/module2-
fdokpd.php?links=fdokpd1. Last checked March 04, 2011.
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be designed to incentivize both parties to achieve the project's objectives
consistently over time.
In fact, "the transfer of risk through contractual frameworks often is the basis for the
decision to deliver public services by a PPP arrangement and movement of assets off
the public sector balance sheet (Garvin, 2009)." Since infrastructure PPPs are
usually undertaken by special purpose companies on a project finance basis
(without recourse to balance sheets), financiers closely scrutinize all risks
associated with the revenue stream. Such projects thus require much deliberation
and a high level of confidence in the project and the surrounding environment
However, contracts cannot possibly account for every possible contingency since
"unpredictable, incalculable events are inevitable (Garvin, 2009)." Such
uncertainties challenge the efficacy of contractual PPP arrangements. Indeed, a
participant in The General Counsels' Roundtable at Stanford University recognized
that the reason for the relatively consistent contractual breakdowns of PPP
contracts in Latin America in the 1990s was that "ex-ante attempts to identify and
mitigate risks failed to prevent project-threatening unforeseen costs and delays (Orr
and Metzger, 2005)."
Thus, though long-term concession contracts are drafted with the intension of
providing stability over time and preventing opportunistic behavior, their inherent
incompleteness and consequent shortcomings needs to be recognized.
Types
Concession contracts usually take one of two forms:
Classical Contracts
These contracts are rigid as they "presume to describe, in advance, all relevant
future contingencies and to provide specific remedies for them (G6mez-Ibiiez,
2003)." They require considerable up-front preparation and are "likely to be an
unrealistic ideal for all but the simplest and shortest relationships (G6mez-Ibafiez,
2003)."
They put little emphasis on contingencies and are thus likely to require
renegotiation when the conditions affecting the viability of a PPP project change
dramatically. Such inflexibility is a big shortcoming of classical contracts, especially
in the context of rapidly evolving technological, economic and political
environments.
Neoclassical Contracts
These contracts are similar to classical contracts, but are designed to address the
unpredictable future. They "clearly spell out appropriate actions and compensations
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under alternative scenarios (Chan, 2010)" based upon the risks that are apparent a
priori. Further, they "acknowledge the possibility of incompleteness and include
provisions for a third party, usually an arbitrator of some sort, to resolve certain
classes of disputes (Chan, 2010)." However, they require significant up-front
preparation and remain inflexible since "the circumstances under which arbitration
is allowed, the factors the arbitrator can consider, and the scope of the remedies
that he can order are often carefully prescribed (G6mez-Ibaiez, 2003)." Thus, while
neo-classical contracts can handle apparent risks with contingency clauses, they are
much less effective at dealing with unexpected risks.
Both types of concession contracts are inflexible and based on the assumption that
risks can be comprehensively described at the outset. However, over the 20-30 year
lifetimes of typical PPP projects, contracts can't account for every possible
contingency (Garvin, 2009). There are certain to be technological, sociopolitical or
economic changes that will affect project economics and cause even well structured
concession contracts to be renegotiated. Furthermore, since the objective functions
of the public and private party in a PPP are different, there are bound to be clashes
of opinion over time.
Contracts are by nature adversarial. They are bound to be
incomplete and thus inadequate by themselves for PPP
governance over time.
Pathways In Case of Contractual Incompleteness
When contracts turn out to be incomplete, the public party has to choose a way
forward among undesirable options:
Enforce/Honor
The terms of the contract may become unfavorable to the public or the private party
or to both owing to the unexpected change(s). Moreover, it may no longer serve the
public purpose. The first option is for the public partner to honor the original terms
of the contract
Example: Noida Toll Bridge
The $100 million concession in 1997 to build, operate and maintain a bridge
between Delhi and Noida was the first toll road and one of the first PPP projects in
India. The project was completed within budget and ahead of schedule but is best
known for being one-sided in favor of the private party. The concessionaire's
involvement in writing up the technical specifications and determining the
reimbursable costs along with the specific contractual guarantee of recovering total
project costs plus a 20% return on the entire value of the project contribute to
creating such a reputation. The contract is unsustainable, but the costs of
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terminating the contract are disproportionately high. Thus, the public partners are
'stuck' honoring an inflexible and undesirable initial agreement.
Renegotiate
The second option is to renegotiate the contract in the presence of information
asymmetry and at the cost of hurting credibility for future PPPs. Furthermore, "if the
contract had to be renegotiated the results would depend on the relative bargaining
positions of the two parties at the time, and there would be no guarantee that it
would be fair to rather consumers or investors (G6mez-Ibaiiez, 2003)."
Example: Dabhol Power Corporation
The DPC project concession was renegotiated (capital costs and tariffs were
adjusted downwards) in 1995 under a new elected state government and again in
2001. Details of the original and renegotiated deal can be found in the detailed case
study of the Dabhol Power Corporation in Chapter 1.
Re-bid
The public partner may rebid the project at the cost of long delays, litigation and/or
service disruption without confidence that other private parties would be interested
in the project.
Example: Chennai Solid Waste Management Project
In the 1990s, the Corporation of Chennai (COC) decided to privatize solid waste
collection services in select wards of the city. The concession persisted successfully
through the three-year concession period after which it was rebid. The incumbent
was not the winning bidder and the new operator took time to mobilize resources,
during which garbage was piling up on the streets with serious health effects (Delhi
etal., 2010).
Example: Port of Miami Tunnel
In February 2008, Florida selected the Miami Access Tunnel (MAT) consortium as
the best value proposer from a group of three short-listed bidders after a
competitive bidding process for the $1 billion tunnel development project8 . Owing
to a proposed change in equity participation within the winning consortium, the
state of Florida proposed to rebid the stalled project. However, Miami-Dade County
mayor Carlos Alvarez fought this proposal, arguing that MAT would pursue legal
action, which would tie up the project in litigation for years. Furthermore, the
project would lose out on $400 million of cheap debt financing that MAT had
already secured (Podkul, 2010). Owing to these dangers of rebidding, differences
8 Port of Miami Tunnel, "Project History", Port of Miami Tunnel Company website,
http: /www.portofmiamitunnel.com/project-overview/project-history/. Last
checked March 02, 2011.
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between the parties were negotiated and MAT received a Notice to Proceed in
October 2009.
Expropriate
Finally, the public partner may expropriate the project while still being subject to
budget constraints, having low confidence of achieving desired performance levels,
and tarnishing reputation locally and internationally (raising the cost of debt for all
PPPs in the country).
Example: Karur Bridge Project
This 14-year DBOT agreement suffered from low traffic and toll collections and
disagreement over contractual obligations. The Highways and Rural Works
Department took over the bridge, restored it for public use, and stopped the
collection of tolls in the public interest As Mahalingam (2010) summarizes: "...a
newly elected municipal government unilaterally cancelled the concession
agreement on the pretext of a damaged approach road without compensating the
concessionaire".
Each of these outcomes is associated with negative consequences for the particular
project and/or for the country's PPP initiative in general. Furthermore, in a dispute
each party is subject to the discretion of the courts, which may or may not be free
from outside influence.
Thus, "contracts work only if they are reasonably complete and if the legal system
that enforces them is reasonably fair and efficient (G6mez-Ibaiiez, 2003)."
Flexibility in Contracts
Some provisions can be included in contracts in order to make them more flexible
and able to respond to certain types of uncertainties and changes over time.
Based on his review of 1000 concession contracts from across Latin America,
Guasch (2004) concludes that contracts need to be more flexible. He suggests that
contracts should clearly define the guidelines to adjust and review tariffs and
contain clear triggers for renegotiation, such as in cases of large fluctuations
whereby project or environmental parameters (such as demand or macroeconomic
indicators) cross certain threshold values.
Mahalingam (2010) elaborates along the same lines as he advocates for a
framework under which 'a process would be created wherein a concerned set of
clauses could be re-examined by a panel of participants through a specified process
under a set of "trigger" conditions'. He offers that this could be done taking "into
account preferred social and political processes in the local context such as seeking
recourse to the judiciary or specially appointed tribunals depending upon prevailing
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local practices". Such flexible contracts "could lead to projects that were structured
more sustainable, and to a situation wherein both the public and private sectors
were willing to engage with each other on PPP projects with an understanding that
the contracts could be re-examined in the event of extenuating circumstances and
that neither side would necessarily have to solely bear the brunt of such risks."
Based on their review of large construction projects from around the world, Miller
and Lessard (2000) echo these sentiments as well: "There is a need to develop
flexible contractual arrangements in the form of rendezvous clauses that establish a
priori the terms and conditions under which agreements will be renegotiated."
Some examples of specific contractual provisions that acknowledge the prevalence
of uncertainties that regularly impact projects and instill elements of flexibility into
otherwise rigid contracts are:
Flexible hand-back date
Concession contracts last for a pre-specified time period (usually 20-50 years).
However, the hand-over date (the date when the contract ends) can be left as an
adjustable parameter for cases where traffic levels are lower/higher than expected.
BOT (Toll) concessions under the National Highway Development Program (NHDP)
in India have such provisions (see Table 4).
Competing facilities
Most investments in infrastructure PPPs are recovered through user fees and are
thus highly dependent on demand and under constant threat from the possibility of
existence of competing facilities in future. Contractual provisions such as those
providing the concessionaire a 'right of first refusal' on future competing facilities or
those ensuring higher tariff rates at future competing facilities can protect against
this risk. For instance, Delhi International Airport Limited (DIAL) enjoys a right of
first refusal in case an alternative airport is proposed in a 150 km radius from the
existing airport and DIAL's bid is within 10% of the most competitive bid (Pandey et
al., 2010). As another example, the National Highway Authority of India (NHAI)
provides projects under the NHDP a contractual commitment that a competing toll-
way will have 25% higher tolls (Government of India, Ministry of Road Transport
and Highways, National Highway Authority of India, 2011).
Revenue sharing
Public parties have incentives to renege on their contractual agreements and
expropriate PPPs in case they perceive that private parties are enjoying
unjustifiably high payoffs. Thus, some concession contracts include revenue sharing
agreements under which the public partner receives a portion of the revenue once
certain levels of return are met For instance, under the 1-495 High Occupancy Toll
(HOT) Lanes project in Virginia, the public sector partner's (Virginia Department of
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Transport) entitlement starts at 5% where IRR is over 12.98%, rises to 15% when
IRR is over 14.5%, and 40% when the IRR exceeds 16% (Guasch, 2004).
Financing structure
The perceived risk in infrastructure PPPs is higher in the early stages of the project
and falls after construction. Thus, the interest rates they have to pay on raising debt
are higher in the initial stages of the project and lower after construction. Projects
can thus benefit from restructuring their debt as they remove certain categories of
risks over time. Since the consequent benefits to the private sector from
restructuring can be seen as windfall gains by the public sector and perceived as
unfair, contracts often outline mechanisms to share the benefits of financial
restructuring. For instance, the Office of Government Commerce in the UK requires
that Private Finance Initiative (PFI) contracts signed from July 2002 onwards
"provide for public authorities to receive 50 per cent of any gains arising from debt
refinancing (U.K. National Audit Office, 2006)."
Scope of work
Very often, the nature of the required infrastructure service, and consequently the
scope of a PPP, changes over time. Contracts can be designed to account for this
possibility and prescribe ways in which the modified work is to be delivered and
compensated. For instance, contracts prepared by the National Highway Authority
of India (NHAI) allow for the private partner to be paid back on a cost plus basis
(Government of India, Ministry of Road Transport and Highways, National Highway
Authority of India, 2011). In the UK as well, the private partner is compensated for
small changes on a cost plus basis. However, if there are large changes in scope, the
additional services are bid in the open market (U.K. National Audit Office, 2008).
Other changes or contract modification
Contracts often contain provisions for review/modification of contractual
agreements in case certain pre-specified triggers are set off or milestones are
achieved. In water concessions, for instance, the private provider may be paid a
certain rate for water provision while expanding services to backward communities
and a different rate once a predetermined level of access is achieved.
Termination or suspension
Contracts require careful management to ensure that the private party delivers the
infrastructure service as per the original agreement. Contracts may have explicit
termination or suspension clauses carefully outlining different levels of actions that
the appropriate public body may take against the private partner corresponding to
different levels of deterioration in service. For instance, NHAI concessions under the
NHDP provide for "termination of the agreement if the average daily traffic in any
accounting year exceeds the design capacity and continues to exceed for three
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subsequent accounting years (Government of India, Ministry of Road Transport and
Highways, National Highway Authority of India, 2011)."
This is by no means a comprehensive list as numerous other adjustment
mechanisms and flexibility clauses have been applied in concessions around the
world. The list provided here simply illustrates that contracts can be made more
flexible in order to respond to uncertainties that can be easily anticipated but not
precisely characterized.
Concessions in India
The PPP Cell within the Department of Economic Affairs (DEA) in the Ministry of
Finance in India, and other PPP Cells at state levels have prepared sector-specific
Model Concession Agreements (MCAs). These standardized contractual documents
lay down the terminologies related to risks, liabilities, performance standards, and
dispute resolution frameworks. They strive to enable optimal risk allocation and to
provide clarity in obligation of both parties and provisions for penalty on accounts
of breach of contract.
The National Highway Authority of India (NHAI) has prepared MCAs for Highways9
corresponding to a number of PPP types (BOT (Toll), BOT (Annuity), etc.) and the
Shipping Ministry has done the same for Ports' 0 . NHAI's BOT (Toll) model
concession is discussed herein as an example of a typical long-term contractual
agreement
Sample Concession Agreement: National Highway Authority of India (NHAI)
The National Highway Development Program (NHDP) is one of the largest road
development programs to be undertaken by a single authority in the world and
involves widening, upgrading and rehabilitation of about 54,000 km of roads across
the country, entailing an estimated investment of more than INR 3,00,000 Crore
(USD 60 billion). The National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) is mandated to
implement the NHDP. Projects covering 15,784 km have already been completed
and another 10,357 km are under progress. The rest 28,313 km under the NHDP are
still to be awarded (Government of India, Ministry of Road Transport and Highways,
National Highway Authority of India, 2011).
NHAI has decided that PPPs are the main mode of project delivery for future phases
of NHDP. More than 60% of the projected investment requirement for the NHDP is
9 A sample is available at NHAI's website: http://www.nhai.org/annuity.pdf. Last
checked January 19, 2011.
10 A sample is available at the Shipping Ministry's website:
http:/ /shipping.gov.in/writereaddata/ linkimages/mca896116248.pdf. Last
checked January 19, 2011.
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to be privately financed, through Build Operate and Transfer (BOT)-Annuity
(investment by firm and return through semi-annual pre-determined payments
from NHAI as per bid) and Build Operate and Transfer (BOT)-Toll modes
(investment by firm and return through levy and retention of user fees). The
concessions are crafted to target an Internal Rate of Return (IRR) on equity for BOT-
Annuity projects of 14-16% and for BOT-Toll projects of 18-20%.
Risk Allocation
As an underlying principle, risks are allocated to the parties that "are best able to
manage them (Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic
Affairs (2010a)." Thus, the commercial and technical risks relating to construction,
operation and maintenance are allocated to the concessionaire. Other commercial
risks, such as the rate of growth of traffic, are also allocated to the concessionaire.
The model agreement also specifies NHAI's obligations. Among other things, NHAI is
responsible to acquire all the land required till the Appointment Date and ensure
that it is free from encumbrances. The government is also supposed to carry out all
preparatory works and meet the costs of obtaining major clearances required for
road projects such as environmental, forest, air and water pollution, rehabilitation
and resettlement of displaced families, techno-economic, etc.
Fixed Provisions
Fixed provisions are included to allow for the natural evolution of performance
standards and tariffs. In case there are no unexpected changes, such provisions are
intended to be sufficient to foster projects through concession periods.
The model concession agreement for BOT (toll) PPPs specifies that the base toll
rates are to rise at a pre-determined rate of 3% per year + 40% of the rise in the
Weighted Price Index. The model concession also contains a flexibility clause that
allows for extension or reduction of the concession period in the event the actual
traffic falls short or exceeds the target traffic. NHAI's Model Concession Agreements
contains the following provisions (Government of India, Ministry of Road Transport
and Highways, National Highway Authority of India, 2011):
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Table 4: Provisions For Adjustment In BOT (Toll) PPPs
Actual Traffic Change in Concession Period for Cap on VariationEvery 1% of Variation
Less than Target Increased by 1.5% 20%
Above Target Reduced by 0.75% 10%
Source: Government of India, Ministry of Road Transport and Highways, National Highway
Authority of India (2011), "Guidelines for Investment in Road Sector (July 2011)", p. 26,
Variation in Traffic, http://www.nhai.org/. Last checked July 19, 2011.
Recognition of Uncertainty, Provisions for Flexibility and Contract Management
A host of factors, such as large jumps in costs, public opposition, macroeconomic
shocks, rule changes, changes in the political environment, etc. could impact the
project over its lifetime. Thus, a contract needs to have provisions keeping in mind
the need to adjust in case such circumstances are encountered. Contract
management teams are typically constituted within the sponsoring agency and
charged with the task to carry out the following functions in this regard:
- Flexibility: The PPP Cell acknowledges the need for change and flexibility over
the life of the PPP. Specific contractual provisions and contract management
practices that it fosters include:
Change of Scope: Typically in India, changes in scope are dealt with in the
following manner11 :
- The concessionaire bears the cost up to an aggregate pre-specified ceiling
(for example, 0.25% of the total project cost in national highways) while
the sponsor bears any additional costs.
- The concessionaire can nullify a change in scope order if it (a) causes
cumulative costs relating to all change in scope orders in three preceding
years to exceed a pre-specified ceiling of the total project cost (5% in case
of roads) or (b) by itself exceeds a pre-specified ceiling of the total project
cost (20% in case of roads) at any time during the concession period.
11 Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs, "Other
Issues Related to Contract Management", PPP Cell, Department of Economic Affairs,
http://toolkit.pppinindia.com/ports/module2 -p4-oirtcm-cos.php?links=oirtcm1d.
Last Accessed January 17, 2011.
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e Contract Amendment In order to maintain the balance of risks and rewards,
certain contractual amendments are likely to be necessary over the life of a
concession. Therefore, a contractual framework to guide contract
amendment is important:
- Regular: Regular reviews can be scheduled at preset intervals to re-
consider key elements of a contract that are uncertain and susceptible to
change over time.
- Extraordinary: Reviews can take place in case there are large changes in
the project environment outside of the control of the concessionaire.
- Dispute Resolution: Adverse impacts on account of political opportunism and
public opposition are classified as "force majeure" risks to be shared between
the two parties. In the environment of an arms-length relationship of the kind
fostered by contracts, disputes are bound to arise in case a force majeure risk is
in fact realized. Thus, elaborate dispute resolution mechanisms need to be
designed into contracts as well.
The model agreement includes a dispute resolution procedure that parties are
required to observe in case of a dispute in relation to the concession contract It
encourages the parties to resolve the dispute amicably or with the help of an
Independent Engineer as mediator, failing which the parties are required to
resort to Arbitration. Each party is free to nominate an arbitrator and the two
nominees appoint a presiding arbitrator.
- Asset Transfer at the End of Life: Reviewing asset conditions at the end of life,
comparing against criteria outlined in the contractual agreement and
implementing penalties as per contractual agreements in case of a divergence.
Summary of the Indian (Contractual) Approach
Led by the PPP Cell in the DEA, India has adopted a contractual approach to
governing PPPs. There is considerable support at the central level and at the state
level in various states to guide project sponsors through the PPP identification,
preparation, development, procurement and management stages. The emphasis of
this approach is on using a risk allocation framework to optimize the collective
resources of the private and public partner and prove value for money to the public
partner. Guidance documents and tools provided as part of the PPP Toolkit reflect
best practices from around the globe and are likely to be helpful to project sponsors
in terms of bringing important risks to their attention, but seem to be inadequate in
guarding against future uncertainties.
Model RFQs, RFPs and MCAs hold the promise to streamline the PPP process and
flexibility clauses and carefully crafted dispute resolution mechanisms provide for
frameworks to respond to unexpected changes over time. However, the
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relationship between the private and public partner remains arms-length and
incentives for a true partnership seem to remain weak.
Summary - Advantages and Limitations of Contractual Governance
Large investment requirements and asset specificity (immobility) of infrastructure
projects makes them prone to opportunistic behavior. Long-term concessions based
on contracts are a mechanism to attract private investment in infrastructure as they
carefully outline responsibilities and obligations for the public and private party
over a period of time to allow for recovery of investment. The tendency for
opportunistic behavior is controlled if the parties have recourse to an independent
and efficient judicial system.
However, technical challenges, political sensitivity, and changing dynamics of the
economic and social environment create a high level of uncertainty and pose strong
challenges to contracts to withstand the tests of time. In spite of best efforts on the
part of project sponsors and partners to create strategies to cope with anticipated
risks, constraints, and issues, projects facing turbulence often enter "spirals of
disintegration" and go from "euphoria to a degenerative nightmare" (Miller and
Lessard, 2000). Even the most comprehensive efforts on the part of the framers of
the contractual agreement turn out to be inadequate in the presence of uncertainties
over time.
Moreover, owing to the essential nature of public services that they deliver,
infrastructure projects, especially those with private sector involvement, are always
in the eye of the media and the public at large. Thus, structuring projects for stability
and to recover investments in the midst of changing technologies, policies, and
public demands over decades is a critical but difficult task. Indeed, India's erstwhile
Minister of Civil Aviation articulated that the key challenge for PPP infrastructure
projects is "How to manage the partnership through a tightly-framed concession
agreement over a 20-30 year period, in a rapidly changing environment
(Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Government of India, 2007)."
In summary, contracts must be long-term to limit expropriation but this limits
flexibility. Long-term contracts are thus successful in attracting investment and
ensuring service delivery over time in case the surrounding environment is stable,
but inadequate by themselves in the presence of significant turbulence. Particular
advantages and limitations of the use of long-term contracts as the main governance
mechanism of public-private partnerships are outlined herein.
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Advantages
- Fixing obligations prevents opportunistic behavior and promises stability to
attract private finance.
- Long-term contracts increase the likelihood and improve the terms of long-
term debt financing.
- Risk identification and allocation is a useful exercise: The emphasis on risk is
valuable since allocation of risks to the party most willing and able to assume
the risk at the lowest cost leads to greater efficiency and responsiveness.
- Clear specification of service levels, tariffs and a risk allocation framework
allow for a level playing field for private investors. Thus the benefits of
competitive tendering can be fully exploited under such an arrangement.
This is particularly important in a democratic society such as India since
transparency leads to a perceptions of fairness.
Limitations
- Not a True Partnership: The relationship between the private and public
partner remains arms-length and incentives for a true partnership seem to
remain weak. Thus, required changes are likely to confront differing
objectives and partners are unlikely to resolve issues in a way that produces
the best outcome for the project
- Resource Drain: Since long-term contracts are meant to comprehensively
specify obligations, responsibilities and contingencies over long periods of
time, they take a considerable amount of time, money and expertise to
develop. G6mez-Ibainez (2003) notes, "...identifying all the risks and
negotiating appropriate contingencies is time consuming, costly, and
impractical." For instance, the Tirupur project in Tamil Nadu - the first
privately financed water and sewerage project in the country - took more
than ten years from concept to financial closure (Asian Development Bank,
2006).
- Inevitable Incompleteness and Inflexibility: G6mez-Ibainez (2003) notes,
"A central limitation of long-term contracts is the possibility that the contract
may prove to be incomplete or become obsolete if circumstances change."
Since desired end results and performance levels are difficult to specify
under rapidly changing technologies, consumer demands and standards,
some parts of contractual agreements may become unworkable over time for
one or both parties. In such situations, parties to the contract face the choice
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of living with unsatisfactory terms or exposing themselves to opportunism
by renegotiating the contract.
Misleading Risk Management Frameworks: Though efficient risk-
allocation is touted as a key strength of long-term contracts, this exercise
often simply creates an illusion of efficiency. Garvin (2009) points out
"...often the public sector retains more risks or pays a higher premium for
risks than anticipated..." This happens because the public partner is
ultimately accountable to the public for infrastructure service delivery.
Additionally, owing to contractual rigidity, unidentified risks also rest with
the public sector partner. Based upon a review of sixty projects, Miller and
Lessard (2000) find "The same long-term contracts that reduce market and
supply risks for independent power producers can block efforts to respond
to market realities." They further report that "strategies implemented to deal
with anticipated risks were not necessarily effective in dealing with
unexpected events; in fact they often hampered the capacity to deal with
them."
Opportunistic Bidding: In multi-stage long-term projects, coordination of
prior technical and managerial knowledge is often vital (Chan, 2010).
Switching private partner mid-way through project delivery is likely to result
in delaying the project and in cost over-runs. Thus, elimination of the
incumbent is unlikely and investors thus have an incentive to submit a low
bid, secure the rights to develop the projec and renegotiate the terms at a
later stage. This incentive is heightened in the case of politically sensitive
projects in which the government pressures the public partner to
successfully deliver the project under a fixed schedule.
The Asian Development Bank (2006) brings attention to this problem:
"Bidders often offer below-cost prices to win the contract in anticipation of
later renegotiation. A concession agreement should cover all possible causes
of later adjustments, leaving minimum room for renegotiation." It notes that
over 60% of 1000 concessions awarded in the 1990s in Latin American were
renegotiated within three years, often owing to opportunistic bidding.
Williamson's (1979) account of contractual governance from the point of view of
transaction-cost economics summarizes the conclusions nicely:
"Increasing the degree of uncertainty makes it more imperative that
the parties devise a machinery to "work things out"-since contractual
gaps will be larger and the occasions for sequential adaptations will
increase in number and importance as the degree of uncertainty
increases."
Subsequent chapters explore mechanisms that can enable PPPs to "work things out"
over time.
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Chapter 3: Regulatory Governance
Chapter 2 establishes that contracts are incomplete since they cannot foresee
all the changes that projects will need to go through over time. When unexpected
events do occur, the private provider and the public partner renegotiate contracts.
This exercise is subject to opportunism and breeds corruption. Uncertainty around
the outcome of these negotiations deters investors from participating in PPPs.
Some, including the Indian Planning Commission make the case for setting up
Independent Regulatory Agencies (IRAs) to be able to govern these relationships
over time. Indeed, experience from Latin America with concessions shows that
presence of a regulator reduces opportunistic behavior (G6mez-Ibaiez, 2008). This
strategy merits exploration. This chapter starts with a discussion of the general idea
of discretionary regulation and identifies the conditions for regulators to be
effective in guiding PPPs through turbulent times. It then explores the regulatory
framework for infrastructure projects across sectors in India. It finds that this form
of governance still does not emphasize true 'partnership' has other shortcomings
that render it insufficient as a governance mechanism for Indian PPPs.
The Concept
An alternative to trying to prescribe service levels and tariff-setting mechanisms
over long period of time through contracts is to allow independent regulators to
determine these as information evolves over time. Leading authors have pointed out
that "...discretionary regulation may be the best solution where the circumstances
are too complex or unstable to draft a complete contract (G6mez-Ibainez, 2003)."
Others have taken more extreme positions: "unless there is an assurance against
expropriation through regulatory commitment, investments won't take place
(Ghosh and Kathuria, 2011)."
Proponents of regulatory governance propose that independent regulators can
simultaneously pursue the interests of consumers and investors while remaining
free from political influence. In their view, such an approach provides the necessary
flexibility to deal with uncertainties over time and prevents contractual
renegotiations in which partners to a PPP have incentives to act opportunistically.
Indeed, the Planning Commission under the Government of India has emphasized
that setting up a regulatory system is a critical component of creating the investor-
friendly environment required to mobilize private investment The concepts of
relational contracts and IRAs are presented herein.
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Relational Contracts
Instead of locking project partners into prescriptive paths, relational contracts allow
for the ability to periodically review and adjust agreements given observations over
time. They are based on the idea that no matter how hard we try, we cannot
adequately account for all the factors that may affect infrastructure projects over
time. Thus, the relational contract does not seek to estimate every possible future
course that the project may take over its life and every contingency the contract
thus needs to develop. Rather, it entrusts a regulatory authority or an independent
regulator with to use discretion in estimating prices, service and quality standards
as required.
This is the most flexible type of contract, which "anticipates that the relationship
between the parties will have to adapt over time in unforeseeable ways. It relies on
renegotiation between the parties as the remedy, and provides a general framework
for those negotiations rather than specific remedies for identified contingencies
G6mez-Ibainez, 2003)."
Relational contracts are commonly used around the world for BOT projects
involving toll roads. They acknowledge that demand forecasts are simply forecasts
and these can be improved over time based on experience. Thus, instead of
determining tariffs for the entire lifetime of a toll road based on long-term traffic
forecasts, relational contracts would prescribe tariffs for a short time period (3-5
years) and allow for review of the tariffs at the end of each period based on the
latest usage information. These contracts usually also specify tolerance values (such
as maximum % change) such that the changes from one period to the next are not
drastic.
Independent Regulatory Agencies and Discretionary Regulation
For the periodic reviews to be effective, they need to be presided over by an
independent third party. Independent Regulatory Agencies (IRAs) are especially
well suited for these positions.
Dubash (2008) provides a comprehensive discussion around various theories and
motivations behind setting up IRAs and the roles that they play:
1. Public Interest: As per this viewpoint, the goal of regulation is to increase
allocative efficiency in pursuit of the "common good." This approach
supposes that regulators are simply agents of the public interest and
assumes that neutral and competent regulators can reliably choose a single
correct answer to regulatory problems by optimizing between the goals of
economic efficiency and achievement of alternative social values.
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2. Private Interest: The proponents of this view argue that regulators emerge
to "serve the private interests of individuals or organized groups". Thus,
regulators develop increasingly close relationships with industry and are
subject to capture by special interest groups. These groups could include
public sector bodies, in cases where infrastructure services are primarily
delivered by public enterprises. According to this view, 'regulators exist to
limit the scope for arbitrary administrative action, thereby creating
conditions favorable for investment'.
3. Stakeholder Approach: Regulators are expected to achieve a balance among
the interests of different stakeholder groups. The legitimacy of regulators is
tied to how well they do so.
The legislation that gives rise to the regulatory body usually contains certain
guidelines and procedures that the regulator needs to follow in order to arrive at a
decision. However, such legislation often leaves ample ground for the regulator to
enjoy substantial freedom in carrying out his duties. Indeed: "The basic advantage
of discretionary regulation is its flexibility, enabling it to adapt to changing
and unforeseen circumstances (G6mez-Ibafiez, 2003)."
IRAs first surfaced in the United States through the Administrative Procedures Act
(1956). These bodies fall under the executive branch of government, but are
supposed to be insulated from political influence. There are important lessons to be
learnt from the American experience with successful provision of electricity services
over many years in the presence of regulators.
The critical factor for the success of a regulatory institution is balance between
autonomy and accountability.
1. Autonomy: Functional autonomy in day-to-day activities while allowing the
Ministry to issue only broad policy guidelines and directives. "Selection,
appointment and removal of the chairperson and members should to be
insulated against any perceived interference or manipulation (Government
of India, Planning Commission, The Secretariat for the Committee on
Infrastructure, 2008)."
2. Legitimacy / Accountability: It is challenging, but critical to make
autonomous regulatory institutions accountable. The modes of responsibility
that need to be established are:
i. Legislative accountability: The regulator should be directly responsible
to the legislature for the ways in which it chooses to administer the
policy guidelines set by the legislature. The legislature should always be
able to exercise oversight over the regulator, except to avoid clashes of
jurisdiction for cases where the decisions of the regulator are open to
appeal before an appellate tribunal.
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ii. Democratic accountability: The regulator should rest decision-making
on publically articulated rationale and the regulator's decisions should
be open to public scrutiny to ensure legitimacy in the eyes of people at
large. This would also serve as an effective safeguard against regulatory
capture by special interests.
The US has been successful in achieving this balance and reasonable compliance by
regulators to Congress' legislative objectives. One reason for this success is that the
US Congress reserves the power to cut funding for non-performers and directly
monitors administrative activity in case it needs to exercise this power. Additionally,
rule making is controlled by an administrative procedure that requires description
of the content of proposed rules to the public in an accessible language ("notice")
and solicitation of views of all interested parties ("comment"). From the experience
in the US and other areas around the world, best practices in achieving regulatory
autonomy and accountability simultaneously are presented herein.
Institutional Framework for Regulatory Success
1. Budgeting: Give the regulatory body a substantial budget while subjecting it
to budget reviews to be conducted by the legislature.
2. Regulator Appointment: These include guidelines for choosing the right
person (people) for the job such that they are able to effectively balance
competing interests without falling prey to opportunistic behavior, and
ensuring autonomy once selected.
i. Appointfor fixed durations: Appointment of regulators for fixed durations
and provisions for removal from office only for specific and limited causes
so that they can make decisions that might be unpopular in the short run
without fear of political influence. This was the case with the Public Utilities
Commissions set up in the US during the first half of the twentieth century.
ii. Appoint to staggered terms: Staggered terms in relation to political
appointments so as to mitigate the power of the appointer.
iii. Choose the right person (people): Characteristics of a good regulator
include:
a. Sector-specific technical expertise
b. Good reputation to earn respect from legislators, industry
participations, adjudicators and the general public
c. Political dexterity and the ability to "distinguish between political
considerations and others that are politicized masks for rents,
wastage and theft, to recognize the limits of government
administration and to be alert enough to take advantage of the few
opportunities for political entrepreneurship (Morris, 2002)."
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3. Participatory approach to rulemaking: These refer to civil society's ability
to engage in decision-making. They include Requirements for issuance of
public notice before issuance of new rules, public deliberation/hearings,
written comments in the face of questions and opposition, and written
justification for proposed and final decisions.
i. Notice and comment: The affected industries and generally concerned
public can be effectively engaged by providing notices before the issuance
of a new regulation (30 days in the US for electricity regulation) and setting
aside reasonable time-periods and avenues such as open discussion
meetings (such as town hall meetings in the US) to solicit comments for all
interested or affected parties.
ii. Open access to information: Democratic accountability can be achieved in
part by requiring the regulator to publish rules online or in a public
register.
iii. Require periodic reports: Legislative accountability can be achieved by
requiring the regulator to submit written reports on the previous year's
activities and on the rationale behind the strategy proposed for the
forthcoming year.
4. Substantive Guidance: Even in the presence of robust regulatory
procedures that ensure transparency and build accountability and
credibility, regulators still require "some basis on which alternative
competing interests are to be weighed and prioritized (Dubash, 2008)." For
instance, the UK's "Utilities Act of 2000 makes consumer protection the
primary duty of the regulator (Dubash, 2008)." Similarly, the pursuit of
public interest was the avowed reason for why many states in the United
States replaced regulation by municipal concession contracts with regulation
by public utility commissions (G6mez-Ibaniiez, 2003). Such legislation is
currently missing, but required in the case of India.
Regulation in India
Indian policy makers have long argued in favor of setting up IRAs to govern
infrastructure. The Planning Commission has made this intention clear: "The
command and control mode of governance that relied on state ownership of
infrastructure services is gradually moving towards a new mode of regulatory
governance where public private partnerships and private sector participation
require governmental priorities to be achieved through independent regulation and
the law of contract (Government of India, Planning Commission, The Secretariat for
the Committee on Infrastructure, 2008)."
Thus, India is witnessing a transformation from an environment where policy
making, legislation, and ownership of enterprises converged in a Department or
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Ministry to one in which these functions are dispersed. However, this
transformation remains largely incomplete and asymmetrical across sectors. Table
5 depicts the current regulatory environment across sectors in India:
Table 5: Asymmetric Regulation Across Infrastructure Sectors in India
Sector Regulation
Roads No regulatory authority; National Highway Authority of India(NHAI) acts as the regulator as well as the operator.
No regulatory authority; Indian Railways acts as the regulator as
well as the operator.
Tariff Authority for Major Ports (TAMP) has the sole function of
tariff setting. Investors and users have no recourse to an
Ports independent regulator on other matters such as dispute
resolution, performance standards, consumer protection and
competition.
Airports Economic Regulatory Authority (AERA) recently set up
to determine tariff structure for aeronautical services,
development fees for major airports and passenger service fees,
Airports and to monitor the performance standards relating to quality,
continuity, and reliability of service (Rastogi, 2007).
Separate agencies regulate safety and technical aspects.
Regulatory Commissions at the Center (CERC) and State (SERCs)
levels with extensive functions and powers.
Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) is responsible for
regulating telecom and internet service providers.
Water Supply No regulatory authority; responsibility of Urban Local Bodies
and Satation
aagen No regulatory authority; responsibility of Urban Local Bodies
Management
Source: Based on data from Government of India, Planning Commission, The Secretariat
for the Committee on Infrastructure (2008), "Approach to Regulation of Infrastructure,"
http://infrastructure.gov.in/event Regulation Law and Policy final.pdf. Last checked
March 23, 2011.
Page 51 of 150
It is clear from Table 5 that the evolution of regulatory institutions across
infrastructure sectors lacks a common regulatory philosophy. Even among sectors
that have independent regulators, there are significant points of departure. These
include:
- Scope: For instance, electricity regulator has extensive powers (rule making,
enforcement, imposition of penalties, etc.) while port regulator can only set
tariffs, that too with restricted powers.
- Avenue for appeal: The telecom and electricity sectors have appellate
tribunals while such specialized forums of appeal are missing in other
sectors.
- Tenure of regulators: Varies between 3 years to 5 years across sectors.
- Reappointment rules: Generally members of regulatory commissions or
appellate tribunals cannot be reappointed but for the electricity appellate
tribunal, they can be reappointed for another 3-year period.
- Selection process: Presence or absence selection committee, prescription of
qualifications, etc.
This current regulatory environment, where different infrastructure sectors face
different rules, has been framed by "political constraints and ministerial preferences
(Government of India, Planning Commission, The Secretariat for the Committee on
Infrastructure, 2008)." Moreover, India has experienced divergent outcomes even
among the sectors where IRAs have been set up and vested with significant powers
- telecommunications and electricity. These experiences are outlined in Appendix 3
and implications for the future of PPP governance through regulation in India's
infrastructure sectors are discussed in the summary of advantages and limitations
in the subsequent section.
Summary
The current regulatory framework in India lacks synchronization across sectors and
creates (instead of removes) avenues of uncertainty owing to structural issues,
political influence and lack of competence among regulators.
The history of telecom and electricity regulation in India (see Appendix 3) suggests
that while they have experienced success on some levels, they are heavily influenced
by political motivations and suffer from a host of other shortcomings. The key
lessons are:
Page 52 of 150
Advantages
- Regulators provide for flexibility under uncertainty: Regulatory
governance holds the promise to overcome one they key shortcoming of
long-term contracts - the inability to respond to unanticipated risks.
Independent regulators can simultaneously pursue the interests of
consumers and investors by smoothening out the effects of such risks by
calling for small changes over time.
- Regulators provide insulation from political influence: Regulators can
limit the scope for arbitrary administrative action, thereby creating
conditions favorable for investment They can protect both public and
private parties from opportunistic behavior.
- Regulators promote transparency and public participation: By regularly
publishing the latest regulations along-with explanatory notes for the
rationale behind the orders, regulators provide the public with insight into
project governance. Additionally, issuing public notices, holding public
hearings on proposed rules, publishing market-monitoring reports, meeting
minutes, public tenders, and maintaining a detailed record of regulatory
proceedings electronically encourages and enables public participation.
Limitations
- Confrontational rather than cooperative: Much like contracts, regulatory
frameworks are for the most part adversarial and thus often result in
litigation and drawn out conflicts. In reference to global experience with such
systems, Lofstedt and Vogel (2001) report, "There has been a great deal of
inefficiency...including constant suits and countersuits and regulation being
driven by public opinion..." Regulators often make rules in the presence of
information asymmetries and then levy fines for non-compliance. Regulatory
systems are thus prone to the "regulate, litigate, regulate, litigate syndrome
(Kelly, 1988 as cited in Coglianese, 1997, p. 1265)." Lofstedt and Vogel
(2001) conclude, "There is more to gain by working together rather than
opposing each other."
- Focus on procedure rather than project: The effectiveness of regulatory
governance is often shackled by well intentioned, but time consuming,
cumbersome procedures. These include requirements for issuance of public
notice before issuance of new rules, public deliberation/hearings, written
comments in the face of questions and opposition, and written justification
for proposed and final decisions. These render the system expensive and
inefficient.
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- Regulators are weak: Regulators seem to either not have extensive powers
(port regulator) or are effectively extensions of public agencies out to
achieve political motives while laying off accountability onto a third party
(electricity regulators).
Governments are not supportive: Relationships between governments and
regulatory bodies have been unsteady and not very constructive and
governments have often been found to be unresponsive and/or opposed to
regulators. For example, the crucial position of Chairman of the CERC was left
vacant for over a year (Bhatiani, 2002) while the Department of
Telecommunications was against the institution of an independent telecom
regulator and even appealed its decisions in court.
- Maintaining independence is challenging in an institutional context
characterized by public ownership of service providers in most sectors; the
existence of a few large and dominant private firms if at all; a limited pool of
skilled individuals capable of assuming the roles of regulator or staff; limited
public familiarity with regulatory processes; and the nascent state of civil
society (Dubash, 2008).
- Public engagement and transparency are limited: For instance, Ghosh
and Kathuria (2011) have argued for a significant increase in participation of
public interest groups in the regulatory decision-making process to meet
concerns about the legitimacy and accountability of independent regulators.
In addition, Dubash (2008) has called for robust procedures of transparency
and participation, and a reorientation of electricity regulatory institutions to
being "an active site of political debate, rather than an island in a sea of
politics".
- Regulation is technically challenging: Notwithstanding particular
difficulties in India, discretionary regulation is technically challenging.
"Under cost of service regulation as developed in the Untied States, for
example, the regulator is supposed to set tariffs high enough to cover the
costs of an efficient firm, including operating expenses, depreciation and a
reasonable rate of return on invested capital (G6mez-Ibaiez, 2003)." To
make this calculation, the regulator needs to have confidence in the reported
costs, assess whether the investments made are prudent, and determine
other critical information such as discount rates on debt and required rates
of return on equity, which are often very difficult to determine.
Substantive guidance is absent while it is particularly important since
there is usually not a clear economically correct answer to regulatory issues.
At the moment, regulators "make back-door adjustments to accommodate
social and political pressures" into regulatory decisions. A clear substantive
framework that forces "explicit and transparent consideration of trade-offs
and alternatives" is needed (Dubash, 2008).
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In summary, though setting up independent regulatory agencies is frequently touted
as a way to improve infrastructure project outcomes, this traditionally prescribed
reform has achieved mixed success in India at best. Public authorities have largely
failed to safeguard the independence and subjectivity of regulators.
Thus, infrastructure projects are unlikely to achieve the double imperative of
ensuring financial sustainability and of meeting user needs and social objectives
under a framework of regulatory governance alone. Tankha et al. (2010) note:
"Where institutions are unfavorable and are difficult to change,
additional pathways and strategies for improving sector
performance warrant exploration."
The subsequent chapter discusses such alternative strategies, collectively referred
to as structural governance.
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Chapter 4: What Works?
The third 'P' in PPP emphasizes partnership. However, as discussed in
Chapters 2 and 3, the usual forms of PPP governance based on contracts or
regulatory bodies seem to emphasize, institutionalize and reinforce an antagonistic
relationship between the public and the private sector 'partners'. In practice, "PPPs
do not involve the intensive cooperation required in the ideal model (Spiering and
Dewulf, 2006)." Thus, neither contractual nor regulatory governance mechanisms
suffice in institutionalizing an environment where infrastructure projects can adjust
to unanticipated changes over time and achieve the dual imperative of ensuring
financial sustainability while meeting user needs and social objectives.
Formal agreements under contractual frameworks provide private partners with
the confidence of having recourse to the courts but are inadequate in an
environment characterized by turbulence and subject to renegotiation in adverse
conditions. More flexible (relational) contracts and regulatory governance
accommodates a changing environment but does not provide adequate insulation
against political influence. Both frameworks are confrontational and fail to
emphasize real commitment to partnership.
Under the traditional frameworks, during project structuring, the public and private
sector partners negotiate risk allocation frameworks and work through the details
of economics, obligations, and responsibilities. Each partner attempts to get the best
deal possible for itself. During the design phase, the public partner typically plays
big boss by approving drawings and recommending changes. For instance, in the
Delhi International Airport project, AAI rejected and completely changed the private
partner's original design. The private company (GMR) wanted to give the airport
fagade a red sandstone structure like the Red Fort in Delhi but the government
asked for a glass-and-steel look instead. The airport layout changed extensively as a
result (ain et aL., 2006).
During the construction phase, the public partner attempts to scrutinize and control
costs even in the presence of information asymmetry. During the longest stage of
the partnership - operations, the public partner simply plays the role of a watchdog,
ensuring that the performance standards originally established are adhered to.
Generally even such oversight is limited. Finally, during the hand-over stage at the
end of the PPPs life, the public partner scrutinizes the conditions of the
infrastructure assets against contractual specifications. The degree of partnership
seems to wither and that of antagonism between the parties seems to intensify over
time.
Contrasting against such a depiction of PPPs is a situation in which issues can be
resolved before they become contractual and the partnership is sustained and even
strengthened over time. This chapter commences with an examination of successful
Indian infrastructure PPPs in search of such alternatives.
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Findings from Successful PPPs
Cochin Airport
Basics
The Cochin International Airport Limited (CIAL) in Kerala was the first major
airport in India built with private sector investment. The head of the district
administration, V. 1. Kurien, incorporated CIAL in 1994 to build, operate and
maintain an international standard airport at Cochin. Upon incorporation, Kurien
relinquished his role as head of district administration and took charge as managing
director of CIAL. After initial problems with fundraising, CIAL was able to raise
initial financing in the form of short term loans and long term debt backed by a
guarantee from the government of Kerala, and eventually equity from the state
government amounting to a 41% stake. The rest of the equity was raised largely
from the primary users of the new airport - high net worth individuals and
industrialists, primarily Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) numbering 10,000 from over
30 countries who regularly traveled in and out of Kerala (15% of Kerala's
population in 2000 was working abroad).
Uncertainties
1. Financing: Initially, the Airports Authority of India (AAI) and the Director
General of Civil Aviation refused to invest in a new international airport at
Cochin despite the identified need.
2. Politics: "During the 5 years of construction of the airport, CIAL officials had to
deal with three Civil Aviation Ministers, four Civil Aviation Secretaries, four
Chairmen of AAI at Central Government, and three Chief Ministers, four
Transport Ministers and four Transport Secretaries at the State Government
(Akintoye and Beck, 2009, p. 110)."
Key Success Factors
Despite lack of clarity on policies, issues and regulations concerning Greenfield
airport construction and operations, financing issues and political chaos at the
center and state levels, CIAL has been consistently generating profits since 2002-03
(four year after the inaugural flight) after an initial hick-up owing to lower than
expected demand. The key reasons include:
1. Public Sector Management: Involvement of the Chief Minister of the State as
the Chairman of the Board in CIAL was a big factor in mitigating political risk. In
India, "large projects that are initiated by the incumbent government and those
that are still in the development phase are usually reviewed by the new
government (Akintoye and Beck, 2009, p. 118)." The magnitude of political risk
is heavily reduced by having the Chief Minister of the State as Chairman of CIAL,
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since no Chief Minister, regardless of party, would like to see a project fail under
their direct oversight.
Equally important in successful navigation of a constantly changing political
environment was having the previous head of the district administration as
Managing Director of CIAL. Kurien lobbied effectively for political support for the
project through regime changes and was successful in reducing risks during such
transition periods. He successfully managed political differences between the
state and central governments and his leadership solicited additional investment
from the state government as well as from private investors.
2. Stakeholder Engagement: "To create a favorable impression among different
stakeholders, publicity and communication regarding the airport project were
directly handled by the Managing Director, which helped in quickly responding
to the queries and concerns (Akintoye and Beck, 2009, p. 120)." Aggressive
advertising, a public relations drive, and special perks encouraged financial
support from potential users of the airport. Such broad based support prevented
the project from being delayed from land acquisition issues and other public
interest litigations.
3. Wide Equity Base: Initial financing from the government and from a few NRIs
encouraged other individuals to invest in CIAL. CIAL was thus able to raise 62%
of its equity from public sources (with the Government of Kerala as the largest
shareholder with a 41% stake) and the remaining 38% from private sources
(with NRIs accounting for 25% of equity investment) (Akintoye and Beck, 2009).
Inclusion of key players such as Air India (national flight carrier) and BPCL (fuel
supplier) proved to be a good strategy to mitigate risks and secure incentives to
increase service levels from the airport
Hassan-Mangalore Railway Project
Basics
The Indian Railways along-with Government of Karnataka formed a consortium -
Hassan-Mangalore Railway Development Company Limited - to upgrade a rail line
between the cities of Hassan and Mangalore in the state of Karnataka. Each party
contributed 40% of the required funds as equity, raised 9% as equity each from
New Mangalore Port Trust and Mineral Enterprises Ltd. and 2% from Karnataka
Rail Development Corporation (K-RIDE) (Raghuram and Gangwar, 2010). This was
one of the first railway PPPs in India and the line has been operating since 2006.
Uncertainties
1. Revenue: The project consortium proposed that significant capacity for
passenger traffic would exist on the trains. However, passenger fares in India
usually do not cover operational costs and are subsidized by freight traffic (Delhi
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et aL, 2010). Moreover, interdivisional and inter-zonal issues, availability of
motive power, availability of crew, train routing problems, and other issues
complicate freight movement as well. In fact, "During the first 11 months of
operation, only 1.6 mt freight moved, as against the forecast of about 6 mt
(Raghuram and Gangwar, 2010)." Thus, revenue was much lower than expected.
2. Bureaucratic: The Indian Railways are mandated to follow certain bureaucratic
procedures that lead to project delays. The need to coordinate a number of
agencies leads to low efficiency and potential breakdown (Delhi et aL, 2010).
Key Success Factors
Including upstream and downstream stakeholders, government officials,
interconnection operators, etc. as board members and managers helped the project
achieve efficient service delivery and profitability in the second year of operations.
Stakeholder Inclusion in Project Management: The project employed an
innovative strategy of offering positions in their board to key stakeholders. The
managers of different rail division in the region were given board positions, which
improved the overall efficiency of freight movement The organization managing a
port connected by the project was also given a board position, which led to the
adoption of new technical applications resulting in reduced spillage and increased
competitiveness of the rail system compared against land-based transport. The
experienced Indian Railways took care of operations and the Government of
Karnataka, which was best positioned to deal with political issues, was also offered a
board position. "This strategy helped balance the interests of the various
stakeholders, and this project is proceeding profitably (Delhi et a., 2010)."
Alandur Sewerage Project and Alandur Solid Waste Management Project
Basics
These projects correspond to Alandur Municipality's efforts towards building a
world-class sewerage infrastructure and meeting its growing solid waste
management needs. For both projects, AM engaged the Tamil Nadu Urban
Development Fund in structuring concession agreements.
Uncertainties
Municipal Worker Unrest / Local Agitation: The businesses of solid waste
collection, management, treatment and disposal traditionally fall under the purview
of Municipal Corporations and employ a number of workers united under labor
unions. These unions usually vehemently oppose privatization of such services since
this threatens their jobs. For instance, labor unions representing municipal workers
filed a legal suit against the Corporation of Chennai as they prepared the bid
documents for privatizing these "essential services" (Delhi et aL., 2010). Things were
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even more serious at Tirupur, where local villagers prevented vehicles from
entering treatment plants and threatened the lives of workers in the plants. Similar
opposition and agitation were expected in Alandur.
Key Success Factors
1. Public Sector Champion: The Alandur Sewerage Project (ASP) "demonstrated
that 'political will and quick decisions make projects happen'. The political
leadership and strong advocacy for the project provided by the chairman and
council of the municipality proved to be critical element of the success. While
strong support for the sewerage system within Alandur existed, political will
was essential to convince the customers and citizens to pay a significant share of
the cost and accept the entry of the private sector (Government of India, Ministry
of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs, PPP Cell, 2010)."
2. Stakeholder Consultation and Financial Involvement: The municipality and
the state government conducted an aggressive public outreach campaign for the
sewerage project to convince stakeholders of the benefits of the project. Based
on extensive stakeholder engagement and results of a 'Willingness to Pay'
survey, they solicited and succeeded in collecting one-time deposits in the form
of connection charges from the citizens of Alandur amounting to 29% of the
required funding. In this regard, the PPP Cell in DEA notes that community
awareness, support and on-going cooperation were critical for the success of the
project (Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic
Affairs, PPP Cell, 2010).
3. Stakeholder Inclusion in Project Management and Oversight: During the
development of the solid waste management project, existing municipal workers
were assured job security and given alternative assignments. Additionally, the
local community was involved in monitoring the performance of the private
operator via participation from prominent citizens and Resident Welfare
Associations, and the populace was educated on the need for segregating waste
and aiding the private waste collection company.
To maintain support for the sewerage project, a citizen's committee was formed
and it met frequently to review the status of the project, monitor performance of
the BOT contractor and provide a forum in which citizens could air their
concerns. As of 2009, the project had been running without incidents or protests
for three years (Mahalingam and Kapur, 2009).
These projects "establish that close involvement of all stakeholders /
departments at the key decision-making stages of the project, as also for review
and monitoring, is critical to ensuring that the project stays on-track
(Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs, PPP
Cell, 2010)."
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Bhiwandi Electricity Distribution
Even among India's crumbling infrastructure sectors, the power sector stands out
like a black sheep. Two decades of economic reform, beginning with the experiment
with Independent Power Producers as part of the 1991 economic liberalization,
have not resulted in much improvement in the technical or financial position of the
power sector.
Despite this weak institutional environment characterized by heavy political
interference, government opportunism and competitive populism, the Bhiwandi
Electricity Distribution system has been successful in involving a private operator
through a Distribution Franchise agreement Plagued by high levels of power theft
and collusion between big users (textile mills) and the state electricity board (SEB)
officials, Bhiwandi circle used to be the worst performing of Maharashtra's 40
power distribution circles. Post-reform, it is considered as one of the state's best
performers.
Basics
In 2007, the state distribution company, Mahadiscom signed a distribution franchise
agreement with Torrent Power on a "right to use" basis (i.e., ownership of assets
remain with Mahadiscom) for 10 years. The agreement obliged Torrent Power to
invest a minimum of $2.8 million per year for the first five years and supply power
to the circle under the same terms and conditions established by the state regulator
for Mahadiscom while meeting progressive performance targets. The PPP has been
a resounding success as the private operator has turned an annual loss of $7 million
into a $10 million profit and has surpassed all targets of reduction in Aggregate
Technical and Commercial losses and hours of load shedding and increase in tariff
collection efficiency. Table 6 summarizes circle characteristics before and after
private sector participation, along with Torrent Power's original performance
targets where known.
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Table 6: Bhiwandi Circle Electricity Distribution Franchise Turn-Around
Performance
Service Parameter Original Year III Target Actual
(2006-07) (2008-09) (2008-09)
Load Shedding (hours/day) 8.0 N/A 3.5
Transformer Failure Rate (%) 40 N/A 7.5
Metering (% of total customers) 23 N/A 95
Number of Interruptions 52.9 N/A 10.3
(per customer per year)
Average Interruption (hours) 22.4 N/A 3.45
AT&C Losses 58% 44% 24%
Collection Efficiency 66% 80% 95%
Source: Author, based on data from: Tankha, S., Misal, A B. and Fuller, B. W. (2010),
"Getting Reforms Done in Inhospitable Institutional Environments: Untying a Gordian
Knot in India's Power Distribution Sector," Energy Policy, Vol. 38, pp. 7 1 2 1-7 1 29 .
Distribution losses alone came down from 43% in April 2006 to 19% in December
2008 (Prayas Pune, 2009). Thus, by every measure, this PPP has been a resounding
success.
Uncertainties
Political and Public: Bhiwandi is a major textile hub, accounting for 33% of the
power looms nationwide. Pre-reform, companies operating these power looms,
accounting for a third of the total power consumed in Bhiwandi, regularly pilfered
power from the grid. They engaged private linesmen and bribed government-
employment linesmen to connect them illegally to the network. Local politicians did
not object to this arrangement and partook in this collusion since these mills were
the main source of employment in Bhiwandi. This imbedded system proved resilient
over the years and any efforts to alter the system faced opposition from the illegal
linesmen and officials of the electricity board to protect employment, power loom
owners and operators to keep costs low, and local politicians to sustain popularity
and power. Bhiwandi's status as the worst performing circle in Maharashtra made it
even more challenging for the private operator to succeed.
Key Success Factors
In addition to technical improvements, there were key structural factors that led to
the project's success. Foremost among them were the facts that the franchisee
reduced the costs of reform for the various stakeholders and created instead of
limited economic opportunities for key interest groups.
Stakeholder Involvement: A critical feature of Torrent Power's strategy was to
include all key stakeholders in crafting a solution to the circle's problems.
Page 62 of 150
- Customers: It reduced transaction costs for customers to regularize their
connections by organizing special camps in different neighborhoods to
sanction new connections on the spot instead of soliciting people to the
central office.
- Private Linesmen: The franchisee tackled power theft through the use of
private linesmen by bringing them within the new formal institutional
structure. It recruited these linesmen, who were previously illegally
connecting people to Mahadiscom's network to perform maintenance and
theft prevention jobs for itself. By mainstreaming rather than marginalizing
these linesmen, the franchisee a) gained access to their technical and tacit
expertise and b) created support for this project in a group that was
previously a critical component of the nexus of corruption.
- Labor Unions: The franchisee prevented potential protests by labor unions
comprised of state electricity board employees by protecting their key
interests of keeping their jobs. More than 100 Mahadiscom employees were
deputed to the franchisee for a term of three years, extendable contingent on
performance. These employees enjoyed pay-for-performance perks in
addition to the service conditions they enjoyed at the state electricity board.
Tankha, Misal and Fuller (2010) note that the distribution franchise contract did not
include any innovative or special clauses to ensure credible commitment on part of
the government. Rather, they report that the success of reforms in this perverse
institutional environment was the result of "a complex interplay of strategic choices,
careful research of the stakeholders, coalition building, and shepherding as the
reforms are formulated and implemented across multiple levels and domains of
governance."
Lessons
It is important at the outset to recognize that projects face different levels of
technical, political, economic, financial and social conditions. Each project presents
its own unique set of challenges and opportunities. Thus, a tactic that works in one
project may be completely in effective in another. However, lessons can be drawn
from elements of strategies that have repeatedly worked across projects. These
lessons, garnered from the case studies discussed in this chapter and others cases
are presented herein.
Public - Private 'Partnership': Emphasis on the Third 'P'
Three models of such a partnership are discussed herein in order of increasing
apparent effectiveness.
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Strong Political Champion
Since "large path-breaking projects require active hand-holding from the
government throughout the project planning and execution stages (Government of
India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs, PPP Cell, 2010)," they
necessarily involve a number of public agencies, some of which are often at odds
with the private sector and even with each other. Moreover, as discussed in
Chapter 1, large projects involving private companies are subject to intense public
opposition.
Thus, the success of PPPs is often contingent not upon the careful design of precise
contractual relationships between private and public partners, but upon the
unwavering support of a strong political champion. The history of private sector
participation in India abounds with examples where support form top political
leaders has been essential in moving forward the case for private participation.
Some of these are:
e The emergence of Gujarat: Owing to Chief Minister Narendra Modi's
unwavering support for private involvement, Gujarat is consistently seen as
India's most progressive state and as a role model for the entire country.
e Electricity Reforms in Delhi: Chief Minister Sheila Dixit's continued support for
privatization of electricity distribution companies was successful.
e Cochin Airport: Involvement of the state's Chief Minister as the Chairman of the
Airport's Board of Directors helped the project navigate the political landscape
and secure financing from the government, banks and from the general public.
e Sewage and Solid Waste Management PPPs in Alandur: The political
leadership and strong advocacy for the project provided by the Chairman of the
municipality proved to be a critical element of success.
However, even the most honest efforts on the part of the strongest political
champions are often not enough for the success of private participation in
infrastructure. The failed water reforms of Delhi despite Chief Minister Sheila Dixit's
best efforts and the unsuccessful privatization of the Hyderabad Metropolitan Water
Supply and Sewerage Board despite advocacy from popular Chief Minister
Chandrababu Naidu are cases in point.
Joint Venture: Public Equity
Joint equity participation by the private and public partner in infrastructure projects
is a way to improve the outcome of the project In Joint Ventures, "the emphasis is
on togetherness" and co-responsibility as "risks, revenues and losses are shared"
Page 64 of 150
(Spiering and Dewulf, 2006). The motives for both public and private partners are
different from concessions, where the focus is on risk transfer, not sharing.
Theoretical support includes the ideas that joint ventures increase economic
efficiency (Moszoro, 2010) relative to projects delivered completely using private or
public equity; that co-ownership fosters better governance over time (Orr and
Metzger, 2005); and that having 'skin-in-the-game' reduces incentives for
opportunism for both partners (Moszoro, 2011). These arguments are presented in
turn:
e Economic Efficiency: Moszoro (2010) argues, "a mixed capital structure allows
to internalize both the cost of capital advantage of the public sector and the
knowledge advantage of the private sector."
Moszoro's economic model to determine the optimal private share in a PPP
project finds that "percentage of savings achieved on the investment thanks to
the private sector participation in the project and the interest rate spread of the
private sector over the rate available to the public sector" are the two important
criteria in determining the nature of the optimal capital participation among the
two parties.
e Governance: Experts participating in a roundtable discussion around PPPs at
Stanford University (Orr and Metzger, 2005) suggest that Joint Ventures can
better manage unexpected changes over time since:
i. The public partner is a participant in the project with a direct and material
economic interest and a "shared economic destiny (Orr, 2006)."
ii. JVs enable the public sector's continuous participation in decision making
iii. Public sector involvement in JVs reduces public opposition
e Opportunism: Given that the public partner has a stake in the success of the
company entering into a PPP, it would have a lower incentive to behave
opportunistically. Indeed, employing a game theoretic model to study
opportunism in infrastructure PPPs, Moszoro (2011) found that welfare in
public-private joint ventures should be bigger than in the case of either public or
regulated private monopolies.
Joint Ventures have been successfully used in India to deliver infrastructure PPPs,
such as in:
Electricity Transmission Projects: As of July 2011, at-least six joint venture
projects with 74% private equity participation and 26% participation by
public company PGCIL, are under various stages of development (Pilai,
2011).
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e Airports: Recent major airports such at Delhi International Airport Ltd.,
Mumbai Airport, and Hyderabad Airport are being delivered as joint
ventures with AAI and state governments as public partners.
e Urban Development: Sewerage / water / waste projects are regularly
delivered as joint ventures with municipal governments as the public
partners.
However, as the case study of DIAL in Appendix 4 shows, JVs are not always
successful and still subject to opportunism. Major bottlenecks remain in such
arrangements as a consequence of the tensions between a large number of public
and private parties on account of different interests, resources, perceptions, and
working methods. Close inter-organizational collaboration can thus get too
complicated and difficult to manage. Furthermore, the public sector partner in the
PPP may not have any influence on other public parties that interfere in the PPP's
business and may even be at odds with it
Public Sector Partner Management Role
Involving public sector partners in decision-making relating to the project over time
by including them as part of the project company's management or governance
committees has been proven to be effective in navigating the tests of time. This form
of governance diminishes the likelihood of negative political behavior.
Infrastructure projects require coordinated management of community and
stakeholder communications so that the project is embraced. They need buy-in from
various Ministries and Departments, not only during the initial structuring but also
over time as the project conditions and realities change.
Public terms in office are shorter than project lifetimes and sometimes even the
time needed for project delivery. Thus, PPPs that do not invite active public partner
involvement lack the required endurance of relationship and the feeling of shared
responsibility. Moreover, in the face of altering political parties, incoming public
figures may even have incentive to see the efforts of the previous partner fail, unless
their own skin is on the line.
The Cochin Airport case examined in this chapter is a prime example of a situation
in which the public sector retains decision-making capacity over time. Headed by
the previous head of district administration in the Managing Director's role and the
Chief Minister of the state as Chairman of the board, the project was able to
successfully navigate financial adversity, regime changes and political differences
between the state and central governments. Similarly, operations management by
Indian Railways and board positions for the Government of Karnataka and other
public agencies critical to service delivery contributed to the success of the Hassan-
Mangalore railway line.
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This strategy appears to be the strongest at maintaining a focus on true partnership
and aligning public and private partner interests over time.
Stakeholder Participation
Infrastructure projects ultimately exist to provide essential public services and their
sustainability depends upon their ability to do so. Going through a transformation
from delivery of infrastructure services by the public sector to one in which the
private sector becomes a major participant entails changes in lifestyle and economic
wellbeing for a number of stakeholders across society. Stakeholder participation is
thus important and involves the identification of key stakeholders, assessment of
stakeholder interests, influence and importance, and development of a participation
strategy.
The PPP Cell in the Ministry of Finance recognizes the importance of stakeholder
engagement:
"Effective communication of project benefits to various stakeholders
and mobilizing public support is one of the key lessons to be drawn
from India's PPP experience to date. Absence of a buy-in from the
people at large can lead to significant hurdles in various stages of a
project such as during land acquisition because of the displacement of
people, or during project operations due resistance to collection of
revenues in the form of toll, charges or tariffs. Public support is thus
critical...(Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of
Economic Affairs, PPP Cell, 2010)."
This section identifies key stakeholders that the private sector and their public
sector partners must not overlook to successfully realize their goals. It highlights
practices that have worked in India in engaging them to produce positive outcomes.
Key stakeholder groups include:
e Users of the infrastructure service who are concerned about rising tariffs;
e Displaced managers, civil servants and workers (unionized and non-
unionized) who enjoyed years of service in public sector bodies and are
concerned about job security, benefits, retraining options, finding other jobs
and opportunities for retirement;
e Trade unions that want to sustain their influence on local politics;
e Local politicians who support illicit activities to gain and sustain public
office;
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e Displaced land-owners who often do not have the required documents to
prove ownership;
e Nearby residents who are often affected by externalities such as noise,
pollution, odor, etc.; and
e Special interest groups such as NGOs and civil society organizations who
speak out and mobilize the masses on genuine and substantial or often
doctored issues of public interest
Other stakeholder groups that may be critical depending on the specific situation
include journalists and the media, private investors and the general public. The
following framework to build a stakeholder governance strategy takes inspiration
from Calabrese (2008), who discusses stakeholder communication strategies based
on successful and unsuccessful efforts on part of The World Bank to encourage
private participation in infrastructure around the world:
Figure 2: Building a Stakeholder Inclusion Strategy
Consultation
For stakeholders who are not particularly critical to the success of a PPP project and
do not have substantial influence on the project outcome, simple consultation has
proven to be an effective strategy. The goals of this strategy are to disseminate
information and to build popular support for the project. The emphasis is on
building trust because co-operation must be maintained for a long time over the
terms of several municipal, state and central governments.
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Strategies such as disseminating information through newspapers, magazines, radio
and television programs; conducting plays and creating songs, etc. in local languages
and sensitive to local cultures to explain the benefits of the project, have been
employed to enlist popular support
Involvement and Oversight
Stakeholders who are more important and relevant to a project, and may have
significant influence on its success need to be engaged beyond simple consultation.
Strategies include stakeholder involvement in PPP requirement specification and
prioritization, oversight over PPP activities and establishment of open
communication channels and compliant redressal systems, and offering ancillary
benefits that the stakeholders consider important Particular tactics that have
worked incude:
e Surveys: These include information-gathering surveys such as 'willingness-
to-pay' conducted at the PPP development stages. Other critical feedback that
is important at the development stage includes exploration of what the
stakeholders desire most (creating jobs, updating quality of service,
decreasing tariffs, reducing corruption, and increasing transparency?)
Highlighting the importance of such surveys, Jingfeng Yuan et al. (2009) note
that specification of the requirements from each stakeholder's perspective of
the expected performance levels from the PPP project is the first principle in
a performance management system. Additional and periodic opinion polls
and surveys down the road to gauge customer satisfaction with an eye
towards improvement of service are equally important.
* Oversight: Creation of citizen watchdog committees and groups that monitor
and verify the performance of the private partner over time. Structures for
compliant registration and addressal need to compliment the creation of
such committees such that key stakeholders feel that their voice is heard and
their efforts have an impact For instance, Husk Power Systems, an
innovative social enterprise that promotes decentralized power generation
and distribution in remote villages of India, actively engages the local village
government bodies (panchayats) when setting up operations and includes
them in project oversight (Bairiganjan et aL, 2010).
* Ancillary benefits: Offering essential services that benefit large groups of
people but are not related to the project, for instance, setting up educational
institutions, health clinics, etc., is an effective strategy to win popular
support. For example, Husk Power Systems sponsors the education of more
than 250 children in private schools and trains women in making incense
sticks. The corporate social responsibility arm of Husk Power Systems, Samta
Samriddhi Foundation, "hopes to train a team of women in each cluster to
audit the work of HPS, manage the schools adopted, and conduct awareness
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programs on issues pertaining to electricity, public health and environment
(Baruah, 2010)."
Two cases discussed in Appendix 5 - one from India and one from Ghana - have
successfully incorporated these two levels of stakeholder governance.
True Participation and Ownership
For the most critical stakeholders, ones that are both important and have significant
influence, offers of employment, involvement in ownership and efforts to enlist
participation in management have proven to be effective governance strategies.
* Employment: Civil servants, public managers, and unionized workers are
usually important and influential stakeholders for infrastructure PPPs. There
are a number of cases where their support has been enlisted by putting their
technical and tacit skills to good use. The Electricity Distribution Franchise in
Bhiwandi discussed in this chapter is a case in point Another example is that
of DESI Power, which provides electricity to households and small businesses
in off-grid villages via biomass-based power plants. "The company builds a
power plant and sells electricity through a local entrepreneur responsible for
sales, billing, and collection. DESI Power entrepreneurs determine their own
pricing model and fee structure and charge a monthly rate based on the
number of bulbs each household or shop uses. The entrepreneur installs a
circuit breaker to ensure that the households do not exceed their monthly
limits (Bairiganjan et aL., 2010)."
* Ownership: Similar to enlisting equity participation on account of the
public-sector partner, financial contributions from key stakeholders in
return for ownership rights can be encouraged. For instance, the financing
plan of the Cochin International Airport involved significant equity
participation from a key stakeholder - NRIs traveling frequently to and from
Kerala. In addition to ownership in the special purpose vehicle, these NRIs
were conferred special rights and privileges such as separate lines, lounges,
etc. Projects in the urban sector (water, sewerage, waste management) in
Tamil Nadu have also regularly employed this strategy of enlisting
stakeholders as co-financiers.
" Board Representation: A further boost to stakeholder involvement can be
given in the form of board membership, such that the stakeholder group can
directly influence overall project governance and major decisions through
voting rights. The Hassan-Mangalore project, for instance, gave key upstream
and downstream stakeholders positions on the company's board.
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Summary
The literature on public-private partnerships, indeed the practices of most Indian
international agencies promoting PPPs at a local, regional or national level,
emphasize the creation of complete contracts as a means of governing the
relationships between various parties. Independent Regulatory Agencies are often
touted as complementary to contractual agreements (to ensure adherence to
contractual terms), or as an alternative form of governance (discretionary
regulation). However, in addition to the inherent limitations of such forms of
governance (see Chapters 2 and 3 for a full discussion), in developing countries such
as India, credible commitment to contractual agreements from the public partner
and true regulatory independence are unlikely. Moreover, such arms-length
relationships don't truly transform into real partnerships. Contracts and regulatory
agencies are thus insufficient governance frameworks in such institutional
environments.
The cases and discussion in this chapter have identified ways to engage public
partners over the life of a PPP to complement traditional forms of governance.
Strategies in this regard have included soliciting support from a strong political
champion and engaging public sector partners financially and in the management of
PPPs. Retaining key public sector partners on the boards of project companies has
proven to truly emphasize 'partnership' as the public partner helps the PPP navigate
complex political environments over time.
Careful research on stakeholders and development of strategies for stakeholders
across different levels of importance and influence has also proven effective at
"untangling the nexus of political interference and rent-seeking that characterizes
low-performing infrastructure systems (Tankha et al., 2010)." Strategies in this
regard progress from consultations with stakeholders of low importance and
influence to greater involvement and oversight on account of more significant
stakeholders, and finally to true partnership via management roles and co-
ownership for the key stakeholders.
These structural mechanisms do not undermine the importance of contractual
and/or regulatory forms of governance but are, in fact, complementary to these
traditional forms of governance.
Next, the thesis presents an interesting case of public-private partnerships from
North America: the Independent Public Authority model, which provides a structure
that incorporates many of the tactical changes identified in the current chapter. It
draws parallels with a uniquely successful project in India - the Delhi Metro Rail
Corporation - and arrives at lessons for a way forward.
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Chapter 5: Independent Public
Authorities: A Viable Model for India?
One of the key motivations for the use of PPPs to deliver projects, perhaps
the most important and relevant in the case of developing countries such as India is
to take big projects off the public budget. On the other hand, the case studies
discussed in this thesis highlight the importance of involving public sector partners
during project operations for effective service delivery and management through
turbulence. Independent Public Authorities (IPAs) in the United States, United
Kingdom, Australia and Canada have incorporated both these aspects and
successfully delivered infrastructure projects for decades. Such structures seem to
have the potential to incorporate the tactical lessons identified in Chapter 4 and
provide the governance that projects in India need.
The key feature of IPAs is that they are government-owned but run like
independent businesses. They internalize negotiations between private and public
parties that are usually subject to cumbersome administrative and legal procedures
under alternative governance frameworks such as regulation. Thus, they are leaner
and more effective at controlling decision-making cost and time. Moreover, minimal
reliance on formal procedures that are contentious by nature builds a sense of real
partnership and fosters commitment among parties to come to the table and resolve
issues that arise owing to inevitable turbulence over the course of a project. Close
involvement of public partners in the operational stages removes the information
asymmetries that often lead to regulatory inefficiencies. Such close involvement and
cooperation reduces incentives for parties to act purely in their selfish interest and
thus reduces counterproductive practices such as withholding information and
finding roundabout ways to meet contractual and regulatory obligations. This
allows service providers to maintain focus on efficient and effective service delivery.
Background: IPAs in North America
Operating off-budget IPAs carry out essential public functions at the municipal,
state, regional, or national level; they are involved in housing, development, water,
sewerage, airports, etc. For instance, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey
(NYPA) has been responsible for creating and maintaining much of the
transportation infrastructure in that region. IPA's perform "the necessary tasks that
the public sector can't perform and the private sector won't."12 They are described
as "neither fully private nor fully public" and are commonly referred to as quasi-
autonomous non-governmental organizations or "quangos" in the United Kingdom
and government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) in the United States (Andre, 2010).
12John Strahinich, "Inside the Shadow Government," Boston Magazine (November
1989); quoted in Hogarty (2002).
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IPAs "are influential organizations that serve commercial as well as societal
purposes, create return for stockholders, contract with businesses, and compete in
the private sector (Andre, 2010)." They target the needs of specific groups (for
instance, the California Public Employees' Retirement System, Calpers) or fulfill
specific functions (for instance, the Federal National Mortgage Association, Fannie
Mae). Since they take on a variety of forms and functions, they are collectively
referred to as the "gray-sector" or the "fourth branch of government". In the US, at
the federal level, there are approximately 50 GSEs (Andre, 2010) and many more at
the state level, with Massachusetts alone having more than 500 (Hogarty, 2002).
IPA's were originally set up "to clean up government and to improve the efficiency
of public services", and to curb patronage and corruption (Hogarty, 2002). Their
managers are supposed to be impartial and efficient and insulated from partisan
politics and from the direct control of elected officials. These organizations are thus
meant to reflect characteristics such as independence, expertise, and
entrepreneurial energy. Political leaders (such as a Governor or a Mayor) appoint
their boards but the board members' terms of office are generally intentionally
staggered from those of their appointing masters to limit political influence and
maintain independence.
These entities are usually structured to finance large-scale public works projects
without having to raise taxes and without having to access funds from the state
budget Although they sometimes enjoy support in the form of subsidies, they
usually make the users pay for such facilities rather than the taxpayers, and are
allowed to spend it at their discretion. They "are not shackled by the constraints of
the state's personnel system" and "although these agencies are subject to open-
meeting laws, they are exempt from civil service rules, contract bidding procedures,
and the state's borrowing cap" (Hogarty, 2002). Thus, they are identical to user-fee
based PPPs with the private company replaced by an Independent Public Authority
/ Company.
Case Study: US Airports
The Boston Logan Airport - the largest commercial airport in the New England
region - is owned and operated by the Massachusetts Port Authority (Massport).
The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey and SEATAC in Seattle manage
airports in their region. Similar arrangements where authorities own and (often)
manage airports exist in other parts of the country.
US airports successfully harness some of the most desirable features of private
participation - private financing and efficient management - while remaining
publically owned.
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Their management, financial and governance features mitigate the costs typically
associated with public ownership of airports (such as overinvestment and lack of
managerial effort) and the distorted investment incentives of a regulated private
airport operator, while securing the public interest
Management Features
Public owners set the framework for private investments and management by
negotiating legally binding contracts (concessions, leases, operations contracts, etc.)
with airlines and other private partners. The private partners provide most of the
services at these airports while the "airport operator's role is limited to basic
aeronautical facilities and services (Padova, 2007)." The private sector's efficiencies
are harnessed since the number of transactions directly managed by public
bureaucrats is limited.
Financial Features
US airports owned by IPAs have no share capital, pay no dividends, and no
corporate taxes. They often do not depend upon subsidies or grants and are
financially independent Their sources of finance typically include:
- Revenue bonds: These are tax-exempt commercial bonds secured
exclusively by revenues from airlines and non-aviation companies or future
income from passenger facility charges. They are generally used to finance
large capital improvement programs.
- Airline rates and non-aviation income: Use-and-lease agreements specify
the terms and conditions for the use of airport facilities. Additionally,
revenues from non-aviation sources are usually at the authorities' spending
discretion, as is the case with Boston Logan airport.
- Passenger facility charges (PFCs) or user charges: In 1990, the federal
government started allowing airports to impose a charge on passengers to
reduce airport dependency on bond financing and use-and-lease agreements
with airlines, contingent upon approval by the Federal Aviation
Administration.
- Federal grants from the Federal Airport and Airways Trust Fund: These
favor small airports whose access to bond financing is limited.
Occasionally, entire terminals are privately financed and managed, such as at JFK in
New York, Chicago O'Hare, and Detroit (Padova, 2007). The use of project finance
(non-recourse finance where the payback of debt comes from and is secured solely
by asset generated revenues) is very common in such arrangements. For instance,
Delta Airlines used project financing to invest in its dedicated terminal facility at
Boston Logan airport.
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Governance Features
The governance frameworks for US airports enable them to mobilize private finance
and engage the efficiencies of private sector management while maintaining a
central focus on customer and wider public interests over time. In their analysis of
US airports based on transaction cost economics, Fuhr and Beckers (2007)
concluded that such arrangements economize both on the ex-ante coordinative
requirements in the stage of planning and constructing terminal facilities, as well as
on ex-post safeguarding problems during the operating stage.
US airports seem to combine elements from the three forms of governance
discussed in this thesis - structural, regulatory and contractual.
Structural: A Board of Directors appointed by political leaders governs the
Independent Public Agency that owns and operates the airport For instance,
"the Governor of Massachusetts appoints the seven members of the Massport
Board of Directors to staggered seven-year terms (Leo, 2011)." The Board
includes members that represent the interests of key interest groups to
minimize disturbance and solve potential issues internally. For instance, the
Business Manager for the Massachusetts Laborers' District Council serves on
Massport's Board of Directors. He also serves as trustee for the New England
Laborers' Training Trust Fund, and the New England Laborers' Labor-
Management Cooperation Trust; representing 15,000 construction laborers
and 7,500 municipal public service workers. His presence effectively
addresses concerns regarding opposition from labor unions. Furthermore,
the staggering and financial non-reliance on the state provide insulation from
immediate political pressures.
Close budget management and calibration (along-with mid-year
adjustments), and regular performance evaluations keep performances in
check. Further, authorities that receive state support have stringent
transparency and public sector engagement requirements.
The role of public agencies is limited to "(i) coordination of investments and
operation of the runway system or general airport assets, (ii) facilitation of
private arrangements in the terminal area by setting standards and rules,
(iii) management or marketing of facilities if private terminal investments
fails, and (iv) safeguarding airline competition (Fuhr and Beckers, 2007)." US
airports are thus able to harness private management skills and efficiency
while maintaining close public oversight without undue political
interference.
Furthermore, since major activities are usually financed by revenue bonds,
capital markets exert substantial control and oversight of activities of the
public owners and the private partners.
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Regulation: US airports that receive federal funds are subject to economic
regulation, even if they are publically owned and managed. They are subject
to local regulations and ordinances, as well as statutory regulations enacted
by Congress and policy statements issued by the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA). The federal policy requires fees and charges to be
"based on historic costs, fair and reasonable, and not just unjustly
discriminatory (Padova, 2007)." Further, "statutory requirements on airport
revenues prohibit the owners from diverting revenue to non-airport
purposes. Although cases are not frequent, airport operators have faced, and
lost, legal challenges when users have perceived that fees and charges are
unjustly discriminatory or that revenues have been diverted from airport
purposes (Padova, 2007)."
Contractual: The general conditions for the use of airport infrastructure are
established in multilaterally negotiated master use-and-lease agreements.
The US institutional environment grants airports and airlines substantial
freedom to design contractual and financing arrangements to govern
transactions in their relationship (Fuhr and Beckers, 2007). These
contractual relationships (usually long-term leases) allocate responsibilities
to the parties best able and more suitable to carrying them out
Contractual clauses allow for efficient asset utilization and adequate
protection from capture by public or private sector interests. For instance,
the Logan airport has an "airport-wide preferential gate use policy" and "all
long-term leases contain gate recapture and forced sublet provisions" (Erie
et aL, 2006). To ensure competition, carriers are substitutable for almost all
origin-and-destination routes served from Logan airport. Thus, airport
investments are indeed non-specific to a particular carrier or business
model. Similarly, contracts protect private sector interests by allowing them
to recover their investments over long periods of time and allowing for
independence in decision-making.
In summary, independent public agency ownership and involvement in broad
management issues ensures accountability to the public and, along with regulation,
maintains a focus on customer and public needs; independence from political
influence enables a strong business ethic; and private sector participation protected
by contracts provides ready access to finance and to efficiency in project delivery
and management
Airports in Canada have also successfully harnessed private sector financing and
efficiencies along with public ownership, oversight and management through
Independent Public Agencies.
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Case Study: Canadian Airports13
Through the 1980s, airports in Canada were the responsibility of the Canadian Air
Transportation Administration (CATA), a division of Transport Canada. Investments
were made out of the Treasury's capital fund, revenues were credited to the
Consolidated Revenue Fund, and airports were not required to be self-financing or
to even break-even. Thus, public sector managers had no incentives to control costs
or increase revenues.
However, rising demand led to airport congestion and the need to invest in
additional capacity and increase the productivity of existing facilities. The National
Airports Policy of 1994 provided for the transfer of management and operations of
airports on long-term leases to self-financing, not-for-profit, non-share-capital
airport authorities called Local Airport Authorities (LAA) and Canadian Airport
Authorities (CAA); corporate entities that do not pay income tax.
To serve the interests of the community, Transport Canada reserved the right to
audit the authorities' records and procedures at any time and subject them to a
periodic performance review. To maintain transparency and to broaden
accountability, CAAs face stringent public disclosure requirements under the Public
Accountability Principles established in 1994, and are required to hold public
meetings after every fiscal year-end. To strengthen community involvement, a
Community Consultative Committee, which includes airline industry
representatives, meets twice a year to discuss matters relating to the airport.
Indian Analogy: The Delhi Metro Rail Corporation
The Delhi Metro Rail Corporation (DMRC) - a public sector company responsible for
constructing, operating, and maintaining the metro rail system in the capital city - is
analogous to an Independent Public Authority and thus makes for an interesting
case study.
Basics
DMRC was formed in May 1995 with equal equity participation of the Government
of India and the Government of the National Capital Territory of Delhi to provide a
rail-based transport system to alleviate Delhi's ever growing transport congestion
and vehicular pollution. It started in 2002 with an 8.5 km link and extended to over
150 km by 2010, proving to be the backbone of the public transport system in the
city with almost 1.5 million daily passengers (H azarika, 2010).
DMRC has been an unprecedented success across multiple dimensions. In addition
to relieving traffic on Delhi roads, reducing travel time and pollution, the project is
'
3 Author, based on data from Padova (2007).
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clearly a financial success: "the financial internal rate of return on investments in
the Metro is estimated as 17 percent while the economic rate of return is 24 percent
(Murty et aL, 2006)." In a country where a study of 894 infrastructure projects
(1992-2009) revealed that 40% of projects experienced cost over-runs and 82%
experienced schedule over-runs (Singh, 2010), the fact that the first phase of the
project was delivered on budget and nearly three years ahead of schedule invites
attention (Lakshman, 2007).
Structure
The DMRC, headed by civil servant and civil engineer Shri E. Sreedharan as
Managing Director (MD) established and has always maintained a "we mean
business" culture based on punctuality, honesty and strict adherence to deadlines -
attributes that are not regularly used to describe public companies in India (Delhi
Metro Rail Corporation, 2011). Much as in North American IPAs, the effectiveness of
DMRC stems from its autonomy and singular focus on business goals, free from the
influence of political or bureaucratic motivations.
The highest decision making body of the DMRC is its Board of Directors, which is
composed of 16 members including five nominees each from GOI and GONCTD and
6 Functional Directors (senior officers with wide ranging experience in the
government sector and possess top order administrative, financial and technical
skills). For effective discharge of his functions, the Board of Directors has delegated
most of the powers to the MD, who is responsible for the day-to-day management of
the company. Functional Directors and other Officers and Staff of the Company
support the MD.
Autonomy of the DMRC was critical in this environment of heavy politicization and
public sector participation. Indeed, DMRC ensured autonomy in the recruitment
process, promotions and contract awarding. Mr. Sreedharan had complete freedom
to recruit people of his choice and build a team. He hired young professionals,
mostly in the age group of 18 to 30 years, after conducting a thorough examination
of their track records and conducting personal interviews. He established systems
and processes that emphasized accountability. DMRC took a stand that any change
in any decision would be made only if it was required from a technical or
professional angle and not simply because somebody wanted it.
Actual decision-making power in DMRC very much resides in the hand of one
person - the Managing Director - and the leadership of this government bureaucrat
has been touted as one of the main reasons for the success of the project (Lakshman,
2007).
Leveraging Private Sector Expertise
DMRC has involved significant local and international private sector participation
across functions such as planning, design, technology provision, construction and
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management It engaged an international consortium of consultants to oversee the
work. Further it involved local and multi-national corporations via competitive
bidding for design-bid-build contracts. Each bid required at least one Indian partner
to ensure technology absorption by Indian firms and for localization and
re-engineering of technology.
For its initial phases, DMRC established a simple and transparent procurement
process that removed all traces of subjectivity from tender evaluation. The MD was
given complete autonomy on all matters and was the last authority on tenders. As a
result, the average duration of major tenders was 19 days compared with a norm of
three to nine months (Lakshman, 2007).
"Sreedharan scoured the world for top companies with extensive experience in the
field. Pacific Consultants International from Japan advised on the engineering
matters, Korea's Rotem and Japan's Mitsubishi supplied the initial shipment of
coaches, while France's Alstom led the consortium responsible for the design of the
automatic train control system (Lakshman, 2007)."
DMRC's Property Development Wing engaged private companies via a number of
contractual mechanisms. It awarded 6-12 year licenses for spaces within station
buildings for commuter related vendors such as ATMs, refreshment kiosks and
magazine stands; 30-year concessions for commercial developments on vacant land
pockets adjacent to MRTS stations; long-term lease (50-90 yrs) on land pockets, in
depots, etc. not immediately needed for operational structures; and advertisements
within stations, on DMRC structures between stations, and within DMRC's
commuter trains.
Thus, DMRC successfully blended government resources and oversight with private
sector financing (the Japan Bank for International Cooperation was the single
largest source of financing with a 60% share), expertise and efficiency.
Although DMRC has predominantly used EPC contracts to engage the private sector
in the past, it has also recently used the PPP model for the recently commissioned
airport extension by engaging a consortium of private operators under a 30-year
revenue sharing cum license-fee arrangement
Enlisting Public Sector Support
Since this is a high profile project, it experienced a "jurisdictional tug of war
between the central, state and city governments over which level has ultimate
control over urban mass rapid transit (Siemiatycki, 2006)." Realization of the
system was impeded for 30 years by political antagonism between the Central and
the Delhi Union Territory governments over which level of government deserves
political credit for initiating the project, and who should have managerial control
over the system. The conflict was exacerbated by the fact that the BJP party
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controlled the Central government, while the Capital Union Territory government of
Delhi was in the political hands of the rival Congress Party (Siemiatycki, 2006).
However, participation from GOI and GNCTD in the form of equity and presence on
the Board of Directors of DMRC helped the public company win overall government
support at all levels and a number of special favors ((Azad and Singla, 2010) and
(Goyal, 2007)):
- In order to smoothen the land acquisition process, The Delhi Metro Railway
(Operation & Maintenance) Act, 2002 was enacted, superseding the local
municipal laws of Delhi and the lower courts were barred from issuing stay
orders. A group of lawyers was engaged to make sure that the courts did not
grant such stay orders. Most of the land for property development was made
available to DMRC on 99-year lease at nominal rents corresponding to inter-
departmental transfer rates.
- All utilities were diverted well in advance so as to ensure minimum
inconvenience to the general public. Community interaction programs were
organized to inform and seek solutions from the public.
- DMRC got prompt access to uninterrupted electricity from Delhi Transco at
subsidized rates to lower energy costs.
- Alternate traffic arrangements were made for the roads affected by the
construction with the assistance of the Indian Institute of Technology, Delhi. This
was done by building new roads or by widening of existing roads.
- Delhi Metro was also given the critical freedom from political interference.
For example there was no pressure to provide employment.
- The equity partners (GOI/GONCTD) provided an interest free subordinate
loan to cover the cost of land equivalent to Rs. 2180 million, to be repaid within
a long span of 25 years.
- The bulk of the funding from the project came from overseas and the
government of India agreed to bear the exchange rate risk.
- DMRC is exempted from payment of income tax, capital gains tax, property
tax and customs duty on imports
- DMRC is permitted to generate revenue through property development for
up-to 20 years.
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External Stakeholder Engagement
DMRC constituted a number of efforts to generate support among its customers and
the general public. These included:
Information and Consultation: With only one precedent in the country
(Calcutta), an underground metro is a new proposition for the people of India
and especially for the people of Delhi, most of who had never experienced a
metro before. To raise awareness, generate goodwill and build a sense of
excitement about the new system, DMRC undertook an extensive public
awareness and education campaign to introduce the virtues of the project to the
people of Delhi and India. It trumpeted the project as a catalyst of societal
change and encouraged conceptualization of the Delhi Metro beyond just a mode
of transport as a vehicle for societal transformation.
"Achieving this goal included an exhibit at the International Trade Fair in Central
Delhi, the formation of a Yahoo news group, the staging of street theatre in
central locations, the distribution of metro information door to door, education
programs in schools and colleges, and radio advertisements in multiple linguistic
dialects (Siemiatycki, 2006)."
The metro has been featured in Bollywood films, played host to international
dignitaries such as Prince Charles and Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro
Koizumi, had visits from local children with cancer, been on the cutting edge of
using technology to mitigate environmental degradation, and implemented an
HIV/ AIDS awareness program for migrant workers involved in its construction.
"The metro was presented in the media as being universally endorsed by all of
the key politicians, which reinforced an image of the metro as the pride of Delhi
(Siemiatycki, 2006)."
In summary, the dimensions upon which the iconic image of the Delhi Metro was
constructed are:
e Tangible benefits including congestion reduction, environmental
amelioration and increased safety;
e The optics of political consensus;
e An image of a company that cares about the well-being of the community;
e The metro as a vehicle for enabling a broader urban transformation.
Involvement and Oversight: DMRC has set up a Vigilance Unit to handle all
vigilance matters relating to the company. The functions of vigilance in DMRC
are to conduct preventive checks, to investigate the complaints from various
sources and to investigate in detail the issues raised through intensive
examinations. The vigilance unit also advises system improvement wherever
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necessary to improve the administrative functioning of DMRC, and arranges
vigilance awareness programs from time to time.
- True Partnership: Consolidated housing for displaced homeowners -A number
of poor households and slums were razed as part of land allocation for DMRC.
The company provided these displaced homeowners and squatters with more
consolidated housing units that improved their livelihoods. Uprisings against
land acquisition that are typically associated with infrastructure projects in India
were thus avoided.
Is this a Replicable Model?
The Delhi Metro has become a symbol of hope for the future of Delhi, and a tangible
vehicle for social transformation that will one day operate in cities across the entire
country. DMRC is serving as a consultant to 28 projects with clients including state
governments (governments of Haryana, Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal,
Kerala, Gujarat), other metro rail project companies (Mumbai, Pune, Bangalore,
Hyderabad, etc.), development agencies (Ghaziabad Development Agency, Punjab
Industrial Development Board, Haryana Urban Development Agency) and private
infrastructure developers (GMR, Nippon Koei Co., IDeck, etc.) (Delhi Metro Rail
Corporation, 2011).
Similar models to develop metro projects are coming up in Chennai and Bangalore
and in parts of Mumbai. The majority of the Mumbai metro project and the entire
Hyderabad metro project will be delivered under PPP route with minority equity
stakes for the state governments.
They key success factors for DMRC include public ownership and management that
helped navigate special interest groups, balance opposing political motivations, and
helped garner a number of special provisions; aggressive promotion that helped
build understanding of the project's benefits and a shared desired for the project's
success, and private participation through the stages of planning, design,
construction, procurement, management and operations that resulted in high levels
of efficiency. The fact that DMRC is run like a business relying on internal
negotiation procedures and compromises instead of lawyers has brought it success.
Summary
IPAs are "influential organizations that serve commercial as well as societal
purposes, create return for stockholders, contract with businesses, and compete in
the private sector (Andre, 2010)." Their main advantages and limitations are
discussed herein.
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Advantages
- Focus on partnership: By internalizing negotiations and decision making
procedures, IPAs focus on an environment fostering partnership as opposed to
other contentious governance frameworks. They incorporate most of the best
practices in structural governance identified in Chapter 4. Public ownership and
close involvement in project delivery and operations mitigates information
asymmetries between public and private partners, promotes collaboration, and
builds an environment in which each party is willing to resolve issues internally
in the best interest of the project Such an arrangement, along-with involvement
of key stakeholders insulates IPAs from opposition from special interest groups
and from the general public to a large extent
- Balancing accountability and autonomy: IPAs internalize major decisions,
such as those related to capital investments, safety and security upgrades, etc.
With appropriate leadership, IPAs thus successfully maintain a balance between
autonomy and accountability. This balance is often disturbed under regulatory
arrangements that are characterized by adversarial regulatory hearings and
negotiations that take focus away from the project
- Protection of the public interest: A Board of Directors appointed by elected
officials to staggered terms governs the activities of an IPA. Their mandates
usually emphasize promotion of the public interest as the main priority. Further,
health, safety, environmental and economic regulations may be applicable to
IPAs.
- Access to independent financing: IPAs are usually self sufficient as they
finance their infrastructure (and other) activities by raising revenue bonds,
charging user fees, and mobilizing private investment in return for managerial
and operational independence via long-term contracts. Thus, as seen in the case
of IPA owned and operated airports such as Boston Logan International Airport,
such infrastructure assets require no recourse to state budget, no need for taxes,
no/limited need for subsidies.
- Leveraging private sector efficiency: Since IPAs usually involve revenue bond
financing and private investment, capital markets and private companies exert
substantial control over their projects. Indeed, Fuhr and Beckers (2007) report
"cost inefficiencies in airport operation are limited as public agencies rely
heavily on the private sector to operate the airport."
- Insulation from political interference: Non-coterminous terms for Board
members limits political control over the functioning of these agencies and
allows for the maintenance of relative independence and a business-like focus.
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- Prevention of opportunistic behavior: Strong contractual and structural
governance frameworks protect the interests of private and public partners as
well as those of users and the general public.
- Freedom from binding constraints: Public agencies are usually subject to
staffing rules (hiring and firing, special reservations for under-represented
communities, etc.), communications protocol, administrative, financial, legal, and
other cumbersome requirements that thwart seamless project delivery. IPAs are
largely relieved of such requirements and allowed to run as businesses.
Limitations
Though IPAs offer the significant advantages discussed above, they need to be
carefully designed to be responsive rather than corrupt and must exist in a
supportive institutional framework. Else, we "risk moving toward the development
of a larger, less transparent gray sector with unknown implications for
organizational accountability and unpredictable societal repercussions (Andre,
2010)."
- IPAs can become power brokers since they are ultimately backed by the state
yet out of the state's direct control. They can get "infused with politics rather
than professionalism" and become "too political to succeed" (Donlan, 2009) and
"too big to fail" (Andre, 2010). This is especially the case when these agencies
are not subject to economic regulation, as is the case with CAAs and LAAs in
Canada. Even in cases where regulators exist, IPAs can become so powerful so as
to influence the design of their own regulators. These are dangers that need to
be carefully guarded against, especially in a complex political environment
marked by rampant corruption, such as that of India.
- Accountability vs. autonomy: Though this is an inherent advantage of the IPA
model, it can also turn out to be a big limitation in some cases. Referring to the
tough balance between autonomy and accountability, Hogarty (2002) remarks
"...those who run these authorities find themselves faced with a perplexing
paradox." He continues "Strung between the opposite poles of autonomy and
accountability, (leaders of IPAs) must efficiently sort out, accommodate, and
integrate these conflicting demands. It is a very difficult balancing act, to say the
least" Andre (2010) elaborates "where independence is incomplete and
accountability indirect, conflict can only be endemic." This is especially the case
when legislation or the lease agreements do not impose external reviews,
approvals, or appeal processes on the prices they set for airport services such as
parking, rent, landing, terminal use, etc., as is the case with CAAs and LAAs in
Canada.
- Dependent on quality of leadership: Hogarty (2002) provides accounts of the
effects of changing leadership and the importance of personalities in two of
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Massachusetts' important authorities - Masspike and Massport over a their
multi-decade histories. He concludes, "like other actors in the political game,
those in charge of authorities have to concern themselves with political realities"
and "integrate conflicting demands." Similarly, a large part of DMRC's success
has been accredited to the Chairman - Mr. Sreedharan and observers have
expressed reservations about repeating the success story under a similar model
elsewhere. For instance, referencing the proposed Jaipur metro, Mehta (2010)
reports: "We cannot create another Sreedharan here to implement the project"
and may land up with huge cost and time over runs.
In this regard, Independent Public Authorities potentially suffer from the same
limitations as those that Independent Regulatory Agencies have faced in India.
The success or failure of these agencies seems to be heavily contextual and
dependent upon the strength and independence of the organizations' leadership.
In summary, IPAs seem to retain the discipline of contracts and regulators while
eliminating problems associated with those arms length relationships. They
eliminate the asymmetry of information that commonly leads to inefficiency in
regulations. Furthermore, they are not tied down by procedural requirements that
plague regulators and can employ a "no-nonsense" attitude. Additionally, they do
not suffer from lack of substantive guidance since they do not depend upon (often
missing) legislation, but on specific functional mandates to guide their behavior.
Thus, unlike regulators, they focus on well-defined goals rather than try to optimize
among changing demands with respect to a complex web of environmental, social
and economic goals. Finally, they are more accountable than regulators since they
are directly financially responsible for their decisions.
However, IPAs are not a governance panacea for infrastructure PPPs. They need to
be carefully designed to be responsive rather than corrupt and must exist in a
supportive institutional framework. Since they are ultimately government backed
but still out of the government's direct control, they are prone to becoming power
brokers. Especially in the precarious institutional, political and social environments
that characterize infrastructure in India, the success of an IPA would particularly
depend upon the quality of its leadership, which would have to integrate and
balance conflicting demands.
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Conclusions
Exploration of a number of infrastructure PPPs from across sectors and
geographies in India illustrates that changing conditions over long asset lives can
potentially derail infrastructure PPPs. Technological, economic, regulatory, political
and social uncertainties that cause such destabilizing changes motivate the need for
alternative governance mechanisms.
Long-term contracts are a commonly used mechanism to govern the relationship
between private and public partners. In fact, India has developed institutional
frameworks at both the central and state government levels to foster contract-based
governance. Contracts specify each party's obligations over long time periods and
are meant to identify and allocate risks to the party best able to manage them.
Additionally, they often contain trigger mechanisms that instill in them a measure of
flexibility to adjust to changes over time. They are thus expected to solicit private
investment and provide for stability in partnerships.
However, this thesis finds that contracts are inadequate by themselves as
governance frameworks. They are incomplete and may become obsolete since there
are bound to be surprises during the long lifetimes of infrastructure projects. Since
they are also by nature adversarial, they are not conducive to cooperative issue
resolution in the face of turbulence. Parties to an obsolete contract end up having to
choose among undesirable options. Honoring the original contractual terms is
generally against both parties' interests in altered circumstances; renegotiation is
subject to opportunism and the outcome dependent upon relative bargaining
positions; re-bidding entails long delays and inefficiencies in the presence of
information asymmetry; and expropriation tarnishes reputations locally and
internationally.
An alternative to contracts that lock partners in to unsustainable adversarial
partnerships for long time periods is the system of discretionary regulation wherein
independent regulators adjust key parameters as information evolves over time.
Indeed, the Indian Planning Commission has emphasized that setting up a
regulatory system is a critical component of the dual effort to mobilize private
investment while safeguarding the public interest.
However, much like contracts, regulatory frameworks are adversarial and often
result in long drawn conflicts and litigation. In addition to being litigious, they are
expensive and inefficient since they are bound by cumbersome procedures such as
notice and comment requirements, public deliberations, written justifications for
new and proposed rules, etc. Though well intentioned, such practices distract from a
focus on partnership.
Regulatory governance is particularly problematic in India where "political
constraints and ministerial preferences" have created an asymmetric regulatory
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environment across sectors (Government of India, Planning Commission, The
Secretariat for the Committee on Infrastructure, 2008). In the context of dominance
of infrastructure sectors by public companies and a handful of large and powerful
private corporations (if at all), maintaining independence from special interests is
particularly difficult. A limited pool of skilled individuals capable of assuming the
roles of regulator or staff; limited public familiarity with regulatory processes; and
the nascent state of civil society (Dubash, 2008) further compound problems related
to regulatory governance.
Owing to the inadequacy of the dominant governance mechanisms, the thesis has
searched for alternative tactics through an analysis of successful infrastructure PPPs
from India. It establishes that focusing on the third 'P' in PPP via engagement of
public sector partners in decision-making over time goes a long way in enabling
projects to navigate the tests of time.
It finds that the public sector partners can be effectively engaged by soliciting
support from strong political leaders, through equity participation, or via inclusion
in the project company's management or governance committees. Further, it finds
that engaging stakeholders is particularly important to affect change in
infrastructure sectors characterized by the vicious cycle of poor service levels, low
willingness to pay and inadequate funds for improvement. It outlines strategies for
stakeholders' participation based on their level of influence and importance. These
progress from consultation and oversight to close involvement via employment,
equity participation and board representation.
The thesis concludes by presenting the case of Independent Public Authorities,
which are government-owned entities that run like independent businesses. They
leverage private finance at the same time as securing the public interest and provide
a structure that incorporates many of the governance tactics identified in Chapter 4.
They internalize negotiations between private and public parties and thus foster
true cooperation rather than contentious relationships between partners. The thesis
encourages further exploration of the suitability of IPAs to provide the governance
that projects in India need.
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Appendix 1: Infrastructure in India
India has experienced impressive economic growth in the past two decades
not because of, but in-spite of the state of its infrastructure. The country possesses
the second largest road network, the fourth largest rail network, and the fifth largest
installed power generation capacity globally, but existing infrastructure is sub-par
and inadequate in meeting demand. Moreover, delivering new projects is extremely
challenging. The country's continuing inability to install and manage infrastructure
assets threatens its future economic growth prospects. Indeed, "The World
Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Report, 2008-09 has identified
inadequate infrastructure as the biggest impediment to doing business in India
(Gulati, 2009)."
A number of reports on infrastructure projects in India concerning central, state and
municipal level infrastructure highlight these difficulties. Singh (2010) analyzed a
dataset of 894 projects completed April 1992 - March 2009, covering 17
infrastructure sectors and found that 40% of project experienced cost over-runs and
82% experienced schedule over-runs. A progress report issued in October 2010 by
the Ministry of Statistics and Program Implementation which monitors the progress
in Central sector projects costing Rs. 150 crore and above on a monthly basis,
indicates that out of 559 projects, 14 were ahead of schedule, 117 were on schedule,
and 293 were delayed (Government of India, Ministry of Statistics and Programme
Implementation, Central Statistical Office, 2010). The situation at the state level is
not much better. For instance, losses suffered by State Electricity Boards (SEBs)
amount to roughly 1% of national GDP annually (Government of India, Ministry of
Finance, 2011a). At the municipal level, a recent rating by the Ministry of Urban
Development reveals that 190 out of 423 municipalities in India are on the brink of
environmental disaster, 229 are judged in need of major improvement, only 4 make
it to safe levels, and none to the highest standard (Government of India, Ministry of
Finance, 2011a).
Owing to the poor quality of existing assets, large gaps between supply and demand
in most sectors, and difficulty in implementation of new projects, India's
infrastructure has consistently ranked behind those of competing developing
nations such as Brazil and China.
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Table 7: Infrastructure Development Ratings: International Comparison
Brazil China India
2001-05 Rating 5.4/10 4.5/10 3.1/10
2001-05 Ranking 47 55 75
2006-10 Rating 5.9/10 5.4/10 4.1/10
2006-10 Ranking 49 54 75
Source: KPMG (2006), "Public Private Participation in Indian Infrastructure. Poised for
Growth: A Background Note," www.ibef.org/download/IndiaInfrastructure.pdf. Last
checked June 11, 2011.
Problems
Some of the issues that repeatedly plague infrastructure business in India include
the lack of a structured regulatory and policy framework, delays in land acquisition,
shifting of utilities, environmental and inter-ministerial clearances, shortage of funds,
litigations over land acquisition, etc.
1. Uneven Regulatory and Policy Frameworks: India lacks a "common
regulatory philosophy guiding the evolution of regulatory institutions
(Government of India, Planning Commission, The Secretariat for the
Committee on Infrastructure, 2008)." As discussed in Chapter 4, only the
Telecommunications and Electricity industries have experience with
Independent Regulatory Institutions. In addition, the Airports sector has a
new regulator (Aera) and the Ports sector has a regulator whose role is
limited to setting tariffs. The other sectors are still under the control of
National Ministries and State Departments. Even among sectors that have
independent regulators, there are significant points of departure in scope,
rules, practices and legitimacy.
2. Land Acquisition: Since most tracts of land in India lack clear title deeds and
farmers are increasingly opposed to use of land for industrial and
infrastructural uses, land acquisition is consistently cited as one of the
biggest hurdles for infrastructure development In most projects, either
project commencement or project execution is delayed for want of land
clearances. For instance, "70 per cent of delays in the country's highway
building program stem from difficulties both in acquiring land and then
obtaining permissions to use it for the intended purpose (Kazmin, 2009)."
The Chairman of India's Planning Commission - Montek Singh Ahluwalia
(2011) expresses concern over this "major problem which needs urgent
attention." He brings attention to two major issues: 1) The "hopelessly
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outdated" Land Acquisitions Act (1894), which "provides for highly
inadequate levels of compensation often well below true market prices," and
2) Non-transparent mechanisms for grant of permissions for land
development, which "inevitably lead to suspicion of corruption and
cronyism." Lack of coordination between central bodies, states and local
authorities further compound the difficulties.
For a detailed discussion of the problems associated with land acquisition in
India and a comprehensive discussion around suggested remedies to the
problem, please see India Infrastructure Report 2009 (Mohanty et al., eds.,
2009), which is entirely dedicated to this issue.
3. Multiple Clearances and Nebulous Bureaucracy: Infrastructure projects in
India require active cooperation across several departments. For example,
project implementation, shifting of power lines, water lines, sewer lines,
cutting of trees, environmental clearances and other such activities are
performed by different departments. Thus, timely project delivery depends
upon joint and timely efforts across departments; laxity on the part of just
one department or dereliction of duty by a few officials can hold up the entire
project. "However, interdependence of efforts means that it is easy for
departments to shirk responsibility and pass the blame on to others. So, in
addition to intra-organizational failures, infrastructure projects in India are
vulnerable to inter-organization failures (Singh, 2010)."
The World Bank (2006) reports that the time taken to obtain all the requisite
approvals for an infrastructure project in India can vary between 18 months
to as much as four to five years. It notes that efforts on the part of state
governments to establish "single window clearance" have largely been futile
since "when most projects apply for approvals at the state-level, these have
to go through multiple clearances at various levels."
4. Finance: India faces a number of macroeconomic and institutional issues
limiting its financing capability to build the required infrastructure. A high
profile report on Infrastructure Finance solicited by the Ministry of Finance
outlines these challenges and proposes solutions (Government of India,
Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs, Infrastructure Division,
2007). The challenges include limited availability of risk capital, limited long-
term borrowing capability in the domestic banking sector, high public debt
levels at around 80% of GDP (Business Monitor International, 2011b),
restrictive infrastructure sector exposure norms for commercial banks, and
regulatory and other restrictions preventing access to debt from insurance
companies and pension funds, among others.
5. Lack of Key Inputs: The infrastructure sector is hampered by the low levels
of mechanization and limited use of modern technological equipment, low
levels of domestic expertise in project management and civil engineering,
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and shortage of key inputs such as petroleum, coal and natural gas. In fact,
the power sector is likely to experience a quarter shortfall in capacity
addition during the current Plan period (2007-12) owing to shortages in fuel
supply (Government of India, Ministry of Finance, 2011a).
The Starting Point
In order to develop a governance strategy to facilitate public private partnerships,
one needs to first recognize and appreciate the current state of affairs. Key
characteristics that describe the starting point include:
e The vicious cycle: People throughout the country, with the possible exception
of rich neighborhoods in the top-tier cities, are used to extremely poor service
levels for infrastructure services, even those that are considered essential, such
as water, sewage, waste management and electricity. Thus, people are in general
opposed to paying rates that are necessary to provide even mediocre service
levels for services that are well below par. Tariff levels as a result remain low,
sometimes below cost; service providers are thus unable to recover their
investments and improve services.
Figure 3: Vicious Cycle of Infrastructure Services
Public sector companies and agencies that are responsible for providing these
services remain heavily debt ridden and dependent upon subsidies and grants for
their survival. For instance, State Electricity Boards (SEBs), which still account for
the bulk of electricity supply in India with a 48% market share in generation, 60% in
transmission and 95% in distribution (Government of India, Ministry of Power,
Central Electricity Authority, 2011a), have been charging lower tariffs than the
average cost of supply, as a result of which all but three out of 22 SEBs are loss
making ventures. Over the years they have consistently contributed to 10-15% of
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state fiscal deficits, received subsidies amounting to Rs. 194 billion (US $4.3 billion),
and accounted for losses amounting to Rs. 610 billion (US $13.5 billion) in 2007-08
(CRISIL, 2010). Service levels are even worse for water and sewerage.
Poor public perception of privatization: With this understanding of
dependence on government subsidies for survival, it is no surprise that tariff
levels rise with a move towards private sector involvement in infrastructure
service delivery. Such a change interferes with the reinforcing vicious cycle
depicted above and incites opposition from users, often culminating into violent
protests. This is especially true for services that people generally consider as a
"right," such as access to clean drinking water and sanitation. Thus, private
companies are seen as evil bodies that make profits at the cost of the poor. This
situation is far from sustainable.
Entrenched interests: The case in Bhiwandi, where the public colludes with
local representatives of public service providers and with local politicians to gain
access to cheap or free services, is replicated throughout the country. The public,
local officials, authorities and politicians have a unified objective to advance
their individual concerns, even at the expense of the general public good or the
rule of law. Thus, it is very difficult for private companies to measure up against
complex networks of entrenched interests.
* Threatened employees: The incumbents - public agencies and companies - are
typically overstaffed and face stringent firing rules. The system thus supports
millions of unskilled and semi-skilled laborers, technicians, engineers and
managers whose jobs are threatened by the entry of private players.
It is this environment of poor service levels, minimal collection of below-cost tariffs,
complex networks of entrenched vested interests and rampant theft and corruption
at all levels, to which the private sector offers to bring a lack of experience and
knowledge or local cultures and norms, a focus on profit maximization, and perhaps
some technical expertise.
The challenges are only complicated further owing to the presence of numerous civil
society organizations, NGOs and a rampant media waiting to expose facts and fiction
about the profit motives of the private sector and skewed personal incentives of
elected officials. Needless to say, a transition to private sector service delivery is
bound to be difficult
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Private Investment in Infrastructure
The Ministry of Finance recognizes that "rapid reduction of the infrastructure deficit
holds the key to competitiveness in an increasingly globalized economic
environment (Government of India, Ministry of Finance, 2011b)." It states that the
goal for infrastructure is to "make huge capacity addition in a time-bound manner
while ensuring that projects embody value for money and investment results in
world class infrastructure. Infrastructure should at the same time be affordable and
sustainable." To achieve this goal, the Planning Commission has called for a
substantial increase in investment in infrastructure.
The level of investment in infrastructure slumped from a peak of 6% of GDP in the
early 1990s to a 30-year low of 3.3% of GDP in 2003 (Infrastructure Development
and Finance Corporation, 2011). It since recovered somewhat to around 5.7% in
2006-07 but is still well below the required range of 7-8% to close the
infrastructure gap (Harris, 2008) and below the government's target of 9%
(Government of India, Ministry of Finance, 2011b).
Total spending on infrastructure during the Tenth Five Year Plan (2002-07)
amounted to $204 billion,14 24.5% of which came from the private sector. The Mid-
Term Appraisal for the Eleventh Five Year Plan projects a cumulative investment of
$456 billion during the Plan Period (2007-12), with 36.2% coming from the private
sector (Government of India, Planning Commission, 2011). Initial projections for the
Twelfth Plan (2012-17) put total investments at $1025 billion and the private
sector's share as 50% (Government of India, Ministry of Finance, 2011a).
In fact, India is among the leading nations in the world for private sector investment,
ranking above its developing countries competitors, as shown in Figure 4.
14Assuming an exchange rate of 45 Rs/$; based on Government of India, Planning
Commission (2007).
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Figure 4: Private Sector Investment in Infrastructure
Source: The World Bank Group (2011), Private Participation in Infrastructure Projects
Database, http://ppi.worldbankorg/. Last checked June 01, 2011.
Annual infrastructure investment in India during the Tenth Plan (1997-2002), the
current Plan (2007-2012) and the subsequent Plan period (2012-17), along-with
the private sector's share of these investments are depicted in Figure 5.
Figure 5: Infrastructure Investment Over Time
Source: Government of India, Planning Commission (2011); Government of India, Ministry
of Finance (2011a); the 10t and 12th Plan numbers represent annual equivalents
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The Electricity sector accounts for a majority of this investment (32% in the
Eleventh Plan), followed by Telecommunications (17%), Roads and Bridges (14%)
and Irrigation (12%). Among major sectors, private participation as a percentage of
total investment is highest for Telecommunications (82%), Ports (80%), and
Airports (64%) while it is almost non-existent for Irrigation, Water Supply &
Sanitation, and Railways. Electricity, however, accounts for the largest projected
private investment in aggregate terms with $64 billion, ahead of
Telecommunications with $63 billion. Figure 6 presents projected investment levels
across sectors and the expected private sector share for each sector.
Figure 6: Sector-Wise Investment During The Eleventh Plan (2007-12)
Source: Government of India, Planning Commission (2011)
Public-Private Partnerships
The Indian government has emphasized the importance of using public private
partnerships to provide much of the required private investments outlined above
and close the infrastructure gap. Top heads of government have repeatedly
highlighted the criticality of PPPs. For instance, India's Finance said that with
growing requirement of funds for the infrastructure sector, "PPPs (have
become)...an important pillar of our strategy for infrastructure development (The
Hindu, 2010)."
In fact, India has already become the top destination in the world for PPPs with a
740 reported projects at various stages of completion and a total projected cost of
$84 billion. The sector and state-wise break-up of these projects is presented in
Figures 7 & 8.
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Figure 7: Sector-Wise Distribution of PPPs
Source: Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs, PPP Cell
(2011)
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Figure 8: State-Wise Distribution of PPPs
Source: Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs, PPP Cell
(2011)
One of the main arguments advanced in favor of using PPPs to deliver infrastructure
projects is that this route leads to improvements in performance. However, for such
a massive PPP program, this argument seems to rest on shaky ground since the
evidence of improved performance via PPPs from around the world is inconclusive.
Table 8 summarizes the results of major studies comparing traditional (public)
delivery of infrastructure and delivery via PPPs:
Page 112 of 150
Table 8: Results From PPP Performance Evaluations
Study Method Findings
Public provision: on-time and on-
Mott Macdonald 39 traditional and budget 30% and 27% of the time
(2002) 11 PPP in UK PPP: on-time and on-budget 76% and
78% of the time
Allen Consulting 21 PPPs and 33 PPPs reported as being an 11%
Group (2007) traditional projects cheaper alternative to traditionalin Australia projects
88% of PPP projects were delivered
Standard and Global survey of on time and at cost while only 30% of
Poor's (2008) 100+ projects traditionally publicly procured (non-PPP) projects achieved the same
result
U.K. National Audit 7 Cases in UK 10-20% cost savings estimated
Office (1999)
there is no evidence to support
the Treasury cost and time overrun
Pollock et al Review of Mott claims of improved efficiency in PFI..
(2007) McDonald (2002) . [estimates being quoted are] not
evidence based but biased to favor
PFI ... [and] all claims based on [this]
are misleading.'
227 new road Ex-ante construction costs of PPPs
Blanc-Brude et al. sections (65 PPPs) were 24% higher than traditional
(2006) across 15 EU weec4rhg ent
countries procurement
Leviakangas Finnish toll-roads The hypothesis that private finance
(2007) case study enabled welfare gains to be achieved
was not confirmed
Source: Author, data excerpted from Hodge, G. and Greve, C. (2009), "PPPs: The Passage of
Time Permits a Sober Reflection," Economic Affairs, Vol. 29, No. 1, pp. 35-36, Table 1.
It is clear from Table 8 that we cannot justify PPPs based on the promise of
improved performance alone. The other main argument presented by proponents of
PPPs is that they provide value for money through the efficient allocation of risks
based on the principle that risk should be assumed by the party best able to manage
it However, there are many complications and imperfections in estimating value for
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money and to the narrow view of risk that the framework assumes (please see the
VFM discussion in Appendix 2 for a detailed explanation).
Despite this lack of concrete evidence around the benefits of PPPs, India has
established an elaborate institutional framework for their development and
delivery. This framework is outlined herein with a more detailed explanation of the
PPP process in Appendix 2.
PPP Institutional Framework
India has dedicated considerable resources towards establishing institutional and
financial support towards the formulation, appraisal, approval and management of
PPPs at the central and state government levels. The Finance Ministry has assumed
leadership in consultation with the Planning Commission.
1. PPP Cell in the Department of Economic Affairs (DEA), Ministry of Finance
(MoF): MoF is the nodal ministry to examine concession agreements from the
financial angle, assess risk allocation from investment and banking
perspectives, and extend guarantees where necessary (Government of India,
Comptroller and Auditor General of India, 2009). The PPP Cell undertakes
core implementation of PPP activities. It develops innovative schemes and
policies to support infrastructure PPPs, develops tools and guidance
documents to enable PPPs, and participates in project development,
structuring and appraisal. It administers the India Infrastructure Project
Development Fund (IIPDF) - a fund with an initial corpus of. Rs. 100 crore
meant to reduce PPP transaction costs for the project Sponsoring Authority.
The IIPDF provides interest free loans to cover costs such as those incurred
in respect of feasibility studies, environmental impact studies, financial
structuring, legal reviews and development of project documentation,
including concession agreements, commercial assessment studies (including
traffic studies, demand assessment, capacity to pay assessment), etc.
required for achieving technical closure for such projects (Government of
India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs, PPP Cell, 2008).
2. Planning Commission: The Planning Commission was set up in 1950 to make
efficient and balanced use of the country's resources and determining
national priorities. For PPPs, it plays the role of enabler by focusing on due
diligence and consistency with processes across sectors, and sharing best
practices. It prepares Model Concession Agreements for various sectors after
consulting the relevant Ministries to enable quicker and more even project
development. It houses the PPP Appraisal Unit (PPPAU), which evaluates PPP
project proposals and prepares appraisal notes for the PPP Appraisal
Committee (PPPAC) on all relevant issues including the concession terms.
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3. Committee on Infrastructure: This is the highest authority, which lays down
the PPP policy and procedures, and evaluates and grants final approval to
individual PPP projects. It is chaired by the Prime Minister, and includes the
Finance Minister, the Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission,
Ministers in charge of the respective Ministries, and two members of the
Planning Commission (Government of India, Comptroller and Auditor
General of India, 2009).
4. PPP Appraisal Committee (PPPAC): This Committee is chaired by the
Secretary to the Department of Economic Affairs (Financial/Risk Analysis
service) and includes Secretaries from the Planning Commission, Department
of Expenditure, Department of Legal Affairs, and the Department/Ministry
sponsoring the project under consideration. The Committee carries out
comprehensive and meticulous due diligence to address the risks attached to
the proposed project and addresses the need to secure "good value in terms
of performance standards, user concerns, public revenue and contingent
liabilities (Government of India, Comptroller and Auditor General of India
(2009)." It handles projects for which the capital cost or underlying value of
assets is more than Rs. 250 crore.
5. Sponsoring Ministry: The concerned Ministry may develop individual
projects using legal, financial and technical consultants, and submit the
proposal to PPPAC for 'in principle' clearance before soliciting expressions of
interest from prospective investors. If the PPP project is based on approved
Model Concession Agreements, such clearance is not necessary until the
bidding stages. The Ministry may provide additional grants or enter into joint
venture partnerships with private developers.
6. Empowered Committee/Institution: For PPP projects that make economic
sense but are not commercially viable on their own, the central government
has set up a Viability Gap Fund (VGF) to provide up-to 20 percent of a
project's costs, and allowed sponsoring Ministries to provide another 20
percent. The Empowered Committee, which is chaired by the Secretary of the
Department of Economic Affairs and has the Secretaries of Planning
Commission, Department of Expenditure and the sponsoring Ministry as
members, makes decisions to release funding via this mechanism. It is
empowered to sanction Viability Gap Funding (VGF) of up to Rs. 200 Crores
for each project.
7. India Infrastructure Finance Company Limited (IIFCL): The central
government set up IIFCL with the specific goal to provide long tenor debt to
commercially viable infrastructure projects (including those that receive
support through VGF). IIFCL issues subordinate debt that functions like
equity and also provides for refinancing to banks and financial institutions
for loans granted by them. It raises funds from both domestic and
international markets on the strength of government guarantees.
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8. Consultants: Government of India has identified and engaged financial, legal,
and other transaction advisors to aid in the structuring, development,
delivery and assessment of PPP projects.
9. State Institutions: Since most funds are disbursed through state agencies and
departments, PPP Cells have been set up under Departments of Finance in
State governments across the country. These are actively involved in
conducting similar activities as the central PPP Cell, such as providing
financial support, preparing modal documents, etc.
Figure 13 depicts details of this institutional set-up.
Summary
The lack of adequate and high-quality infrastructure services threatens to limit
India's economic growth prospects. Traditionally marked by a large share of public
involvement in financing and delivery, projects across India's infrastructure sectors
have suffered perpetual budget and schedule over-runs. Political intervention,
policy flip-flops and land issues, among others, have at times proved to be
insurmountable obstacles.
Yet, as discussed in this chapter, India has become a leading destination globally for
private sector investment in infrastructure in general and for the use of PPPs in
specific. It ranks ahead of competing developing nations such as Brazil, China and
Mexico in total private sector investment in infrastructure. Indeed, the Twelfth Five
Year Plan (2012-17) accounts for the private sector to supply 50% of the $1 trillion
in infrastructure investment over the Plan period.
India has put in place an extensive institutional framework to help formulate and
develop PPP projects across sectors. States have followed suit by institutionalizing
their own PPP Cells within Finance Departments. Forms of support available to
PPPs include development of standardized documents such as RFQs, RFPs and
M CAs, and financial support in the form of grants, interest free loans, and long-term
debt, among other efforts to create a supportive environment (see Figure 13). Most
of these levels of support, however, have been limited to up-front project
preparation and have paid less attention to governance of PPP projects over their
long lifetimes (apart from efforts to draft comprehensive long-term contracts).
It is critical to recognize that the business of infrastructure is about delivering
essential public services over time, not simply constructing physical assets
within ex-ante estimates of time and budget. Thus, success is not about signing
contracts, reaching financial closure, or putting the physical assets in place, but
about delivering the public service sustainably over time. Based on case studies and
extensive literature review, this thesis has characterized the key types of turbulence
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that projects face in Indian conditions and evaluated governance strategies that
have managed to navigate such turbulence. As shown in Figure 9, the focus has been
on shifting thinking from the traditional emphasis on the need for finance in the
short-term to the importance of public service delivery over the long term.
Figure 9: A Required Shift in Thinking
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Appendix 2: PPP Process in India
The PPP Cell in the Department of Economic Affairs (DEA) under the Ministry
of Finance in India undertakes core implementation of PPP activities in the country.
Similar cells have been set up in states across the country to facilitate preparation of
bankable state level PPP projects. These cells outline criteria for evaluating
proposed PPP projects and make available tools to test projects against these
criteria. For projects in which delivery via the PPP route is found to be suitable, they
have prepared model RFPs, RFQs and MCAs to streamline project development and
delivery.
The PPP Cells help identify risk assessment and allocation frameworks that can be
incorporated into long-term contracts based on sector, geography and the particular
project conditions. This section takes a closer look at the management of PPPs at the
central level in order to examine how and to what extent the current PPP
procurement and support process prepares projects to adjust to changes over time
that are typical in Indian conditions.
PPP Identification and Evaluation
The PPP Cell recognizes that the long lifetimes of infrastructure assets are
associated with high levels of risk and that a key feature of PPPs is risk allocation. It
operates on the principle that individual risks should be allocated "to those who are
best able to manage them (Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of
Economic Affairs, 2010)." For instance, it states that the private sector is better at
managing technical, construction and market risks while the public partner is
usually better at managing land acquisition risks. Thus, its aims to "pick out the
strengths (of public and private partners) and combine them together" such that the
"partnership of public and private parties is stronger and more efficient than either
party by itself."
In order to guide sponsoring agencies through the risk identification and allocation
process with a goal to "improve the quality and likely success of projects entering
the PPP development pipeline," the PPP Cell has prepared various tools as part of an
online Toolkit. These tools outline the main types of risks that infrastructure
projects face in various phases along with estimates of typical risk levels (high,
medium, low). Based on the theory that risks should be assigned to the party best
able to manage it, the PPP Cell provides template risk allocation mechanisms for
different types of projects.
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PPP Toolkit
The "PPP Toolkit" provided on the website http://toolkit.pppinindia.com/ contains
the following tools relevant to risk identification, assessment and allocation:
- PPP Suitability Filter: is made up of a series of questions about the
important factors that impact the suitability of the project for delivery as a
PPP. Many of the PPP project risks are identified at this stage and the long-
term uncertainty perspective seems to come into play here with questions
such as "Is there a high level political champion for the PPP?" and "Is there
support for the PPP in affected communities?" The answers to each question
are scored, and the final result from all questions is presented on a scale from
easy to difficult development of the project as a PPP.
- PPP Mode Validation Tool: uses a risk allocation analysis to help decide
whether the selected PPP mode is best for the project. It allows users to
specify their own preferred risk allocation, and compares this against the
typical risk allocations under the main families of PPPs (sector specific). It
highlights differences between the preferred allocation and the typical
allocations in order to encourage critical thinking.
If after such analysis a project is still considered suitable for delivery via an
identified PPP mode, it enters the PPP development pipeline, which includes a full
feasibility study culminating in an application for in-principle clearance by the
Appraisal/Clearance Authority (see Figure 13) and the procurement process
culminating in final approval and project award. Analysts engaged in the feasibility
study are required to assess all possible risks as applicable to the particular project
under study. The tools that assist analysis and decision-making at these stages are:
- Financial Viability Indicator Model: allows for a quantitative analysis of
the financial feasibility of the project. The analysis uses information gained
from demand forecasts, technical feasibility, and cost estimates along with
assumed PPP mode, capital structure, discount rates, debt repayment
schedules and sensitivity ranges on assumptions "designed to encourage a
careful consideration of probable outcomes." The outputs from this tool
include expected returns illustrated by indicators such as Net Present Value
(NPV) and Internal Rate of Return (IRR), and other summary financials. This
tool also allows for the testing of 'what-if scenarios.
- Value-for-money Indicator Tool: Value for Money (VFM) analyses aid
public agencies to determine whether to pursue a project as a PPP or via
traditional procurement. This tool provides for a quantitative test to compare
the estimated cost of procuring the project in the public sector with the
estimated cost of procuring it as a PPP. At the heart of this test is an
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evaluation of the value of the risks that are transferred from the public to the
private partner through the proposed partnership. The output provides an
indication of the expected range of value-for-money for the public sector
from the PPP.
Since proving value for money is a central assessment in moving a project forward
to the next stage of PPP procurement, it is important to recognize that "...the
emphasis on risk transfer can be misleading as value-for-money requires equitable
allocation of risk between the public and private sector partners, and there may be
an inherent conflict between the public sector's need to demonstrate the value-for-
money versus the private sector's need for robust revenue streams to support the
financing arrangements (Grimsey and Lewis, 2002)." This contentious concept is
therefore discussed in detail herein with a special emphasis on its limitations.
Value For Money (VFM)
Concept
"Value for money means the public sector is financially better off if the
project is done as a PPP rather than if it is done as a traditional public
sector project (ECAL and CRISIL, 2011)."
Value for Money (VFM) analyses aid public agencies in determining whether to
pursue a project as a PPP or via traditional procurement These are typically
conducted during the feasibility phase of a project. As in many other countries,
current practice in India justifies PPP projects based on the premise that the public
sector achieves "value for money" by transferring risks onto the private sector.
Unlike some countries (for example the UK, where PFI investment, once
affordability has been confirmed, is taken on VFM grounds alone (Morallos and
Amekudzi, 2008)), proving that the PPP project provides VFM is not an absolute
requirement for it to move to the subsequent stages of project development and
delivery. Rather, the purpose of the tool in India is to indicate the level of
uncertainty in estimates of value to the public sector. It is still a critical assessment,
as the VFM guidelines state: "If a project is not expected to provide VFM for the
public sector then the project should not be implemented as a PPP (ECAL and
CRISIL, 2011)."
Calculation
In India, VFM is assessed from the point of view of the Ministry of Finance or the
finance department of the sponsoring public authority in the following way:
Value for Money (VFM) = Cost of Public Sector Comparator (PSC) - Cost of PPP
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The net costs are estimated as the difference between all outflows (investment,
annuity payments, etc.) and inflows (taxes, tolls, etc.) affecting the public party. The
particular steps involved in assessing value for money are:
- Cost of PPP: This is expressed as a Net Present Cost (outflows - inflows)
based on the financial model for the PPP project, which is prepared as part of
the feasibility analysis. It includes all the payment commitments (annuities,
subsidies, grants, etc.) that the public partner would need to make in support
of the project and all the financial inflows that would be received by the
public partner (taxes, concession fees, up-front payments, etc.).
- Transferred Risks: This step involves estimation in financial terms of the
risks transferred onto the private party as part of the suggested PPP
agreement This is done by multiplying together estimates of probability of
impact and magnitude (cost) of impact for each risk and adding these up
across all risks. The public partner would face these costs if the project were
procured in the public sector.
- Cost of Public Sector Comparator (PSC): A PSC is a hypothetical risk-
adjusted costing based on the public sector as supplier for the same output
specifications as those prepared for the PPP. It involves a modified set of
inputs since the public party makes the investment (capital costs) and
obtains the revenues (user charges). The PSC also includes the expected
monetary value of the risk that is shifted to the private partner in a PPP
arrangement (the "Transferred Risks" component described above).
The PSC evaluation in other countries includes various adjustments to key
inputs such as financing charges, potential revenues sources and quantities,
competitive neutrality adjustments, corrections for optimism bias, and other
adjustments depending upon the particular assessment method utilized by
the appraiser.
Typical VFM tests arrive at point estimates for VFM (projects are approved if VFM is
positive) since they use just one monetary value for the risk that would be
transferred to the private sector in the PPP. The PPP Cell in Department of Economic
Affairs, however, has developed a VFM indicator that does not rely on point
estimates but includes ranges for uncertain parameters that provide an improved
indicator of the likelihood of the PPP to deliver value for money. There are three
scenarios of results for expected VFM:
- The range is all positive: This indicates that the project can be expected to
provide VFM;
- The range is all negative: VFM is unlikely;
- The range covers both negative and positive VFM outcomes: The focus
should shift to a careful qualitative assessment of the key risks and to
identifying mitigation alternatives for these risks.
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Figure 10 depicts a sample output from VFM analysis where VFM is uncertain:
Figure 10: Sample 'Value for Money' Test Result
Source: ECAL and CRISIL (2010), "India, Developing PPP
Toolkits, VFM Indicator Tool Note November 2010,"
http://toolkitpppinindia.com /pdf/VFM-Background-
user-guide.pdf. Figure 4, p. 12. Last checked July 01, 2011.
Limitations
Though the toolkit prepared by the PPP Cell in DEA is an improvement over
alternative VFM estimators that rely on point estimates as it recognizes
uncertainties in particular estimates of transferred risk, rationalizing PPPs based
on this indicator is still a highly subjective and potentially misleading practice.
Some of the shortcomings of this assessment are:
- Vulnerability to Bias: Estimating costs and benefits under different delivery
modes is not a straightforward and transparent exercise. It "heavily relies on
estimates made by the procuring agency and on the experience of the
person(s) conducting the analysis" since not all specifications are hard-
coded. Technical complexities of the financial methods challenge the limited
experience of analysts.
The analyst's discretion on some key uncertain inputs leads to a vulnerability
to bias. Grimsey and Lewis (2002) report "there may be an inherent conflict
between the public sector's need to demonstrate the value-for-money versus
the private sector's need for robust revenue streams to support the financing
arrangements" Similarly, based on a review of VFM appraisal practices from
around the world, Morallos and Amekudzi (2008) conclude, "Because an
outcome where the PSC proved to be more affordable than the PPP would
technically lead to the cancellation of the project, agencies may make slight
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adjustments to the VFM calculations despite a potentially large margin of
error to make the PPP seem cheaper."
Optimal Risk Allocation is a Highly Unlikely: With regard to risks, the PPP
Toolkit mentions: "if one knows what the distribution looks like one can use
it to indicate the outcome that might be expected (ECAL and CRISIL, 2011)."
Unfortunately we do not typically know what the distribution looks like and
it is thus highly improbable to account for all possible outcomes of a project.
Moreover, we do not always account for all the risks that could affect the
value of a project Thus, even if we knew precisely the spread for all
identified risks, a single unaccounted risk could have a bigger impact on the
project than the cumulative impact of the accounted risks. Value for Money
analyses are thus based on a false premise that optimal risk allocation
frameworks can be framed and value for money can be assessed based on
such a framework.
Choice of Discount Rate Affects Analysis: The choice of discount rate that a
procuring agency uses in discounting cash flows has a major impact on the
outcome of a VFM analysis. Current practices associated with key inputs to
VFM differ across countries and sector (ECAL and CRISIL, 2011). These
differences are reflected through the various guidance documents and tools
published internationally, with countries such as Australia, UK, South Africa,
and Canada adopting different approaches to a number of issues as
compared to India15 . Partnerships Victoria uses a risk-free discount rate of
3% plus a risk premium dependent on risk classification (low, medium,
high); UK's HM Treasury uses a risk-free discount rate of 3.5%; Partnerships
British Columbia uses the private sector weighted average cost of capital
(WACC); India and Hong Kong do not specify a particular discount rate; and
other countries justify their own practices.
There are several options for the use of discount rate and each has its own
caveats (Morallos and Amekudzi, 2008):
e Use the public sector's borrowing rate as the discount rate for the VFM
discounting cash flow analysis: This practice seems to ignore that the
revenue and cost streams and their associated risk characteristics are not
the same for the two procurement alternatives.
e Employ a risk-free discount rate and value risks in the cash flows:
Morallos and Amekudzi (2008) suggest that this method can be quite
difficult "because it still entails relying on practitioners' estimates of the
risk values to adjust the cash flows".
15 For a state of the practice review of VFM analysis using examples from Australia,
Canada, Europe, Africa and Asia, see Morallos and Amekudzi (2008).
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e Use a risk-adjusted discount rate: This method also presents some
difficulty "because identifying the market or systematic risks that are
transferred in a PPP model as opposed to a public procurement can be
complicated."
- The Harsh Reality of Contingent Risks: Owing to the essential nature of
infrastructure services, the public partner never fully absolves himself of any
risk that may adversely impact service delivery. Thus, despite an agency's
efforts to optimally allocate risks, "there will always be some risks that are
still held by the public sector and potentially the general public that are not
always factored into the VFM assessment."
In summary, this exercise is highly subjective and the inputs can be easily
doctored to produce the desired outcome. Thus, over-reliance on the VFM
indicator as a basis of PPP evaluation and decision-making should be avoided.
If an identified project manages to secure initial approval after going through this
evaluation, it moves on to the procurement and management stages, described
herein.
PPP Procurement and Management
Long-term contracts form the basis for most infrastructure PPPs in India. One
significant advantage of this approach is that it allows for competitive tendering,
promoting transparency in procurement and driving down overall costs owing to
competitive pressures. The PPP Cell in DEA and other state PPP cells provide project
procurement support to project sponsors in the form of model RFQs, RFPs, and
MCAs that become relevant after the project has passed the VFM test and achieved
in principle clearance.
Two-Stage Bidding
Project delivery via PPPs commonly involves two-stage bidding processes: RFQ
followed by RFP. The objective at the RFQ stage is to pre-qualify and short-list
eligible bidders such that only serious bidders can participate in the second stage. In
the RFP stage, "the bidders engage in a comprehensive scrutiny of the project before
submitting their financial offers (Government of India, Ministry of Finance,
Department of Economic Affairs, 2007)."
To reduce the time and promote transparency in procurement, the Ministry of
Finance has issued bidding guidelines for central sector projects in the form of
model RFQs and RFPs. Several state PPP cells use these or have issued their own
guidelines. Specific Ministries and other project sponsors amend the model
documents based on the characteristics of their particular sector and on specific
project requirements.
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The model RFQ seeks to streamline the process of soliciting qualifications for PPP
projects, and reduce the time and costs to all parties in doing so. It lays out the
essential elements that an RFQ should include - background information, bidding
process schedule and description, requirements from applicants (experience and
other requirements across technical, financial, and other capacities), criteria for
evaluation, and other guidelines.
The model RFP is generic. It lends transparency and predictability to the entire
process, allowing decisions to be made expeditiously. It provides guidelines for
inviting financial bids from pre-qualified and shortlisted bidders based on detailed
terms of the project that are specified in the Concession Agreement / Power
Purchase Agreement (PPA).
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Appendix 3: Indian Experience with
Regulation
Telecommunications
No infrastructure sector in India has grown as fast as the telecommunications
industry. The Indian mobile communications market has been growing faster than
its Chinese counterpart with a growth rate of 75% per year between 2002 and 2007
(Heymann et al., 2007) and an increase in telephone connections from around 76
million in 2004 (Government of India, Ministry of Finance, 2011) to more than 874
million telephone (wired and wireless) subscribers by June 2011 (Telecom
Regulatory Authority of India (2011). India is now the second largest
telecommunications provider in the world after China and telecom rates in India are
among the lowest in the world.
Some have attributed this unprecedented success in large part to the telecom
regulator - TRAI. Patel and Bhattacharya (2010) note, "TRAI has gone onto play a
notable role in the evolution of the sector." Others, however, have claimed that the
industry has succeeded not because of, but despite the regulator. Indeed, in his
account of the challenges to governance in India, Morris (2002) notes that the
telecom industry has been successful but only because "the powerful force of
technology overrode regulatory mistakes."
Starting Point
The Indian telecommunications sector was wholly government owned until the mid-
1980s. Public sector corporations were set up in 1986 to allow greater autonomy in
decision-making and to facilitate public borrowing. A number of efforts to
encourage private sector participation were taken starting in 1991 with de-licensing
and de-reservation of the telecommunications equipment manufacturing industry.
Shortly thereafter, foreign investment in telecom equipment manufacturing and
private investment in value added services were encouraged (Arun, 2003).
Other reform measures were perused under the umbrella of The National Telecom
Policy (NTP) of 1994, which required telephone services on demand, the
achievement of a universal service obligation, assurance of world-class service to
subscribers and the universal availability of basic telephone services. A new NTP
was issued in 1999 to alter some contentious issues related to license fees,
interconnections, etc. This enhanced the confidence of industry players to regroup
their efforts and embark on the next phase of growth. India has since attempted to
create a level playing field between private and public companies in various sub-
sectors within telecommunications (Arun, 2003).
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Both policy formulation and regulation, however, remained with the Department of
Telecommunications (DOT) until 1997.
Regulatory Details
In the face of rapid technological change, the government of India set up the
Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) in 1997 as the first independent
regulatory commission in India and vested it with powers to protect consumer
interests, fix tariffs, ensure compliance with license conditions, facilitate
competition and interconnection between operators, and settle disputes. Thus, it
was originally structured to perform both executive and judicial functions (Patel
and Bhattacharya, 2010; Arun, 2003).
Although TRAI divested the DOT of several regulatory functions DOT retained
policy-making, licensing, and operative powers within the same organizational
boundaries. Additionally, TRAI was not given responsibility to issue and revoke
licenses, but only to recommend them. In fact, the Department of
Telecommunications originally opposed TRAI's creation and contested its decisions
on key issues in court. For instance, it appealed a TRAI order that favored cellular
operators who alleged that DOT had unilaterally increased the tariffs for calls made
from ordinary telephone to cellular mobile phones, and requested to curtail the
scope and powers of TRAI. Owing to such differences and confusion over the
Authority's dual role as regulator and adjudicator, it could not make much headway
in its first few years.
Furthermore, although the composition of TRAI was to protect it from unnecessary
government intervention and provide functional autonomy, in the initial years TRAI
was not truly independent owing to the specific personnel chosen to staff its
leadership. Structurally, policy makers provided for fixed terms of five years for the
Chairman of TRAI and its members with the possibility of removal only on the basis
of a Supreme Court decision after a specific enquiry held by it into his or her
misconduct However, in practice, the majority of TRAI's members did not have a
background in communications and were not businessmen, economists,
industrialists, consumer activists or public policy makers. Rather, "the Minister for
Communications nominated members to the TRAI and most of these members were
former civil servants, who throughout their life were practitioners of the 'permit-
license-quota system'...(Arun, 2003)". In fact, even a serving member of the Telecom
Commission of the DOT was appointed to the TRAI.
These issues of lack of transparency in appointment of members, and the duality of
powers were dealt with under a legislative amendment of the TRAI Act in 2000. The
Act changed the nature, composition and powers of the regulatory commission. "A
sharp distinction was drawn between regulation and adjudication, by divesting
TRAI of its judicial powers by establishing a separate Telecom Disputes Settlement
and Appellate Tribunal (TDSAT) to rule on appeals against TRAI's decisions, and
Page 127 of 150
settle disputes between service providers, licensor and licensee, and service
provider and consumers (Patel and Bhattacharya, 2010)."
Despite these efforts, "it is evident that key decisions associated with entry,
licensing, and distribution of the spectrum frequency lie with the government, while
the TRAI maintains residual command over co-ordinating certain practices (Anant
and Singh, 2002)."
Post-Regulation Performance
Patel and Bhattacharya (2010) summarize the improvements in the
telecommunications sector since the beginning of reforms: "The former bleakness
typified by perennial underinvestment, outdated equipment and yawning unmet
demand under government-owned service providers has given way to
extraordinary growth and low prices in a competitive environment with substantial
private participation" The shift in the pace of increase in the number of subscriber
lines in India depicts a part of this improvement - the overall customer base
expanded by the same amount on average in each month of 2007 as the cumulative
expansion between 1960 and 1992 (Heymann et aL, 2007). The sector's
transformation is also seen in the fact that the private sector's network presence
expanded from 20 percent in 2003 to 70 percent in 2010.
TRAI has certainly contributed to this transformation by adopting a technology
agnostic stance and establishing a level playing field. For instance, it's unified
licensing proposal in 2003 allowed the price momentum from the mobile networks
to spill over to the landline networks. Furthermore, it let the competition establish
the technology that is most cost-efficient for a given region. In fact, India is one of
the few markets where there is active competition between the two major standards
in mobile telephony: Global System for Mobile (GSM) and Code Division Multiple
Access (CDMA). 'Resolution of this major (contestability) issue and continuing light
handed tariff regulation effectively gave free play to price competition, thus
instigating a quintupling of tele-density from 6.6 in 2003 to 35.7 in 2009 (Patel and
Bhattacharya, 2010).'
TRAI has played other critical roles in the evolution of this sector. For instance, it
has published consultation papers on a number of critical issues, promoted
transparency in consumer tariff plans, developed mergers and acquisitions
guidelines and monitored service parameters. Over the years, as competition has
emerged as a reliable and effective means to drive telecom call charges towards
marginal costs, TRAI has largely relinquish the onerous task of tariff setting except
in case of basic services in rural areas.
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Lessons
In summary, there is little disagreement around the fact that the telecom sector has
advanced significantly over the past two decades and that TRAI can partly claim
responsibility for this impressive turnaround. However, TRAI's contribution needs
to be taken in context of an environment in which it has had limited input into key
decisions related to the sector, and rapid technological improvement and other
efforts towards encouraging private participation have played a significant role.
Moreover, "major differences between the dynamic urban agglomerations and the
rural areas" still remain and "huge market potential still remains untapped
(Heymann et al., 2007)."
In evaluating the success of the telecom industry and extrapolating lessons to other
sectors, it is also important to keep in mind the unique attributes of the telecom
industry that make it more amenable to private participation and regulation.
Specifically, the fact that telecommunication services are not regarded as a 'right' in
the same way as water or electricity gives operators the freedom to operate on
broadly commercial terms with non-payment resulting in service cut offs. Moreover,
the required investments (i.e. sunk costs) are not as prohibitive as those in other
sectors.
Overall, the case of the telecommunications industry in India shows that regulation
has been positively correlated with vast improvements in performance, but that the
regulatory institution has faced significant challenges, had various shortcomings,
and other enablers have had a significant role to play. These are important lessons
for other infrastructure sectors in India that are looking towards regulation as a
panacea to their problems and the success of the telecom industry needs to be
evaluated in full cognizance of the unique attributes of the sector.
Power
The power sector is the largest out of all infrastructure sectors in India, accounting
for 32% of the total infrastructure investment called for in the 11th Five-Year Plan
(2007-2012) (Government of India, Planning Commission, 2011b). The Planning
Commission estimates that meeting its power sector goals during the 12th Five Year
Plan (2012-17) necessitates roughly $450 billion16 in investment and calls for 50%
of this funding to come private sources.
As of 2011, India has the world's fifth largest power generation capacity after the
US, China, Japan and Russia at 171,926 MW (U.S. Energy Information
Administration, 2011). State government owned generation plants produce the
16 $146.05 billion in the 11th Plan period and $300 billion in the 12th Plan period. See
Banerji and Mishra (2010).
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majority of this power with a 48% share; central government owned generation
plants produce another 31%. The generation sub-sector has experienced the most
significant private sector involvement, growing from 9% in 1999-2000 to 21% by
March 2011 (see Figure 11). The transmission network is mostly owned, operated
and maintained by the government with only a few noticeable cases of private
involvement17. Privatization of the revenue generating distribution system has been
targeted and successfully completed in a handful of jurisdictions but this too
remains largely a government-controlled activity18. In summary, private
involvement in the power sector is still very much at a nascent stage.
Figure 11: Central, State and Private Shares in Power Generation
Source: Government of India, Ministry of Power, Central Electricity Authority (2011),
"Executive Summary: March 2011," http://www.cea.nic.in/executive summary.html. Last
checked April, 21, 2011.
Starting Point
The Indian power sector has gone through tremendous regulatory change over the
past century - from a system of license raj to dominance by State Electricity Boards
(SEBs) to the recent emphasis on competition and private sector participation
governed by IRAs.
17The central and the state utilities own nearly 40 percent and 60 percent,
respectively of the total transmission lines of 2.7 million circuit kilometers. See
Government of India, Ministry of Power, Central Electricity Authority (2011b).
18 State Electricity Boards own nearly 95 percent of the distribution network in
India. See KPMG (2006).
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In 1910, the Indian Electricity Act created licenses for power-generating companies
and established companies with political influence received their initial licenses.
After independence, the Indian Parliament passed the Electricity Supply Act of 1948,
which placed State Electricity Boards (SEBs) in charge of generation, transmission,
and distribution. This arrangement put an end to private electricity development
because private entities that wished to build new assets were required to obtain
licenses from the SEBs, who did not want to create competition for themselves. At
the same time, however, the Boards lacked the resources to meet the country's
electricity needs. As a result, India suffered a peak deficit of 12.2% in 2003 and has
consistently suffered from peak deficits higher than 10% (Government of India,
Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, Central Statistical Office,
2010). Moreover, India's SEBs have been in a perpetual state of financial ruin,
running commercial losses of Rs. 40 billion ($0.9 billion) in 1991-92 and a
staggering Rs. 610 billion ($14 billion) in 2007-08 (CRISIL, 2010).
Realizing that SEBs were not going to be able to efficiently deliver India's power
infrastructure, legislators framed The Electricity Laws (Amendment) Act, 1991,
whereby Independent Power Producers (IPPs) could establish and run generation
plants and sell the output to the SEBs through long term contracts. India provided
generous incentives and a fast-track approval process for large IPP projects to
achieve rapid capacity expansion.
This change, however, did not lead to an improvement in the sector's performance.
In fact, authors have referred to these reforms as "a cure worse than the disease"
owing to the slow capacity build up and the inefficiencies of reform (Mahalingam,
2005). Contrary to working towards the government's highest priority of closing
the gap between demand and supply, actual capacity addition as a percentage of
planned addition dropped down to the 50% level starting in the Eight Five Year Plan
(1992-97) (see Figure 12).
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Figure 12: Planned vs. Actual Capacity Addition
Source: Government of India, Ministry of Power, Central Electricity Authority and
Confederation of Indian Industry (2007),'White Paper on Strategy for 11th Plan,"
www.cea.nic.in/reports/planning/white paper strategy 11plan.pdf. Last checked April 28,
2011.
In an analysis of 41 IPPs from developing countries including 8 projects from India,
Phadke (2009) finds that the stated capital costs of negotiated projects (majority of
projects were negotiated rather than competitively bid) was on average 44-56%
higher than that of competitively bid projects. The author reports that this wave of
reforms suffered from the fact that efficiency gains from private participation were
not passed onto consumers and that a transparent and vigilant regulatory system
could have limited the extent to which capital costs were over-stated.
This disappointing experience with private participation prompted further reforms,
this time involving the creation of independent regulatory authorities.
Regulatory Environment
The Orissa regulatory agency, setup in 1996 with significant World Bank
involvement, was the first independent regulator in the power sector. Though it was
set up with the goal of balancing consumer and investor interest, the reality turned
out to be quite different. Mahalingam (2005) reports that while availability of power
in the state improved, reforms failed to improve accessibility (only 5.5 percent of
rural households in Orissa had access to electricity compared to a national average
of 55 percent), affordability (tariffs increased regularly and targeted consumers
who had the least ability to pay), or efficiency (T&D losses remained high and there
were no significant improvements in metering, billing or collection efficiencies).
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Encouraged by the World Bank, several other states passed similar reforms to
Orissa and eventually, the Electricity Act of 2003 replaced ad hoc experiments with
a uniform national framework and set the tone for a complete overhaul of the power
sector (Williams and Ghanadan, 2006).
This Act established the CERC and mandated that each state establish its own State
Electricity Regulatory Commission (SERC). The roles of these regulators include
tariff regulation, monitoring quality of service and compliance to regulatory orders,
redressing grievances, and advising the government on related matters (Ghosh and
Kathuria, 2011). Their primary role is to balance consumer and investor interests.
The Appellate Tribunal for Electricity was set up in 2004 to adjudicate disputes and
hear appeals from Central and State Electricity Regulatory Commissions.
All regulatory commissions have adopted public hearing practices to encourage
public participation in decision-making and some have even adopted more
information open-house sessions to discuss the issues in a more non-restrictive
manner. However, as discussed herein, stakeholder engagement efforts overall
remain weak.
Regulatory Experience: Positives
Despite the numerous shortcomings of electricity regulation in India, there have
been some positive developments:
- Regulation Helps Promote Transparency: CERC and many state regulators
regularly publish latest regulations and utility tariff orders online along-with
explanatory notes for the rationale behind the orders. Additionally, they
issue public notices, hold public hearings on proposed rules, publish market-
monitoring reports, meeting minutes, public tenders, and maintain a detailed
record of regulatory proceedings electronically. There is however, much
room to improve as Dubash (2008) notes, "Public participation procedures
enshrined in regulatory statutes have led to some transparency and
discussion, but neither have these been followed diligently, nor have they
been used to their full potential, in part due to the weaknesses of civil
society."
- Transparency Helps Regulators: In addition to instilling confidence in the
public and mobilizing support for regulation, transparency leads to improved
rulemaking. Moreover, transparency and resultant debates over the
consequences of state decisions place bounds on state action and thus help
insulate regulators from state influence (Dubash, 2005). Indeed, in their
analysis of regulation in the state of Andhra Pradesh, Ghosh and Kathuria
(2011) find that "a pro-active regulation is still possible when it sticks to the
text book prescriptions of following the standard procedures of
transparency. This allows all stakeholder groups to bring forth the discussion
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into the public domain thereby reducing the scope of the regulator being
captured by either the public or private interest groups."
- Regulation Benefits from Greater Public Participation: Diverse and
meaningful public input helps decision-makers consider different issues,
perspectives, and options when defining a problem and devising solutions.
Dubash (2005) finds inclusion of stakeholders to hold "the possibility for
regulatory spaces to be new and open sites for political contest."
Regulatory Experience: Limitations
India's experience with electricity regulation has been disappointing at best, as
politics has retained a significant influence on regulatory decision-making while
stakeholder involvement has been weak. Dubash (2008) critically explores
electricity regulation in India with special attention to the political, legal and
institutional contexts within which regulators operate. He concludes, "The original
hope that electricity regulators would function as some sort of island insulated from
politics appears to have been flawed in its conception." Dubash and Rao (2008)
provide insights into the critical flaws in the regulatory design. These include:
1. Staffing Issues: The authors find that an apolitical regulatory sphere cannot
be created merely by legislation. State regulatory bodies are often extended
branches of state governments since governments heavily influence selection
of regulators and staff, who mostly retired from high ranked government
cadre under the Indian Administrative Services (IAS). This tendency to staff
with retired judges and bureaucrats instead of professionals with required
expertise along-with restrictions on salaries and lack of adequate budgets are
serious systemic shortcomings. Instead, "Indian regulators need to be
innovative, far-sighted and politically savvy. They need to act quickly and
decisively (Bhatiani, 2002)."
2. Political Criteria Often Outweigh Techno-Economic Criteria: Regulatory
decisions are more influenced by politics than techno-economic criteria.
Ghosh and Kathuria (2011) report, "Decisions are often individual-specific,
variable and often entrenched in the political networks from which the staff
is drawn. Thus the process is heavily politicized and tied to electoral
outcomes resulting in a non transparent and imbalanced negotiation of
political pressures." For instance, following the decision to provide free
power to farmers in 2005, the state regulator in Tamil Nadu did not pull up
the state utility for its failure to file the required Annual Revenue
Requirement statement for fear of embarrassing the state government ahead
of the pending elections in 2006 (Dubash, 2005);
3. Stakeholders Engagement in Weak: Dubash and Rao (2008) note that
there is little progress towards stakeholder involvement wherein
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"independence is ensured not through isolation, but through being subject
equally to the voice and representation of all stakeholders." Dubash (2008)
elaborates, "Public participation procedures enshrined in regulatory statutes
have led to some transparency and discussion, but neither have these been
followed diligently, nor have they been used to their full potential, in part due
to the weaknesses of civil society."
In addition to design failures, Dubash (2005) highlights the fact that independent
regulation suffers from major complications in an environment where the state
owns and controls infrastructure assets. Ghosh and Kathuria (2011) elaborate, "the
regulation of state owned generation and distribution utilities is an 'idiosyncrasy' in
that it is a strange case of'a state agency regulating another state agency'."
The following examples are evidence of this particular danger:
1. Free Power to Farmers: Starting in mid-2004, a number of important states
including Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra, Haryana and Punjab
reinstituted provisions for free power and/or a number of other electricity
concessions to farmers. Though regulators are meant to insulate tariff
determination and other economic decisions from political system,
regulatory institutions in these states "chose to interpret government action
as a policy position over which they had no control (Dubash, 2005)."
2. Political Control over Utility Decisions: State governments exercise
control over distribution companies by asking them not to file for tariff
revisions at politically inconvenient moments and over state owned
generating companies by asking them to slash their rates even at the expense
of incurring losses so that no tariff revisions are necessary.
3. Regulatory Leniency: Though penalizing rouge utilities is important to
bring discipline, utilities have largely been able to ignore the directives of
regulatory bodies without penalty. Bhatiani (2002), for instance, notes,
"there is not a single instance in our knowledge where a utility and its
management have been penalized for failures to meet the directives given in
tariff orders".
For detailed guidance on the design of regulatory institutions with emphasis on the
highest standards of governance, please refer to the Electricity Governance Toolkit
(Dixit et al., 2007), a publication of the Electricity Governance Initiative - a
collaborative initiative of civil society, policymakers, regulators, and other
electricity sector actors to promote the open, transparent, and accountable decision-
making processes.
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Appendix 4: Detailed Case Studies of
Troubled Projects
Delhi International Airport Limited: Regulatory and Policy Flip-Flops
Basics
Increasing passenger and cargo traffic over the years led to saturation at many
airports across India, including the Indira Gandhi International Airport (IGIA) in
Delhi. IGIA was an embarrassment as a first welcome for a growing number of
international travelers to the metropolitan capital of the country. Thus, the decision
to restructure and modernize IGIA to world-class levels was taken in 2006 under a
30-year concession and lease agreement (extendable for another 30 years).
A new joint venture company - Delhi International Airport Private Limited (DIAL)
was entrusted with this responsibility. A private consortium (GMR group, Fraport
AG, Eraman Malaysia and IDFC) contributed 74% of the equity while the rest 26%
rested with the public sector representative - the Airports Authority of India (AAI)
(World Economic Forum, 2010). In return for rights to control revenue during the
operations of the airport, the private developer committed to capital investments,
an up-front payment to the government, and a revenue sharing agreement with a
45.99% government share of gross revenue (Government of India, Ministry of Civil
Aviation, 2006).
DIAL's revenue is made up of two main elements:
1. Aeronautical charges: These are fees for landing, aircraft parking and
hangars, and passenger service. For DIAL, these charges were to be regulated
by the Ministry of Civil Aviation for three years and by the Airports Economic
Regulatory Authority (Aera) thereafter if it came into existence.
2. Non-aeronautical charges: These are revenues from activities such as cargo
handling, aircraft maintenance, advertising, duty-free retail sales, car parking
facilities, real estate development, food and beverages, etc. These fees were
to be left unregulated with DIAL reserving the right to charge for its services
on a competitive basis.
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The project enjoyed strong support form commercial banks owing to demonstrated
sector knowledge on behalf of the private sector partners, strong revenue forecasts
and the stable revenue structure.
Regulatory Background
Indian airports were managed by the Civil Aviation Department within the
Government of India prior to the creation of the International Airports Authority of
India (IAAI) in 1972 and the National Airports Authority (NAA) in 1986. These two
authorities were then merged to form AAI in 1995 for better management of all
airports in India by a single authority.
An independent regulatory authority (Aera) was set up in 2009, after the Delhi
airport was already well under construction. The envisioned functions of this
authority were to monitor and assess service quality performance standards set by
the government and to review and assess capital and operating expenses.
Unforeseen Impacts
The shift in power from the Ministry of Civil Aviation to the new regulator Aera
threatens the private operator's business. Referring to this situation, Paul (2011)
remarks: "[T]he advent of Aera has changed the dynamics of the aviation business
almost overnight." Potentially devastating impacts to the majority shareholder, GMR
Infrastructure could occur in two ways:
1. Reimbursement for cost escalation: The project was delivered in a record
time of 37 months but experienced a cost escalation owing to the need for
new mini-projects (a low cost terminal and an underpass) along the way. The
new regulator Aera is to determine whether the government, civil society or
the developer should pay for the uncovered escalation, amounting to roughly
15% of the project costs. Since GMR has already incurred these costs, it could
suffer from a big financial setback if Aera decides not to reimburse the
amount
2. Revenues for cost recovery: In the agreement with the government
(represented by AAI), there was some uncertainty as to the details of the
revenue sharing agreement (mostly relating to the government's share from
non-aeronautical revenues) and the cost base used to determine the
aeronautical tariffs (whether to include non-aeronautical capital costs)
(Pandey et al., 2010). Aera now plans to include non-aeronautical revenues
within its ambit and its current thinking regarding these issues threatens to
drastically impact the private partners' returns.
With help from the law ministry, Aera has made sure that its rulings on airport
revenues would overrule any prior contractual agreement - even if they were with
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the government "This simply mean(s) that the government's promises and GMR's
assumptions in the Delhi airport project (are) invalid if Aera (doesn't) agree with
them (Paul, 2011)."
These 'regulatory hurdles and policy flip-flops' could make GMR Infrastructure's
business unviable. This uncertainty has already contributed to a 50% drop in GMR
Infrastructure's stock value over one year. Similar policy 'flip-flops' have landed
businesses in other infrastructure sectors in trouble as well.
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Karur Bridge Project: Bad Forecasts and New Government Opportunism
Basics
The Karur Toll Bridge was to be a 14-year Design-Build-Operate-Transfer (DBOT)
agreement involving East Coast Construction and Industries (concessionaire), Karur
municipality and Tamil Nadu Urban Development Fund (TNUDF). This was a high
profile project as it was the first toll bridge contracted by an Urban Local Body
(ULB) in India (Collaboratory for Research on Global Projects, 2005).
Unforeseen Impacts
The target financial rate of return for the project was 18% but even the hurdle rate
of 14% was not achieved since actual toll collections were only 70% of projections
(The World Bank, 2005). Moreover, Tamil Nadu experienced heavy rains during the
northeast monsoon of 2005 resulting in unprecedented floods, which caused
extensive damage to the approach roach to the bridge. This was considered a
"breach of obligation" on part of the private concessionaire (Government of Tamil
Nadu, Municipal Administration and Water Supply (MA3) Department, 2008). The
Highways and Rural Works Department took over the bridge, restored it for public
use, and stopped the collection of tolls in the public interest Despite the fact that the
concessionaire was willing to repair the damage on the approach road and absorb
the costs for doing the same, the Karur Municipality did not give them that option.
As Mahalingam (2010) summarizes: "...a newly elected municipal government
unilaterally cancelled the concession agreement on the pretext of a damaged
approach road without compensating the concessionaire". Since the concessionaire
had substantial debt obligations respect of this project, premature termination of
the BOT contract put them into severe financial constraints besides creating a lack
of confidence in the financial institutions of the concessionaire's ability to
participate in future BOT ventures.
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East Coast Road Project: Government Reneges on Promises
Basics
The Tamil Nadu Road Development Company (TNRDC) was formed in 1998 as a
joint venture company with equal equity participation from the Tamil Nadu
Industrial Development Corporation - the investment arm of the Government of
Tamil Nadu - and infrastructure development and finance company IL&FS to
improve state infrastructure. One of the projects involved repair work and widening
of the East Coast Road (ECR) - an important State Highway connecting the cities of
Chennai and Pondicherry. TNRDC was to charge tolls to road users to recoup their
investment and the toll rates were to increase by 8% every year to combat inflation
(Delhi et al., 2010). The concession agreement was signed in December 2000 and
civil works were completed by December 2001, within time and cost (Infrastructure
Leasing & Financial Services, 2005a).
Unforeseen impacts
Toll collection commenced in March 2002. Involvement of the government helped
the project navigate initial toll-compliance related problems as the state
government made a one-time grant to the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) in
exchange for exempting local residents and three wheelers from paying the toll.
However, the project soon landed in financial trouble owing to political decisions.
The Government of Tamil Nadu "banned the quarrying process on environmental
grounds, dramatically reducing the number of trucks using the ECR (Delhi et al.,
2010)," whereas trucks transporting sand to and from quarries located along the
road constituted a significant user-base of the toll road. Furthermore, the
government reneged on its commitment to increase annual toll rates by 8% because
of "political compulsions" (Thillai et al., 2010). The project was therefore stuck with
high debt servicing costs and revenues from other projects had to be mobilized in
order to keep the consortium afloat
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Tirupur Solid Waste Management Project'9: Waste Today, Gone Tomorrow
Basics
Tirupur Municipal Corporation decided to engage a private operator in a 20-year
PPP to finance, construct and operate a waste management plant, including a
composting facility for organic waste. The Municipality agreed to provide a daily
minimum of 100MT of mixed waste (Delhi et aL, 2010).
Unforeseen Impacts
In 2000, the Government of India enacted Municipal Solid Waste Management laws
that directed municipalities to supply only segregated waste to composting facilities.
Based on these rules, the original agreement to provide 100MT of mixed waste was
no longer feasible and the municipality sought to re-write the contract The case is
currently under arbitration while the "composting plant is not being used and the
municipal solid waste continues to pile up outside Tirupur (Delhi et al., 2010)." This
is thus another example of the "policy flip-flop" discussed in the context of the Delhi
International Airport
19 Since the sector does not have a formal regulator, laws governing the 'rules of the
game' in the sector are considered a form of regulation.
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Latur Water Supply Project: The "Right" To Water Incites Agitation
Basics
Owing to the inability of the Latur Municipal Corporation (LMC) to operate and
maintain the water supply system and provide water to its 350,000 citizens,
Maharashtra Jeevan Pradhikaran (MJP), the nodal agency responsible for
development and regulation of water supply and sanitation in Maharashtra, was
entrusted with this responsibility for 30 years. MJP in turn entered into a hybrid
management / affermage / concession contract in 2008, which was the first source-
to-tap integrated management contract being executed through a SPV.
Unforeseen impacts
This concession faced intense local opposition leading to delay of transfer of assets
and commencement of contract. Expressions of public opposition involved
formation of an Opposition Committee, which started a severe agitation campaign
against what they termed "privatization of water supply." Agitators vandalized and
closed down the LWMC office in Latur despite state government support for the
project 20
20 Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs, "Case
Studies: Latur Water Supply Project," PPP Toolkit for Improving PPP Decision
Making Processes, http://toolkit.pppinindia.com/solid-waste-
management/module3-rocs-lwsp 1 .php?links=lwsp1. Last checked March 04, 2011.
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Timarpur-Okhla Integrated Municipal Solid Waste Management Project: Not In My
Back-Yard
Basics
Despite having the highest per capita income in the country, Delhi is facing a waste
management disaster with its antiquated landfills rapidly filling-up. This project was
envisioned to divert waste from these landfills and generate valuable end products
such as electricity and organic fertilizer. The project involves setting up plants to
convert municipal solid waste (MSW) into refuse derived fuel (RDF), a
biomethanation plant capable of handling green waste, a water recovery plant and a
power plant to turn RDF into electricity.
Unforeseen Impacts
This 25-year BOOT agreement has already been delayed by more than a year owing
to public opposition based on environmental and other concerns. The prevailing
sentiment is that the affected public was not afforded a voice at the table during the
initial project consultations and emissions from the plant are unacceptable to the
residents of the area.
Meanwhile, there is an alternate proposal to process the city's municipal solid waste
in a more decentralized fashion. Such a practice could potentially result in only 20%
of the waste being available for this project (Dunu, 2011). The future of this critical
project this remains uncertain.
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New Delhi Water: Public Opposition Crushes Private Participation Effort
Basics
The condition of Delhi's water utility was among the worst nation-wide when it was
being considered for privatization. Intermittent water supply, low coverage
(especially amongst the poor), and limited collection of what were already the
lowest tariffs among all metropolitan regions marked the state of the Delhi Jal Board
(DJB) - the government agency responsible for the supply of potable water for most
of Delhi.
Road to Private Participation
The government engaged a consulting firm, Pricewaterhouse Coopers (PwC) with
financial support from the World Bank in order to identify a solution to its water
woes. Upon PwC's recommendation, the government decided to engage private
water companies in pilot management contracts for two of its 21 water zones for a
five-year period. The private contractors were to receive fixed-fees plus
performance based bonuses in return for their technical and managerial expertise in
service provision while the assets, staff, revenues, and tariff regulation would remain
with the DJB.
Unforeseen Impacts
A local citizen's group, Parivartan, whose mission was "fighting corruption and
ensuring just transparent and accountable governance" alleged that the project
would lead to higher tariffs and accused the government of ignoring the needs of the
poor neighborhoods (Lee and Singh, 2009). It further asserted that private
management contracts were an abrogation of government's responsibility. In
partnership with other NGOs and community groups, Parivartan mobilized public
opposition against private involvement in water supply. In the face of such
opposition, the Chief Minister of Delhi had to eventually abandon this move towards
private participation.
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Narmada Dams: Public Opposition Leads to Big Changes and Long Delays
"The Narmada Dams controversy provides apt demonstration of the
ways that large physical infrastructure projects can generate strong
contentions among their many stakeholders (Peterson, 2010)."
Basics
A set of large dams was first envisioned in 1947-48 to be built on several sections of
the Narmada river in order to "supply irrigation and drinking water to the drier and
drought-prone parts of Gujarat (later extended to equally dry Rajasthan) and to
supply hydroelectric power to all three riparian states (Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh
and Maharashtra) (Conca, 2005)." The main controversy surrounds the Sardar
Sarovar Dam at Navagam in Gujarat, but also include several dams at various points
in Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra.
Unforeseen Impacts
Proposals to build large dams on the Narmada inspired political controversy from
the very beginning. Starting in the mid-1980s, however, the controversy took upon
transnational aspects. Peterson (2010) reports: "massive rallies of villagers from the
19 affected villages got enough publicity to come to the attention not only of the
government but also of international aid groups including Oxfam and the World
Bank."
Grounds for Contention
- Lack of Public Participation: Inadequate public information and
participation in project conceptualization, definition and design.
- Inadequate Resettlement and Rehabilitation: Displacement of indigenous
populations (adivasis2l) and inadequate land/cash compensation.
21Adivasis are treated as a distinct category and provided with special legal
protection under several Indian laws for maintenance of their traditional communal
ways of life.
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- Foreign Involvement: Opposition groups attracted people who believed
that the involvement of multi-lateral international organizations in the
projects was against their interest, since their funding comes from developed
countries who are looking to pursue their own agenda whether or not it is in
the interest of the host countries.
- Miscellaneous: Environmental impact (wildlife, forests, etc.), safety,
technical reasons, and any other reason they could find.
Forums for Expression of Discontent
These include prominent social figures, voluntary associations, community action
groups and NGOs. Prominent and vocal stakeholder groups included:
- Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA): The NBA was formed in Maharashtra in
1989 and later spread to include 150 affiliates in other parts of India and
organizations of supporters abroad. It organized village committees in the
areas of Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra that would be affected by Sardar
Sarovar and other dams on the Narmada, registered its opposition to the
Narmada Project on human rights and environmental grounds and staged a
series of demonstrations, road blockades, and sit-ins against its continuation.
Social activist Medha Patkar became the central figure in the Narmada
Bachao Andolan. "The efforts of NBA to seek social and environmental justice
for those most directly affected by the Sardar Sarover Dam construction
feature prominently" in an award winning film: A Narmada Diary (1995).
- Lokayan: An organization founded by social scientists seeking to link
researchers with activists, policy makers and ordinary citizens affected by
development projects;
- SETU: A non-profit organization intended to build leadership within
marginalized communities so they could carry out their own struggles;
- Lok Adhikar Sangh: A civic organization specializing in legal assistance to
the poor;
- Action Research in Community Health and Development (ARCH) and Vahini:
Engaged in providing social services in adivasi communities.
Each of these groups and many others took advantage of opportunities to mobilize
the local public and transnational groups on issues that formed the foundations of
their own objectives.
Changes Resulting from Opposition
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- Project Reconsideration: The NBA succeeded at getting Prime Minister V.P.
Singh to agree to reconsider the Narmada Project in March 1990 and got
several other concessions from various governments.
- Elimination of World Bank funding: By 1989, campaigners were
demanding that the World Bank, which was considering $440 million in
additional loans for the Sardar Sarovar Project -either force modification of
or refuse to support the project. The World Bank faced strong pressures on
both sides. There were several reasons to both approve the loans (to
maintain relations with central and state governments and to further their
development objectives) and refuse the loans (internal stakeholder
opposition to the project, growing NGO influence, legitimate environmental
and social concerns). Ultimately, the state and central governments decided
to proceed without World Bank support.
- Oustee compensation: ARCH-Vahini battled with the Gujarat government
about the inadequacies of the tribunal resettlement provisions. After several
years of oustee organizing and demonstration, the Government of Gujarat
in1987 "offered a revised resettlement package that improved the terms and
also included landless and encroachers among the beneficiaries (Peterson,
2010)."
In many ways, this landmark project epitomizes the force of the masses in India and
the impact it can have on infrastructure and industrial projects. Many other projects,
such as the cancelled Tata Nano plant in Singur, West Bengal and the Posco plant in
Orissa, have faced similar stiff public opposition, largely surrounding issues
concerning land acquisition.
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Appendix 5: Cases of Stakeholder
Involvement
Case Study: Community Solar Power Plant22
Scatec Solar, a Norwegian company partnered with Development Alternatives (DA),
an Indian non-profit working in the field of creating sustainable livelihoods, to pilot
the Community Solar Power Plant (CSPP) project in two villages: Rampura and
Gopalpura in Jhansi district, Uttar Pradesh. The project leveraged the participatory
processes and utilizes the two levels of stakeholder governance discussed above to
build power plants for electrifying villages.
The partnership created a Village Energy Committee (VEC) and entrusted it with
responsibility for the construction, operation and maintenance of the power plant.
The VEC includes members from all sectors of the village community. DA, the project
facilitator, mobilized the villagers and trained the VEC so that ultimately, plant
operations and maintenance would be locally owned. Scatec Solar funded the
project and provided technical expertise.
Initially, DA, which had previous knowledge in the local environment, mobilized
villagers and cleared their misconceptions regarding solar energy. It organized
various workshops to build awareness about the environmental, economic and
social benefits of solar power. It held meetings with local government agencies,
district administration and the villagers to enable open dialogue on the topic. It even
introduced an innovative game of 'saap sidhi' (snakes and ladders) to explain how
taking certain positive measures, like the use of solar electricity, could help village
life 'move up the ladder'.
The VEC in Rampura effectively executed the entire project and the village
community extended their whole-hearted support.
Case Study: Ghana Urban Water Project
Ghana's urban water project utilized these two levels of stakeholder governance and
was successful in introducing private sector participation to a situation where only
51% of the population had access to improved water supply and less than 40% to
sanitation services. The strategy included elements such as solid opinion research to
establish benchmarks for goal setting, a Public Education and Communication
2222 Author, based on data from Kedia, S. (2011), "Community Solar Power Plant
Project - Jhansi," One World Foundation India,
http:/ /indiagovernance.gov.in/bestpractices.php?id=592. Last checked June 12,
2011.
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Program to spread awareness and understanding of policy goals, a Water
Communication Committee to ensure coordination and consistency across water-
related organizations, community rallies for Resident Associations, tailored
workshops and presentations to media, Members of Parliament, NGOs, women
groups, labor unions and religious interests; and production and dissemination of
TV documentaries and radio talk shows.
"The major outcome was the emergence of a pro-PSP coalition made up of some
resident associations, professional associations, and individual citizens." The new
culture of transparency and public oversight "helps to maintain confidence in the
system and keeps up the pressure for better service (Calabrese, 2008)."
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Figure 13: Institutional Selt-up for PPPs in India
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